-Caveat Lector-
10/14/00
This was first posted in 1995 to the web site - "Understanding The New
World order." The site no longer exists but was instrumental in bringing
the Council on Foreign Realations into the spotlight for all to see.
-- Nurev
=========================================================================
Understanding the New World Order
by Joshua2
BY WHAT AUTHORITY IS THE CFR MAKINING
POLICY FOR THE USA ,THE MID-EAST, AND THE WORLD? ---
After the failure of the Oslo peace accords, the CFR who are neither elected
nor appointed by anyone, gathered their Court Jews and House Arabs to try
to salvage a process that benefits neither Jews nor Arabs in the Mid-East.
The purpose of these efforts is to claim stability for the area, and form a
trading block of nations with rules favoring International Big Business.
It is clear that the Palestinians will not get what they want. It is clear that
Israel will not have it's security where it needs to be. This is a recipe for
disaster.
The Palestinan people are tired of living in misery, and the Israelis are tired of
war and living under seige. But real issues can't always be resolved by
compromise. Some issues can't be resolved at all. To make believe that
paper agreements will somehow solve these problems is wishful thinking in
the extreme, and raises everyone's hopes to where if more violence occurs,
only the elimination of one or the other parties involved will resolve the
situation at that point. In a region where nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons proliferate, this becomes a huge gamble for all of us.
The buisiness and policy elites in the CFR are only interested in controlling
the worlds economies. That is the prize. Not decent lives for the people who
will have to live out the CFR's short sighted and greedy plans. - [ J2, 1995]
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U.S. Middle East Policy
and the Peace Process
Report of an Independent Task Force
Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations
Henry Siegman, Project Coordinator
The Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., a nonprofit, nonpartisan national
membership organization founded in 1921, is dedicated to promoting
understanding of international affairs through the free and civil exchange
of ideas. The Council's members are dedicated to the belief that America's
peace and prosperity are firmly linked to that of the world. From this flows
the mission of the Council: to foster America's understanding of its fellow
members of the international community, near and far, their peoples,
cultures, histories, hopes, quarrels, and ambitions; and thus to serve,
protect, and advance America's own global interests through study and
debate, private and public.
THE COUNCIL TAKES NO INSTITUTIONAL POSITION ON POLICY ISSUES AND HAS NO
AFFILIATION WITH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. ALL STATEMENTS OF FACT AND EXPRESSIONS
OF OPINION CONTAINED IN ALL ITS PUBLICATIONS ARE THE SOLE RESPONSIBILITY OF
THE AUTHOR OR AUTHORS.
The Council on Foreign Relations will sponsor independent Task Forces from
time to time when it believes that a current foreign policy or international
economic debate of critical importance to the United States can benefit from
the advice of a small group of people of divergent backgrounds and views.
Most, but not all, Task Force members are also members of the Council, and
the Council provides the group with staff support.
The goal of the Task Force is to reach a consensus on the issue; if a strong
and meaningful consensus cannot be reached, the goal is to state concisely
alternative positions.
The Report of the Task Force reflects the general policy thrust and
judgments reached by the group, although not all members necessarily
subscribe fully to every finding and recommendation in the Report.
For further information about the Council or this Task Force, please contact
the Public Affairs Office, Council on Foreign Relations, 58 East 68th
Street, New York, NY 10021.
Copyright1997 by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.
All rights reserved.
Printed in the United States of America.
The Report may not be reproduced in whole or in part, in any form (beyond
that copying permitted by Sections 107 and 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law and
except by reviewers for the public press), and without written permission
from the publisher.
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments
Preface
Executive Summary
Findings and Recommendations
Introduction
The End of Incrementalism
Defining American Interests in the Middle East
U.S. Priorities in the Peace Process
The Syrian-Israeli Track
The Need for a Bold Initiative: A New Declaration of Principles
Refugees
The Palestinian Economy
The Role of Allies in the Peace Process
Preparing for a Middle East at Peace
Members of the Task Force
Dissenting Views
Additional Views
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The work of the independent Task Force on U.S. Middle East Policy and the
Peace Process went through several stages, each contributing significantly
to the final product. During the initial study phase of its work, the Task
Force was chaired by former Senator William S. Cohen, who resigned from his
chairmanship and from the Task Force when he was nominated by President
Clinton to serve as secretary of defense in December 1996.
