WJPBR Email News List [EMAIL PROTECTED] Peace at any cost is a Prelude to War! SOLDIERS FOR THE TRUTH "DEFENDING AMERICA NEWSLETTER" 06 September 2000 - "The People Factor" "When we assumed the Soldier, we did not lay aside the Citizen." General George Washington, New York Legislature, 1775 "Our militia will be heroes, if we have heroes to lead them." Thomas Jefferson Soldiers For The Truth Foundation, PO Box 63840, Colorado Springs, CO 80962-3840 HTTP://WWW.SFTT.ORG *********************************************************** TABLE OF CONTENTS: SITREP from the President HOT BUTTONS! Hack's Column: "Military readiness is not a Political Game" "Through the Primary Gun Sight" Article 1 - Streamlined Units and Hardcore NonComs are the Cornerstone for Readiness Big Picture: Article 2 - Pentagon Divulges Military Readiness Article 3 - Tomorrows Grunts must be the Cream of the Crop Article 4 - Opinion -- Gore and Bush: Military Records Compared Voices from the Field: Article 5 -- Buffalo Battalion is Ready to Fight! Article 6 -- Navy: Another decent American Hung out to Dry Article 7 -- USMC: New Breed, Same Spirit - Marines in the 21st Century Article 8 -- NCO's in Today's Army Article 9 -- Air Force: "Warm and Fuzzy" Training takes precedence over Operations Security Article 10 -- Army: Aviator Recall Message Article 11 -- Miscellaneous Readiness Messages from The Frontlines Article 12 -- Quality of Life Update: "Bouncing Bill" Cohen, GAO and TRICARE, VA Linguists? Pay raise? G.I Humor: Article 13 -- GI HUMOR - Redneck Medical Terms Medal of Honor: Article 14 -- ZABITOSKY, FRED WILLIAM, Vietnam 1968. SITREP: 1. Main topics: 1) Readiness in political debate 2) Quality people are as important as superior equipment 3) Good things are happening 4) Voices from the frontlines 5) Quality of Life/Healthcare 2. Hot Buttons: A. The Polish Joke. I received a few complaints about using the Polish Virus joke for the newsletter. The joke wasn't intended to single our Polish veterans and patriots for public ridicule. Once again, I need to point out that the total political correctness attitude in our society has made us so sensitive that we are losing our ability to laugh at life and most importantly ourselves. If it comes to a sense of humor, I am a fan of Thomas Jefferson who insisted: " We had all rather associate with a good humored, light principled man than with an ill tempered rigorist in morality." B. The letters and donations are coming in. 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Other Methods of Support Check or Money order: Send to and make payable to: Soldiers For The Truth Foundation, PO Box 63840, Colorado Springs, CO 80962-3840. 5. REMINDERS: Your donation is tax deductible! SFTT is a 501 (c) 3 non-profit educational foundation, IRS # 31-1592564. If you send us an E-MAIL address with your donation we can immediately mail you a RECEIPT!!!! Multiple contributions: Please remind us when you submit your donation. We will send you a cumulative statement. "Crew Ready! -- LOAD SABOT - DRIVER MOVE OUT!" R.W. Zimmermann President SFTT [EMAIL PROTECTED] =========================================================== Hack's Column ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ "Military readiness is not a Political Game" ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ By David Hackworth Justin P.D. Wilcox resigned last week over the plague that's destroying our Army. He was a future George Marshall or Dwight Eisenhower. This nation's armed forces cannot continue to lose such dedicated patriots. Here, in his own words, is why he quit in disgust: "Listening to the secretary of defense and top brass dispute the Bush/Cheney readiness claims has reaffirmed my decision to leave the Army as a captain this month. I served for the past five years in a declining institution which needs urgent help from its top leadership. My decision to leave the Army stems from my refusal to live the 'readiness lie' portrayed by the nation's top leaders. "In the age of 'do more with less,' the most frequent topic of discussion for today's Army junior officer is the decision to leave the military. Accordingly, the top brass express their concern with the large numbers of captains departing the Army between four and six years of service. Their concern is so great that they surveyed majors with at least 10 years of service to discover why captains were leaving. It is hard to find out what is wrong when you really do not want to know. "I was excited to begin my Army career after graduating from West Point in June of 1995, but over the next five years my zeal diminished. I realized that the brass and political leaders expected 110 percent capability but resourced for 50 percent. I received soldiers from Basic Training who could not pass fitness tests, qualify with their weapons, or uphold basic discipline standards. "At Fort Bragg (N.C.), as a combat engineer in the XVIII Airborne Corps, my unit shot its weapons with live rounds only once a year for qualification and once a year for a live-fire exercise, due to ammunition constraints. Vehicles and equipment