The United Nations Rapid Deployment Police and Security Act of 2000
NewsMax.com
Sept. 6, 2000
106th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 4453 To encourage the establishment of a United Nations
Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
May 15, 2000 Mr. MCGOVERN (for himself, Mr. PORTER, and
Mrs. MORELLA) introduced the following bill; which was referred
to the Committee on International Relations
-----------------------------------------------------
A BILL To encourage the establishment of a United Nations Rapid
Deployment Police and Security Force.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the `United Nations Rapid Deployment
Police and Security Force Act of 2000'.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress finds the following:
(1) United States Presidential Decision Directive 71 calls for a
stronger United States response to maintaining order in
societies recovering from conflict. It aims to improve
coordination of United States efforts and to enhance the
ability of other countries, the United Nations, and regional
organizations to plan, mount, and sustain operations in support
of the rule of law.
(2) In a press briefing on February 24, 2000, Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright stated the following: `The recent slowness
in deploying desperately needed civilian police to Kosovo
provides only the latest evidence that present international
capabilities are not adequate. And the ongoing deployment of
CIVPOL teams to East Timor and Sierra Leone show that the need
will not soon diminish. In response, we must recognize that old
models of peacekeeping don't always meet current challenges.
Peace operations today often require skills that are neither
strictly military nor strictly police but, rather, a
combination of the two. The international community needs to
identify and train units that are able to control crowds, deter
vigilante actions, prevent looting and disarm civilian
agitators while, at the same time, winning the trust of the
communities in which they are deployed.'.
(3) In his April 2000 report, `We the Peoples, The Role of the
United Nations in the 21st Century', United Nations Secretary
General Kofi Annan states that only member nations of the
United
Nations can fix the `structural weakness of United Nations
peace operations . . .
Our system for launching operations has sometimes been compared
to a volunteer fire department, but that description is too
generous. Every time there is a fire, we must first find fire
engines and the funds to run them before we can start dousing
any flames. The present system relies almost entirely on last
minute, ad hoc arrangements that guarantee delay, with respect
to the provision of civilian personnel even more so than
military. Although we have understandings for military standby
arrangements with Member States, the availability of the
designated forces is unpredictable and very few are in a state
of high readiness. Resource constraints preclude us even from
being able to deploy a mission headquarters rapidly.'.
(4) The December 1999 United Nations `Report on the Independent
Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994
Genocide in Rwanda' indicates that in April 1994, the United
Nations Security Council failed to deploy 5,500 United Nations
peacekeepers to Rwanda within two weeks of the initial
violence, thereby allowing the conflict to escalate. The
6-month estimated cost of the deployment would have been
$115,000,000. Instead, the genocide consumed 800,000 lives
along with $2,000,000,000 in humanitarian aid.
(5) In Srebrenica, Bosnia, on July 11, 1995, Bosnian Serb troops
forced the retreat of Dutch United Nations peacekeepers who
were part of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (UNMIBH) from a `safe haven', resulting in the
massacre of 7,000 Bosnian civilians and expulsion of 40,000
Bosnian civilians.
(6) The United Nations peacekeeping budget estimate for the United
Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina from July 1, 1997,
to June 30, 1998, was $165,600,000, while the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO)-sponsored intervention in the
Serbian province of Kosovo cost $37,000,000 per day.
(7) In July 1999, 4,700 civilian police officers were requested to
be deployed to the Serbian province of Kosovo but, as of
April 17, 2000, the United Nations has deployed only 2,901 of
the requested police officers, resulting in the breakdown of
law and order and the escalation of unrest in Kosovo.
(8) In May 2000, Revolutionary United Front rebels in Sierra Leone,
in violation of the ceasefire and peace accords, captured and
held prisoner approximately 500 United Nations Mission in
Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) peacekeepers. The weapons, equipment,
and vehicles of the peacekeepers were also seized. The UNAMSIL
force had been deployed too slowly and was undertrained and
understaffed, consisting of only 8,700 peacekeepers of the
11,000
peacekeepers requested by the United Nations Security Council.
(9) On February 24, 2000, the United Nations Security Council
approved a United States-sponsored proposal to send 5,537
troops on an observer mission to the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (to be known as the United Nations Organization
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)), a
Republic 1/3 the size of the United States, to monitor the
implementation of the Lusaka accords. However, it will take at
least three months to deploy the required forces. On
April 25, 2000, South African Foreign Minister Dlamini-Zuma
urged rapid deployment of the troops and stated `[i]f
deployment is very slow [the accords] can fall apart . . .
The troops should have been deployed a long time ago.'.
(10) The United States has the power in the United Nations Security
Council to veto decisions that are not within the national
interests of the United States.
SEC. 4. ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNITED NATIONS RAPID DEPLOYMENT POLICE
AND SECURITY FORCE.
(a) ESTABLISHMENT- The President shall direct the United States
representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote,
and influence of the United States to urge the United Nations--
(1) to establish a United Nations Rapid Deployment Police and
Security Force that is rapidly deployable, under the authority
of the United Nations Security Council, and trained to
standardized objectives;
(2) to recruit personnel to serve in this Force; and
(3) to provide equitable and reliable funding for the United
Nations Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force.
(b) MISSION STATEMENT- The United Nations Rapid Deployment Police
and Security Force should have a mission statement that
provides for the following:
(1) The United Nations Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force
will engage in operations when--
(A) the United Nations Security Council determines that an imminent
threat to the peace requires a preventive deployment of forces
and the Security Council deems it as an appropriate response;
(B) the United Nations Security Council determines ongoing gross
violations of human rights or breaches of the peace require
rapid intervention by the international community and the
Security Council deems it as an appropriate response;
(C) peace has been restored to a region but the rule of law has not
yet been reestablished and when national civilian police or
United Nations member nations personnel are not available and
the Security Council deems it as an appropriate response; or
(D) the United Nations Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force
can utilize its personnel to help train the military and
civilian police of member nations of the United Nations to
better participate in international peace operations.
(2) The United Nations Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force
will consist of not more than 6000 personnel who are--
(A) placed under the authority of the United Nations Security
Council;
(B) under the direction of the Secretary General of the United
Nations;
(C) deployed only by United Nations Security Council resolution;
(D) volunteers from United Nations member nations employed directly
by the United Nations;
(E) trained as a single unit, appropriately equipped, expressly for
international peace operations including civilian policing; and
(F) rapidly deployable.
(3) The United Nations Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force
will be organized as a sub-department within the United Nations
Department of Peacekeeping Operations or under the control of
the United Nations's Military Staff Committee and will contain
personnel trained as military staff officers and civilian
police officers to be deployed immediately to a potential
conflict area.
(4) The deployment of the United Nations Rapid Deployment Police
and Security Force will be limited to a maximum of 6 months,
at which time the Police and Security Force would be replaced
by personnel supplied by United Nations member nations.
(5) The basing and infrastructure service of the United Nations
Rapid Deployment Police and Security Force will be leased from
existing member nations' institutions.
SEC. 5. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS RAPID DEPLOYMENT POLICE AND
SECURITY FORCE.
Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the
President shall prepare and transmit to the Congress a report on
the progress of negotiations with the United Nations and its member
nations regarding the creation of a United Nations Rapid Deployment
Police and Security Force described in section 3.
SEC. 6. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) The term `international peace operations' means--
(A) any such operation carried out under chapter VI or chapter VII
of the Charter of the United Nations; and
(B) any such United Nations operation that includes civilian
policing.
(2) The term `rapidly deployable' refers to the capacity to deploy
military or civilian personnel to a region undergoing conflict
within 15 days of the enactment of a United Nations Security
Council resolution authorizing a deployment.
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