During this initial study phase, the work of the Task Force was organized
and directed by Stephen P. Cohen, president of the Institute for Middle East
Peace and Development, who produced summaries and syntheses of presentations
made to the Task Force
by a wide range of Middle East experts and of the Task Force's own
deliberations.
In the second phase of the Task Force's work, a new document was prepared
by two members of the Task Force, Shibley Telhami and Dov Zakheim. That
document, which underwent change in significant respects, served as a basis
for the Task Force's final recommendations.
I wish to express my deepest appreciation to Secretary William Cohen for
his wise counsel and guidance while he served as chair of the Task Force
during its early study phase, although he took no part in the Task Force's
subsequent deliberations and takes no responsibility for its
recommendations. We are equally indebted to Stephen P. Cohen, Shibley
Telhami, and Dov Zakheim (none of whom is necessarily in full agreement with
the final report), without whose efforts the Task Force's exertions would
not have reached a successful conclusion.
We are indebted to James R. Tanenbaum; Stroock, Stroock & Lavan; the
Jonathan and Frances Ilany Charitable Foundation; John C. Sites, Jr.; and
the Monterey Fund, Inc., whose generous financial support made the Task
Force Report possible.
My thanks also to Barbara McCurtain, Magda L. Aboulfadl, and Jonathan S.
Paris of the U.S./Middle East Project staff for their administrative support.
Our largest debt is to the members of the Task Force who labored patiently
for nearly a year to fashion a set of thoughtful recommendations to help put
the peace process back on track. If the Report contributes even in small
measure to this goal, I know they will feel more than amply rewarded.
PREFACE
The independent Task Force on U.S. Middle East Policy and the Peace Process,
sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, began its work when the
Middle East peace process still seemed "irreversible" but was already
encountering serious difficulties. That was in the aftermath of the
traumatic terrorist acts committed against Israeli civilians in February and
March 1996 and immediately following the May 1996 Israeli elections, which
brought a new Likud-led government to power.
The Task Force's undertaking--to assess U.S. peace policy in light of these
developments--assumed greater urgency with every passing day as the peace
process encountered ever greater difficulties and then reached the dangerous
impasse that it now faces.
The Task Force's mandate was to identify important U.S. interests in the
Middle East and the Persian Gulf and to examine how U.S. policy toward the
Arab-Israel negotiations can best serve to advance those interests. It was
not the Task Force's mandate to engage in a broad review of U.S. policy
toward the region.
The impasse in the peace process has created conflicting reactions in the
foreign policy community and in the public at large. Some argue for greater
American distance from the conflict, since "we cannot want peace more than
the parties themselves," while others urge a far deeper and more proactive
American role, given the potential damage to important American interests in
the region if the conflict is not resolved.
In view of the passions that are aroused by the Israel-Arab conflict, the
results achieved by the Task Force are quite extraordinary. To be sure, the
Task Force did not escape those passions, and several of its members dissent
vigorously from some of the Task Force's main recommendations. But even the
dissenting minority (with but one exception) agrees with several of the Task
Force's major findings: that the incremental "confidence-building" measures
no longer work and have now turned into a prescription for conflict; that
the time has come for the parties to define a framework for the negotiation
of final-status issues; that a Palestinian state, however constrained in its
sovereignty, is an essential component of such a framework, along with
measures that assure Israel's security (for the minority that dissented, the
trade-off for statehood is Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem); and that the
United States must be deeply engaged in the peace process, even if it cannot
and should not impose a settlement. They also agree that the first priority
of U.S. peace efforts must be the Palestinian track, even as efforts
continue to get Syria/Lebanon-Israel negotiations underway.
Members of the Task Force agree that the situation has deteriorated to a
perilous point and that without strong and determined U.S. leadership to put
the peace process back on track, it can easily lead to renewed conflict,
with potentially devastating consequences not only for Arabs and Israelis
but for important American interests in the area as well.