were rarely used during the months of August and September due to budgetary constraints at the end of the fiscal year. Newly fielded equipment did not meet the specifications of the equipment it replaced and only became reliable after at least two years of retrofits and recalls. (It is probably not known that from December 1998 until this summer, every new 2.5- and 5-ton vehicle on Fort Bragg, as well as the Army, could not be driven over 35 mph until retrofitted to prevent the drive shaft from dropping during movement and causing the vehicle to flip.) On a weekly basis, I saw more attention placed on landscaping and details in the unit area than on training soldiers in the field. "For those who claim these statements are merely subjective, I can offer further proof of the poor unit readiness I witnessed. For two years I participated in the unit readiness report for my battalion, as the project officer for the report and the head of battalion maintenance. Throughout the past year, maintenance or personnel issues have prevented achievement of top readiness ratings. "Excellence is no longer the standard. The pursuit of mediocrity has become the norm. When will a general officer finally lay his stars on the table and stand up to the current administration for his soldiers? "Junior officers stand where the 'rubber meets the road.' They have the responsibilities of preparing their soldiers for battle and ultimately to prepare them in such manner as to prevent casualties due to inexperience or lack of training. When the brass decide their objectives, the lieutenants and captains bear the responsibility of taking these objectives. "Retired Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf stated in his autobiography that a commander can delegate authority, but never responsibility. I realized that in the future I could be responsible for the deaths of too many men who could have been saved by proper training. "I was not prepared to sacrifice good men, knowing that their deaths could have been avoided. I could not in good conscience continue to live the lie of our current readiness. "When the next round of bloodshed by U.S. servicemen happens due to lack of preparation, the current brass and civilian/political leaders should be responsible for signing the following casualty notification letters: "Dear Mrs. Smith, I regret to inform you of the death of your son. His death is my fault, for I did not properly train him." Thank you for your rare courage, Captain Wilcox. *** Http://www.hackworth.com is the address of David Hackworth's home page. Sign in for the free weekly Defending America column at his Web site. Send mail to P.O. Box 5210, Greenwich, CT 06831. (c) 2000 David H. Hackworth Distributed by King Features Syndicate Inc. =========================================================== ARTICLE 1 - "Through the Primary Gun Sight" ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Streamlined Units and Hardcore NonComs are the Cornerstone for Readiness ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ By R.W. (Zimm) Zimmermann President SFTT 09/04/00 Why is it that most of our units are experiencing micromanagement, officers are focusing on how to get promoted and Command Sergeants Major are becoming co-commanders? The main culprits are outdated 1980's industrialized systems management and bloated, hierarchical organizations and staffs. Just look at the battalion task force as a key fighting organization that integrates on average four companies with three combat platoons each, and you recognize how cumbersome and bloated we are. All of the company's three platoons are led by Lieutenants, fresh out of OCS, WestPoint or ROTC, while their enlisted assistants, the platoon sergeants, are generally experienced NonComs in the grade of Sergeant First Class (SFC). The Lieutenants normally remain in their platoons for twelve months or less and move on to bigger and better assignments. With a few notable exceptions, they barely know small unit tactics and the basics of up front leading. Combat readiness suffers because the platoon sergeant is again and again challenged to help the next platoon leader "survive," while officers are under the gun to showcase themselves and make no mistakes, a major reason why many company commanders micromanage to get the best report card in their 18 months of glory. Superficial programs such as Sergeants Time, scheduled once a week, can't rescue quality combat training. One solution to reinforce chain of command stability and cooperation is to reduce the number of officer platoon leaders to only one per company - a company executive officer/senior platoon leader who is the primary apprentice to the commander. The two remaining platoons would be led by experienced Master Sergeants who remain in position for a minimum of three years, tasked only to produce elite and tactically proficient troops. Rank upgrading to Master Sergeant would appropriately their status as platoon commanders. To further solidify NCO leadership and prevent NCO ticket punching along the current officer model, company first sergeants