-Caveat Lector-
Stealth secrets feared stolen
U.S. is investigating Russian mathematician employed by Bothell
software company
Monday, October 30, 2000
By PAUL SHUKOVSKY
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER REPORTER
A Russian mathematician who was given access to an American
supercomputer loaded with stealth warplane design software is
under investigation for espionage.
Federal agents suspect that Aleksey Yeremin, who logged on to the
supercomputer from Moscow, took advantage of Lockheed Martin and
military security lapses to steal stealth technology secrets.
The 3 1/2-year investigation stretches from the heart of the old
Soviet empire to Lockheed's secretive Skunk Works plant in
Southern California to a quiet suburb north of Seattle.
Yeremin, vice president of a software company based in Bothell
that did work for Lockheed, was e-mailed part of Lockheed's
modeling program for designing stealth planes. And, sources say,
it would have been easy for him to steal the rest of it.
The potential loss is staggering: the United States' global
monopoly on radar invisibility.
In spring 1997, the FBI and the Air Force Office of Special
Investigations, or OSI, began the investigation, code-named
Digital Demon. A short time later, Lockheed pulled the plug on
its project with Yeremin: an ultra-high-speed, number-crunching
computer program that was supposed to greatly accelerate stealth
aircraft design work.
Federal criminal-justice sources say Yeremin, 46, has connections
to the Russian military and now-defunct KGB.
It is unknown whether Yeremin got his hands on any classified
information. But sources told the Seattle Post-Intelligencer
that some of the unclassified information he did obtain should
have been classified top-secret.
A retired Air Force three-star general said he is concerned that
the apparent leak could help the Russians build their own stealth
warplanes.
"I don't think what is at risk here is making these (U.S.)
aircraft any more visible to radar," said George Muellner, who
played a key role in developing the nation's stealth fleet.
"But what is at risk is accelerating a country's ability to
develop and build these sorts of aircraft -- to produce something
that is a threat downstream," he said. "If they started building
and selling these things to the Iraqis, that would be a concern."
The joint FBI-Air Force probe has so far yielded no arrests, and
no one has been publicly charged with a crime. Agents have
seized the home computer of a Lockheed employee who worked
closely with Yeremin.
That man told the P-I that he now realizes he was deftly
manipulated by Yeremin.
"I am not 100 percent sure, but I am highly sure he is a spy,"
said the 38-year-old computer expert, who no longer works for
Lockheed. He asked that he not be identified for fear of
jeopardizing his current job.
He said he went beyond giving Yeremin portions of the MM3D
simulation software -- used to model highly complex interactions
between stealth aircraft and radar -- that the Russian needed to
do his job. He said he also provided information that Yeremin
could have used to determine American stealth capabilities.
"I have to admit, I am very gullible, very naive, very trusting,"
he said. "He asked very probing questions, but I pushed my
concerns away.
"Now I can look back and see how he gathered information from me.
He used textbook ways to win over someone; to recruit them as an
operative or agent. He would earn my trust by saying he was not
in any way . . . loyal to the country he was from, but wanted
to come here."
The computer expert is befuddled by how Lockheed and the Air
Force could allow a Russian with KGB ties access to such a
sensitive program.
Lockheed refused to answer questions about whether security was
compromised. The Air Force would not explain how it conducts
security oversight of the defense contractor.
Officials at Skunk Works, in Palmdale, Calif., where the U-2 spy
plane, the bat-winged F-117 and the F-22 were designed, first
became aware in 1997 "that an employee . . . was not reporting
contacts with foreign nationals as required by governing security
regulations," Lockheed spokesman Sam Grizzle said in a prepared
statement.
The officials reported the violations to "appropriate U.S.
government agencies and followed their instructions in addressing
the situation. The employee in question no longer works for
Lockheed Martin," Grizzle said.
The FBI and the Air Force OSI declined to comment on the case,
and federal prosecutors did not return a call. "What I can tell
you is it is an ongoing investigation," said Maj. Mike Richmond,
an OSI spokesman at Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland.
There are strong parallels to the Wen Ho Lee case, which also
raised questions about digital transmission of technology to
foreign nationals, and the way in which the federal government
classifies its secrets.
The government feared that Lee, a scientist at Los Alamos
National Laboratory in New Mexico, had stolen computer records
containing the crown jewels of U.S. nuclear secrets and turned
them over to the Chinese government. He recently pleaded guilty
to a single count of mishandling classified information and
received a sentence of time served -- nine months.
A federal judge delivered a stinging rebuke of the government's
handling of the case, apologizing to Lee for the harsh conditions
of his incarceration.
The Bothell connection
Working out of his Bothell home, high-tech entrepreneur Russ
Sarbora plucked Yeremin from a Russian military aircraft-design
center a decade ago and collaborated with him to start a company
called Elegant Mathematics.
Today, Sarbora is shocked that his business partner is under
investigation in an espionage case.