Henry Siegman
Project Coordinator
Executive Summary
Major setbacks to the Arab-Israeli peace process in the past year have
jeopardized the historic opportunity to achieve broad Arab-Israeli
reconciliation that emerged with the Oslo Agreements between Israel and the
Palestinians.
The current impasse threatens a total collapse of the peace process, which
could have the most serious consequences for important American interests in
the region. These interests include the uninterrupted flow of oil, the
survival and security of the state of Israel, the security and stability of
friendly Arab states, and the prevention of both terrorism and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
A broad Arab-Israeli peace is therefore an important American interest, and
the sooner the better. Palestinian-Israeli peace remains the most essential
step for a broader regional conciliation and must remain the first priority
of American diplomacy.
THE END OF INCREMENTALISM
AND FACILITATION
Since the Oslo Accords, two major principles have characterized U.S. policy
toward the peace process:
1. Acceptance of Oslo's incremental approach of progressive movement toward
ever larger areas of Palestinian self-governance that is matched by
Palestinian efforts to prevent the impairment of Israel's security. Progress
in this incremental process was expected to build to a level of mutual trust
that would enable the parties to tackle the more difficult final-status
issues of borders, settlements, Jerusalem, and refugees.
2. U.S. reliance on Israel and the Palestinians to negotiate their own
agreements with minimal American intervention, except to help manage crises
when they occur, provide moral and political support, and rally
international backing.
These two principles served the peace process well up to the Hebron
agreement of January 1997. However, the collapse of confidence between
Israelis and Palestinians over the last year and the ability of opponents of
peace on both sides to exploit incremental measures to their advantage have
brought the peace process to a dangerous impasse. The two major principles
of U.S. policy no longer work: Incrementalism, far from building confidence,
now threatens to undermine it further; and an American role limited to
facilitation will not enable the parties to resume successful negotiations.
The time has come for a change in U.S. policy and for a bold American
initiative to induce Israel and the Palestinians to agree on the broad
contours of a final settlement that can satisfy the minimal aspirations of
both parties. Only the promise that these aspirations are achievable can
revitalize the peace process and sustain it to a successful conclusion.
While the United States cannot and should not impose a settlement on the
parties, only an American willingness to offer a road map to a final
settlement and to influence the parties to proceed in that direction is
likely to break through the current impasse.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MIDDLE EAST
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Secretary Baker and Ambassador Djerejian participated in the
consultation hosted by the Center for Middle East Peace and Economic
Cooperation in Washington on May 31, 1995. The discussion involved
American, Arab, and Israeli officials and leaders in the business
community. Both Secretary Baker and Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon
Peres spoke before the group on the future of the Arab-Israeli peace
process. The main points Secretary Baker made were:
�Palestinian self-government and Israeli security have become
inextricably linked. For the Palestinian Authority, Israeli security
must be a top priority; if the Palestinian Authority does not improve
Israel's security, there will be no Palestinian self-government. For
Israel, the future of the Palestinians is a top priority; only a stable
Palestinian society can deliver long-term security to Israel.
�The United States should take an assertive role in Israeli-Syrian
talks. This should include the presentation of concrete proposals to
break deadlocks on critical issues of land, peace, and security and, if
necessary, the preparation of a draft agreement to be used as a working
text in further negotiations between the two sides. The United States
should be prepared to station troops on the Golan Heights as part of a
multilateral peacekeeping or monitoring force if such a force is
necessary for a final agreement between Israel and Syria. A final
agreement between Syria and Israel will not only reinforce
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and strengthen peace with Jordan, but
will lay the necessary groundwork for the economic cooperation that
provides the best long-term guarantee of a stable Middle East.
�In large part because of American engagement, the Middle East today
enjoys a unique window of opportunity. But there are extremists who want
to see that window slammed shut. America must do what it can to see that
the window remains open. This requires steadfast involvement in the
peace process, and it also includes a regional military presence
sufficient to contain the ambitions of renegade states such as Iran and
Iraq. Finally, it means sustained support for Israel and the moderate
Arab states.
Ambassador Djerejian participated in the consultation sponsored by the
U.S./Middle East Project of the Council on Foreign Relations at the
Aspen Institute Wye Center in Maryland on June 11-20, where he made a
presentation on Syria in the peace process.