would be selected from the senior NCO platoon leaders with lots of line unit experience. Make them E-9's. Other deflating changes should occur at battalion level. An experienced battalion commander doesn't need the support of two staff Majors. One good Major can easily serve as second in command and operations officer. His primary assistant would be a Captain operations assistant, ideally a highly experienced former company commander from the battalion. With increased NCO experience at company level, the battalion Command Sergeant Major becomes obsolete. The battalion commander doesn't require an assistant NCO battalion commander or police call/paint coordinator. What he needs is a good operations NCO who is his right hand during combat. Why is the Army not interested in streamlining? Because officer jobs and promotions are at stake and we still believe in massive combat casualties. But guess what? German Panzer and Infantry formations of WWII fought through WWII, using similarly streamlined chains of command. They ensured that officers were in charge of planning and decision-making, but NCO's weren't denied to use initiative and tactical freedom to exploit success. I asked my old man who commanded his first tank as a PFC/NCO aspirant about this. He recalled the importance of experienced NCO and officer teamwork in a situation, where his unit had been overrun by enemy infantry and tanks. The enemy was ultimately threatening the flank of the entire regiment. An Oberfeldwebel (SSG equivalent) came up on the radio and confidently announced: "all surviving "Adular" elements (his platoon's Panther tanks), I am assessing the situation as follows...enemy threat is most significant from the regiment's northern flank...only a rapid counterattack from Hill 229 can prevent the front from breaking. I intend to attack with three remaining tanks into the enemy's flank to concentrate fires from 229." The company commander, who had monitored, immediately approved and offered to reinforce the attack. Within 5 minutes three Panthers attacked at 20 mph along a 7-kilometer route with infantry riding on the back. They saved the day, the result of trust and confidence between an experienced NonCom and an officer. In two years as a battalion commander, I experimented with abbreviated orders, and NCO's in key leadership slots. I identified many NCOs of the caliber of the Oberfeldwebel who wanted nothing more than lead a platoon for as long as possible -- as long as you recognized them for it. Given the opportunity and training, they can do it! With a prudent reorganization of our units, we could once more ensure that experienced officers command with respect, every day is Sergeant's Time, and micromanagement changes to mutually supporting teamwork. The streamlining of combat formations would furthermore positively impact even on the highest leadership positions and staffs. (c) R.W. Zimmermann, LandserUSA [EMAIL PROTECTED] ============================================================ ARTICLE 2 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Pentagon Divulges Military Readiness ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Ed.: In the latest quarterly report, the Pentagon questions our forces' capabilities to fight a two major conflict scenario. Maybe a surprise to SecDef Cohen but not to us! What worries me a little is that our strategists aren't addressing the quality of personnel as a critical factor. An AP report. *********************************************************** By Robert Burns, the Associated Press WASHINGTON (AP) - Most U.S. combat forces are ready to perform wartime missions, but if the country had to fight two major conflicts at the same time it would run a high risk of increased casualties because of shortfalls in the ability to move, supply and protect troops, the Pentagon said Thursday. In an assessment required by Congress every three months, the Pentagon said the military services are facing training problems, personnel shortages and aging equipment. Even so, it concluded that ``America's armed forces remain capable of executing'' the military strategy of the Clinton administration. The report comes amid growing debate between the presidential campaigns of Vice President Al Gore and Texas Gov. George W. Bush about whether the Clinton administration has sapped the U.S. military of the strength it needs to maintain the nation's status as the world's lone remaining superpower. Just last week, Defense Secretary William Cohen disagreed with Bush's assertion that the military is ``in decline'' and that morale is low. ``Things are on the upswing,'' Cohen said Aug. 21, noting recent improvements in the services' ability to recruit and retain troops. ``While there's always room for improvement, we've got the best in the world.'' The latest Pentagon assessment is nearly identical to the one it provided to Congress three months ago, except that it judged the military's readiness against a somewhat more stressing theoretical baseline - fighting two major wars at the same time, rather than one war and one small-scale crisis. Thursday's