Ambassador Djerejian gave a number of speeches on the Arab-Israeli peace
process and U.S. policy toward Islam, including presentations before the
Arab-American Anti-Defamation League, the Temple Beth Israel
Congregation in Houston, the Houston Philosophical Society, and the
Tiger Bay Club in Pensacola, Florida. He also appeared on McNeil-Lehrer
PBS News and CNN on the Israeli-Syrian negotiations.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Subject:
Council on Foreign Relations proposal far from PLO demands
Date:
Thu, 19 Jun 97 00:26:47 PDT
From:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
To:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Excerpts from "U.S. Middle East Policy and the Peace Process"
Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on
Foreign Relations. Henry Siegman, Project Coordinator
By: Aaron Lerner Date: 18 June, 1997
IMRA note: On Monday, June 16, the Council on Foreign Relations
released a Task Force report calling for final status talks based
on a new declaration of principles. While the proposed "DOP" is
far from what is acceptable to Israel - or even the dissenting
members of the Task Force whose comments also appear below - it is
light years away from the position of the Palestinian Authority.
It is particularly noteworthy that even the Arab members of the
Task Force appear to assume that Israel will retain sovereignty
over the Old City of Jerusalem.
The majority opinion which appears below was approved by the
following Task Force members: U.S. Senator Spencer Abraham, Lester
Crown, Kenneth Duberstein, Richard M. Fairbanks, III, former
Editor-in-Chief of Time Inc. Henry A. Grunwald, Rita Hauser ,
former President of the American Jewish Congress Robert K. Lifton,
Richard W. Murphy , Louis Perlmutter, Robert L. Rosen, George
Salem, Brent Scowcroft, former National Executive Director of the
American Jewish Congress Henry Siegman, Gordon Sullivan,
Shibley Telhami, John Waterbury and Dov Zakheim. Hermann Eilts,
Rashid Khalidi and Phebe Marr addressed the Task Force and
endorsed the Report.
As such, this report provides strong evidence that even those
Americans who would be "generous" to the PLO hold positions
regarding the final status which are remote from those of the PLO.
There is however one distressing element of the majority report.
In the section describing American interests, support for a secure
Israel is based exclusively on what might be termed altruistic
considerations with no reference to Israel's strategic value
["historical ties... shared Judeo-Christian religious
sensibilities, and common democratic values. Israel enjoys the
strong and emotional support of a large segment of the American
population. The base of this support is broader based than the
Jewish community, although this community's ties with the Jewish
state are especially close."].
IMRA thanks the Council on Foreign Relations for providing the text
of the report.
=============
"For the majority of the Task Force, the following are the major
features of the proposed Declaration of Principles:
Assurance to the Palestinians that the final status of their
territories will be statehood in Gaza and most of the West Bank
would be coupled with assurance to Israel that the Palestinian
state will be demilitarized; that Palestinians will not have the
right to forge military alliances with hostile states; that the
minimum necessary contingent of Israeli forces will be stationed in
parts of the Jordan Valley, and that appropriate security
arrangements to ensure the personal security of Israel's
citizens�including benchmarks for Palestinian measures against
terrorism�will be implemented.
Territorial agreement would be based on the principle of maximal
territorial contiguity for the Palestinian state on the majority of
West Bank and Gaza territories, while holding to a minimum the
relocation of Israeli populations now living there and giving
Israel secure and recognized boundaries. Since a number of recent
studies have confirmed that 80 percent of Israeli settlers reside
on 10 percent of West Bank territories, mostly along the 1967 Green
Line, this principle can be met.
Because of the complexity and depth of emotions on the issue of
Jerusalem's sovereignty, discussion of this issue should be
postponed until all other issues are resolved. However, such
postponement does not imply that the final outcome can be anything
less than an undivided city. Any final settlement agreement on
Jerusalem must recognize both Jerusalem as the capital of Israel,
and al-Quds (the Arab name for Jerusalem), whose location and
boundaries are to be negotiated by the parties, as the capital of
the new Palestinian state (in line with proposals reportedly put
forward in the so-called Abu Mazen�Yossi Beilin plan).
Because the status quo in Jerusalem would prevail until all other
issues are resolved, neither party would take unilateral steps to
alter significantly the demographics of the city. Unilateral
actions such as the recent housing project in Har Homa /Jabal Abu
Ghneim would be precluded. At the same time, reasonable ground
rules must be negotiated for the accommodation of the proportional
growth of both Israeli and Palestinian communities in Jerusalem and
for functional spheres of authority and rights, including municipal
and religious rights, the right of access to the city, rights of
residency, property rights and the Palestinian of locating offices
of varying kinds.
Both Palestinians and Israelis must commit to serious efforts to
end the inflammatory rhetoric that, coupled with the threat of
violence whenever a crisis materializes, conjures up the other's
worst historic fears. Palestinians must commit to an unrelenting
war against terrorism.
The parties must agree to a timetable for a phased implementation
of the agreements. Sufficient time must be allotted for Israel to
put in place the necessary security arrangements and for
Palestinians to build the necessary institutions. But as the
history of the peace process has shown, too much time serves the
purposes of the enemies of peace, whose ability to destroy the
process is only increased as negotiations and the implementation of
agreements are delayed.
Once the parties agree to the new Declaration of Principles, the
United States must refrain from acting as the court of first resort
when disputes between the parties arise. Palestinians and Israelis
must work out arrangements between them that conform to the
contours of their agreement. On the other hand, Washington cannot
return to the sidelines; it must stand ready to speak out
forcefully when differences over questions of interpretation and
implementation threaten to disrupt the peace process.
...
REFUGEES
The United States could also take the lead in organizing funds for
the dispossessed of the Middle East conflict. Humanitarian
considerations aside, it is clear that an enduring settlement must
deal with the outstanding claims of refugees (both Palestinian and
Jewish refugees from Arab countries), many of which will be
financial...
COMMENTS:
Shibley Telhami: Director of Near Eastern Studies at the Department
of Government, Cornell University.
...
It is conceivable, for example, that there will be parts of al-Quds
over which the Palestinian state will not be able to assert
sovereign authority, even after final settlement is reached.
Palestinian access to these parts would have to be guaranteed
together with property rights, religious rights, and residency
rights....
Henry Grunwald: former Editor-in-Chief of Time Inc. He served as
the U.S. Ambassador to Austria.
...
In my view, the majority recommendation on Jerusalem should be
understood to mean that Palestinian sovereignty in Jerusalem would
be partly symbolic, confined to the Moslem holy places, and a
limited, separate entity, probably outside the traditional city
limits, which would function as the Palestinian capital.
Rashid Khalidi: Director of the Center for International Studies
at the University of Chicago.
...
Regarding Jerusalem, the principle of reciprocity should operate as
well. Thus if the location and boundaries of the Palestinian
capital district are to be negotiated by the parties, so should the
location and boundaries of the Israeli capital district. Similarly,
Palestinian (and Arab) recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of
Israel should include such specifications, and should be matched by
Israeli recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine, with
locations and boundaries to be likewise specified. Incidentally,
calling the Palestinian district al-Quds is preposterous: al-Quds
or al-Quds al-Sharif to give it its full name, is Jerusalem, which
for Arabic-speakers means and can only mean the Old City and its
immediate environs, centering on the Haram al-Sharif, the Dome of
the Rock and the al-Aqsa Mosque; any other use of the term, for
example to describe distant Arab suburbs of the city to which a
Palestinian capital might be relegated, would rightly be considered
ludicrous and insulting.
...
Dissenting Views
Lester Pollack: Managing Director at Lazard Freres & Co. LLC. He
is former Chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major
American Jewish Organizations.
The basic position of the Report is that the Oslo process of
incrementalism has come to an end and that a new approach involving
what is in effect final status talks should begin. While this is a
legitimate view which we share, what we don't agree with is that
the United States should take any kind of explicit positions on the
critical issues that divide the parties. It is far better for the
parties to seek to negotiate their own agreements, for only if they
have negotiated and compromised on their own will they live with
the consequences of the decisions and concessions they have made.