Pentagon report to Congress was a summary of a classified report and covered the period April-June 2000. It includes an assessment of the Pentagon's ability to execute a notional scenario in the context of U.S. military commitments as of March 15, which included peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, plus Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps air patrols over northern and southern Iraq. The scenario postulated that war broke out between North and South Korea, followed by war in the Persian Gulf. The conclusion drawn was that ``most major combat and support forces are ready to meet assigned taskings under this scenario, although there are force readiness and capability shortfalls that increase risk in executing operations.'' The term ``risk'' in this context means the risk of not meeting field commanders' timetables for moving forces to a theater of war and executing the war plan. It does not mean the risk of failing to win the war, but rather the risk that longer timelines for starting combat operations would mean higher U.S. casualties. The assessment said there was a ``moderate'' risk associated with responding to the first war - in Korea, under the scenario - and a ``high'' risk for the second war, in the Gulf. The report offered no more precise definition of these ratings. Congress was given more detailed assessments in the classified version of the report. The non-classified report cited several areas of ``strategic concern,'' all related to the military's ability to build up forces where war had broken out and to initiate a counteroffensive. These include shortfalls in mobility and logistics; deficiencies in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; limits in dealing with threats from terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, and the vulnerability to cyberattacks. The report included specific assessments for each service, including: Army personnel readiness is a concern. It has shortages in some critical enlisted skills and at the rank of captain, but it has shown recent improvement in retaining soldiers and finding new recruits. The Navy's limited aviation equipment is a concern. It would experience shortfalls if its air wings and carriers had to support the second of two nearly simultaneous major theater wars. Also of concern is the availability in sufficient numbers of the EA-6B Prowler electronic warfare planes that jam enemy radars. The Marines are meeting their recruiting goals. Its land warfare equipment is ready for operation, but there are questions about its ability to sustain that equipment in the longer term because of aging and corrosion. The Air Force faces shortages in many critical job skills. Shortages of spare parts and skill-level mismatches in many personnel areas are creating problems that hurt the Air Force's ability to train. =================================================================== ARTICLE 3 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Tomorrows Grunts must be the Cream of the Crop ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Ed.: An interesting assessment of the people factor by the retiring Commandant of the US Army War College. The main theme - combat troops must be the best and they are the ones who become casualties. He is pretty much on target. Interesting, that here is another study in 2000 that states the same that Hack and many of us have recognized for decades. This great stuff about leadership intent and leading by touch at the lowest level was fundamental in the education of the German combat forces in WWII and was a result of the small unit tactical evolution toward the end of WWI. Once again we are reinventing the wheel and claim we are the first. *********************************************************** By Staff Sgt. Kathleen T. Rhem, USA American Forces Press Service WASHINGTON, Aug. 31, 2000 - Ninety-five percent of American casualties in wars throughout this century came from "close-combat" units -- aircrews, infantry and armor. So to protect these troops, America needs to take a closer look at how to prepare them for battle. To deal with the ever-changing nature of warfare, the U.S. military needs to focus on "how we select, how we train, how we educate and how we bond close-combat units," now-retired Army Maj. Gen. Robert Scales Jr. said at a recent DoD conference on operational stress... During the Civil War, there were 26,000 men per mile of front; for World War I, it was 1,000; by the 1991 Gulf War, there were 240, Scales said. By the year 2020, he suggested, "we may find that the battlefield will practically be empty." The new face of war, he said, "might be four or five soldiers per running mile of front" -- or perhaps 10 or 15 soldiers per square kilometer in a shifting combat zone with no fronts. ...Scales outlined the list of issues that he and other Army experts believe will be critical for close-combat units by 2020: o Troop intelligence. One of the greatest tragedies in U.S. military history, Scales said, is that the men in the lowest mental categories in Europe during World War II