For the United States to propose its solutions would be to
drastically reduce the effectiveness of the American role in the
negotiations. It might make us feel good at home, but it is bound
to create suspicions on one or both sides and inhibit the role of
the United States as the interlocutor and communicator between the
two parties.
So much for process in a part of the world where process is
critical. As to the substance, this Report advocates an approach
that ostensibly meets the aspirations of both sides, a tradeoff
whereby incentives to both sides would be such that each side could
gain so as to absorb the pain of the other side's gain. No pain, no
gain.
The problem is that the incentives do not extend to both sides. The
Palestinians have much to gain from the proposals put forth here.
But where is the gain for the Israelis?
The great Palestinian incentive is for the United States to
recognize statehood for them in Gaza and most of the West Bank. The
tradeoff originally was to have the United States acknowledge
Israel's full sovereignty over Jerusalem with the exception of
symbolic Muslim sovereignty over the holy sites and symbolic
Palestinian sovereignty in an outlying area of Jerusalem such as
Abu Dis. Instead, the issue of Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem
has been deferred, and Israel is being asked to make further
concessions in the interim period by limiting what it can do in
Jerusalem under the terms of the present Oslo agreement regarding
its rights and its role. The Israelis are being asked to negotiate
functions and rights with the Palestinians and, as well, to
restrict what they, the Israelis, can do in and for the city. The
notion of functional spheres of authority and rights the Report
describes for the Palestinians in Jerusalem would surely be seen by
the Israelis as a step towards divided sovereignty, to be
negotiated at the end of the process when all the pressures would
be on the Israelis to make such a compromise. Such a delay would
not resolve the conflict. Rather, by deferring it, it would instead
inflame the Israelis and make it even more difficult for them to
make the concessions necessary to reach a final agreement.
Therefore, both as a matter of process, that is deferring the issue
of Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem until the end, and as a matter
of substance that is formalizing Palestinian rights and restricting
Israeli control in Jerusalem, the Israelis would see this approach
not as an incentive but as another disincentive.
The Report also stipulates that the Palestinian state in the West
Bank would provide "secure and recognized boundaries" for the
Israelis, and that it should also provide for maximum territorial
contiguity for the Palestinian state and minimal disruption of the
Israeli population. It then states that since eighty per cent of
the Israeli settlers reside on less than ten per cent of the West
Bank territories, mostly along the Green Line, that the border
adjustments should be minimal and mostly along the Green Line.
Since these borders essentially did not provide Israel with
security prior to 1967, it will hardly satisfy the Israelis' need
for secure boundaries. The standard should not just be the issue of
relocation of Israeli populations. Secure and recognized boundaries
have a lot more to do than with just where people live. There are
military considerations of time and space, which are relevant to
where borders are located so as to provide security.
In this regard, the Report implies that the Israeli government is
unprepared to make the territorial concessions necessary to insure
Palestinian cooperation. One could just as easily say that the
Palestinians are unwilling to make territorial compromises on the
West Bank to insure Israeli cooperation. It is precisely a comment
such as this that reveals the disputed burden being placed on the
Israelis as different from that being placed on the Palestinians.
The Report refers to providing Israel with the assurance that the
Palestinian state would be demilitarized, that appropriate security
arrangements will be implemented to insure the security of Israeli
citizens, including benchmarks for Palestinian measures against
terrorism. Palestinian obligations to combat terrorism have existed
since Oslo I and were repeated in Oslo II and in the Hebron
agreement. They have failed to meet those commitments. It seems
unlikely that this will provide an incentive for the Israelis, who
undoubtedly are being asked to buy the same bridge for the fourth
time. What the Israelis will seek for their security, of course, is
not to have it dependent on Palestinian enforcement of their
obligations. Rather, the Israelis will seek borders that the
Israelis feel are secure, or as secure as they can be given the
deep emotions in the region.
The more viable approach, then, is to allow the parties to meet and
themselves agree on a Declaration of Principles without such
proposals from the United States. Such an agreement can only be
accomplished out of the public focus that is implicit in the
approach proposed by this study. Furthermore, it is in this quiet
back channel negotiation where the United States could play a much
more constructive role if it has not offered its own proposals, but
seeks to be an intermediary dealing with both parties in an attempt
to bring them together. This is exactly why the United States was
effective in bringing about the most recent agreement in Hebron. To
advance its own set of principles would greatly diminish the
effectiveness of the United States, and to imply that the United
States can deliver one side to the other on certain terms would be
a huge mistake.
Finally, the United States for decades has sought to limit the
involvement of others, including Russia and the Europeans, in the
Middle East peace process. To involve the Europeans at this stage,
in a new dialogue, would seem to be as counterproductive in the
future as it has been in the past.
Robert Satloff: Executive Director of the Washington Institute for
Near East Policy.
...Third, as for the bargain outlined herein, it doesn't sound like
a bargain to me. Palestinians win Israel's commitment to
"statehood" ( a major historical achievement for the Palestinian
national movement) and some "rights" in Jerusalem (a foothold for
later advances) while Israelis get in return "security" (which they
have already been promised) and a postponement of the negotiation
over Jerusalem (which will ensure that this remains a festering
sore) coupled with restrictions on Israel activity in the city.
Where is the bargain?
Reading the text, one expects the rest of the bargain to come in
the form of some mandated pan-Arab normalization with Israel, along
the lines foreshadowed with the reference to a "broadest possible
circle of Israel's Arab neighbors." The convening of the Arab
League to amend its Charter by outlawing war between the 22 Arab
states and Israel (individually and collectively), offering a
termination of all claims and full diplomatic recognition and
establishing an all-Middle East mutual non-aggression pact with
detailed annexes on security cooperation, political coordination
and economic and trade relations might (I say might) have been the
countervailing incentive to the Israelis to entice them into a deal
virtually any government - Labor or Likud - is otherwise sure to
refuse. But instead, "for these bold moves," the Report argues,
"all Israelis get in return is the 'reopen[ing of] the prospect for
increased cooperation between Israel and Arab states.' " Thin gruel
indeed.
This Report skirts two fundamental issues. First, for better or
worse, the Labor government which negotiated Oslo and implemented
its provisions, was turned out of office a year ago. The Israeli
people have spoken, and while the message of Prime Minister
Netanyahu's victory is not fully clear, at least a piece of it
reflects the Israeli people's dissatisfaction with the pace and
manner of Oslo's implementation, especially vis-a-vis Palestinian
compliance with its treaty obligations. In urging a bold American
initiative that asks Israel effectively to renegotiate the core
Oslo bargain - changing the formula of "security for recognition
+ self-government + a promise of final status negotiations" to a
new formula of "security for statehood" - this Report does not
address that changed reality. Instead, the Report refers to the
objective of a "revived peace coalition," which sounds awfully like
a heaving sigh for the bygone days of a Labor-led government. While
that may be self-satisfying, it is also irrelevant in the current
circumstances.
Second, it is true that a vigorous internal Israeli debate -
reflected in the Beilin-Eitan discussions - have pointed out
significant areas of common ground between Labor and Likud.
Regretfully, however, no such debate has occurred on the
Palestinian side. In my view, the most interesting aspect of the
Beilin-Abu Mazen "understanding" referenced in this Report is that
it has been publicly repudiated by Abu Mazen. The reality is that
no Palestinian public figure has yet ever suggested publicly any
willingness to accept anything less than 100 per cent of the West
Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem in a "final status" agreement. As a
result, we are left with the fact that, on "final status issues,"
the difference between Labor and Likud is less than the difference
between any Israeli government and the PLO. It may not always be
so, but it is so today.
Forcing the issue before the circumstances have ripened is, in my
view, a formula for failure. Oslo needs to be repaired but this
Report offers American activism and Israeli concessions as the
principal forms of "improvements." As luck may have it, the ideas
proposed in this Report may have the consequence of frightening the
parties into an early compromise lest they face the heavy hand of
Washington's intrusiveness, but any sort of progress along those
lines will be purely serendipitous.
Dr. Aaron Lerner, Director
IMRA (Independent Media Review & Analysis)
<A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/">www.ctrl.org</A>
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Let us please be civil and as always, Caveat Lector.
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