were assigned to infantry units. "That goes for leaders as well," he said. "Yet I would argue with you that the most difficult intellectual exercise is staying alive when somebody is shooting at you." ..."In the studies that we've done, we've found three reasons why American Army units engage in close combat," Scales explained. One is that firepower and maneuver have beaten down the enemy and all that's needed is to sweep the battlefield, he said. Second, the units were taken by surprise and annihilated because of the stupidity of their leaders, he noted. ..."Most often in wars in this century, they do it because the leaders don't know what else to do," Scales said. o Troop maturity. Statistics show the death rate of members of close-combat units decreases with age. "The day of the 18-year-old infantryman is over. It must end now," Scales said. "He doesn't have the maturity, the mental balance and the ability to deal with psychological stress that a more mature individual has." o Training in multiple skills. To survive on the empty, lethal battlefields of the future, soldiers will need to know far more than how to use their weapons. They'll need to know medicine, engineering and communications and have the ability to deal with information systems, Scales said. "It may take three, four, perhaps five years to produce a person who's able to deal with this combat environment," he continued. "So you have to be able to prepare your close-combat units in peacetime because you're not going to have time (in wartime) to train them up to the degree necessary to face these stressors in the future." o A smaller leader-to-men ratio. The ratio today is about 1 to 11, Scales said, and future Army and Marine close-combat units may have a leader-to-men ratio of 1 to 3, or even 1 to 2. o Built-in redundancy. Future units must be "very, very fat with enormous amounts of duplication," Scales said. "Trust me; when the bullets start to fly, what Abraham Lincoln called 'the arithmetic' kicks in." o Earlier leader education. There are three ways to command soldiers -- through touch, written orders and intent, Scales said. "The secret of commanding through touch and written orders is you have to see and literally go out and touch your soldiers," he said. In today's military structure, the lieutenant colonels and colonels who command battalions and brigades still have direct access to their troops. That kind of access will disappear at the company or platoon level by 2020, he said. "We'll be asking junior officers -- lieutenants and captains -- to lead by intent," he said. "Do you know what the first place in the Army educational system is where we teach officers to lead by intent? At the War College." Officers typically attend their service's war college at the grades of O-5 and O-6. Today's platoon leaders spend one or two years on the job before they move on. Scales said officers should be platoon leaders for at least double that time, and platoons should stay together for at least four years... The way to build leaders who can deal with that future is to make them more adaptive than their enemies, the general continued. "The only way to do that is to stress decentralized command and control, the use of individual initiative, and an understanding of languages and cultures and psychology and sociology -- all those things that we don't teach our soldiers today." o Psychological screening. "Some soldiers are able to deal with the horrors of combat; some aren't. Much of that ability is inherited or learned over long periods of time," Scales said. o Physical toughening. "The life expectancy for all of us has increased 15 years or so in the last 50 years. Our ability to use diet, exercise and discipline to maintain peak physical performance into our 30s and 40s is with us right now," Scales said. "In order to deal with these hardships, soldiers have to be physically tuned and toughened before they go to war. There's no time to do that during a war because the process is very, very gradual." Scales offered some ideas about achieving the fighting force he described. Close-combat troops must be highly paid and need to be "protected and excluded from all extraneous diversions," he said. *COPYRIGHT NOTICE** In accordance with Title 17 U. S. C. Section 107, any copyrighted work in this message is distributed under fair use without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for nonprofit research and educational purposes only.[Ref. http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml ] Want to be on our lists? Write at [EMAIL PROTECTED] for a menu of our lists! ****************************************************************************** ******************* A vote for Bush or Gore is a vote to continue Clinton policies! A vote for Buchanan is a vote to continue America! Therefore a vote for Gore or Bush is a wasted vote for America! Don't waste your vote! Vote for Patrick Buchanan! Today, candor compels us to admit that our vaunted two-party system is a snare and a delusion, a fraud upon the nation. 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