"I believe he is not an agent for any foreign power," Sarbora
said. "It would surprise me enormously if he turned out to be."
Yeremin "readily acknowledged working for the Soviet military,"
according to Sarbora, but "prior to 1990, if you were a scientist
of any stature, you worked for the Soviet military structure.
You didn't get to work, or support in school without working for
the military."
Reached recently at his home in Moscow, Yeremin refused to
discuss the espionage allegations.
"If somebody say something about that, it is better that you ask
this individual," he said in heavily accented English.
Yeremin and his associates in Russia were working on computers
loaded with software known as MM3D, or Method of Moments in Three
Dimensions. It would have been easy for people with their
expertise to steal the portions of MM3D they hadn't already been
given, the former Lockheed computer expert said.
And it wasn't just MM3D that was at risk of being stolen. Also
loaded on the expert's home computer were test fixtures -- secret
computer representations of stealth aircraft structures.
The expert said he had been assured by Lockheed engineers that
the test fixtures were not classified. But after the
investigation began, federal agents claimed some were top-secret.
One of the computers Yeremin was given access to also contained
data on the performance characteristics of radar-absorbing
materials that coat stealth planes, the expert said.
Those data, however, did not specifically identify the name or
chemical composition of the materials, he said.
Gen. Muellner, now vice president-general manager of The Boeing
Co.'s Phantom Works research and development division, cautions
that there may be no way of telling if the apparent leak is
devastating or merely distressing.
In the old days of espionage, blueprints, decoder machines and
the like would suddenly disappear -- setting off alarms. Today,
secrets can be downloaded without a trace.
"It's like the thing in Los Alamos," Muellner said. "You don't
know what is lost."
Like Lee and former CIA Director John Deutch, who is under
investigation for having classified information on his home
computer, the Lockheed computer expert was working on an unsecure
computer.
His home computer was loaded with MM3D. The program, he said,
contains a feature called an "optimizer" by which designers can
simulate changes in aircraft configuration or materials and
quickly see how that affects the plane's radar invisibility.
Unlike in the Deutch case, the computer expert said he had
written permission from Lockheed's security and legal departments
to work on the program at home. Only after the investigation
began was he told that the optimizer should have been classified
top-secret, he said.
The computer expert said the reason he was allowed to work at
home is that at night, he could access government and private
supercomputers for free, saving Lockheed the expense of
maintaining an in-house supercomputer on which he could work.
"I really campaigned hard to get an in-house supercomputer so I
wouldn't have to go out on the Net," he said.
He said he repeatedly sought guidance from Lockheed security
officials over how far he could go with Yeremin but was either
ignored or rebuffed. "I had continually apprised security of
everything," he said. "Somebody out there knew what Alex's
background was. But somehow the communication to the (security)
guy that was supposed to be covering my back didn't happen."
A former Lockheed security official agreed.
"It was bungled by Lockheed and the Air Force. From what I saw,
everybody kind of snoozed through, kind of kissed it off. It was
just 'keep an eye on it and give a report once in a while,'" said
the former official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.
The computer expert said he left Lockheed after the company
pulled his access to work on the stealth program. He remained a
Lockheed consultant for a time, then left for another job.
He maintains that any information he gave Yeremin "pales in
comparison" to open articles written by scientists and engineers,
and technical information available over the Internet.
"The bigger issue is that these guys (Russian mathematicians) had
access to a lot of computers and computer networks," the former
employee said. "Their software was being run on many American
networks and supercomputers."
Yeremin's algorithm
The 48-year-old Sarbora is a longtime software programmer and
former computer industry executive.
He moved to Seattle in 1988 to become vice president of quality
assurance and technical support at Microrim Inc., a database
software company.
During the Goodwill Games of 1990, Sarbora volunteered to work on
a project showcasing the best of Soviet technology and met
several Russian scientists.
The following year, Sarbora went to Russia on a business trip,
looking to bring back software he could sell to U.S. companies.
He said he met Yeremin at the Central Aerohydrodynamics
Institute, about 30 miles southeast of Moscow, where Russian
warplanes are designed.
It was shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union. Work for
scientists and mathematicians in Russia was rapidly disappearing.
The U.S. government feared they would peddle their expertise in
"rogue" states like Libya or Iraq.
When Sarbora learned that Yeremin had created an algorithm, or
calculation method, that could achieve on relatively primitive
computers what U.S. scientists did on supercomputers, he
immediately grasped the scientific and commercial potential.
Yeremin joined forces with Sarbora to launch Elegant Mathematics.
They incorporated in Washington state with Sarbora as president
and Yeremin as vice president. The main offices, however, were
thousands of miles away in Moscow, at the Russian Academy of
Sciences.
At its peak, the company employed about 20 mathematicians,
physicists and software experts from the Russian academy, Steklov
Mathematical Institute and Moscow State University.
"We insisted on maintaining the team in Russia," Sarbora said.
"The idea is that after the transition from communism to
capitalism, there would be a few teams that could maintain
mathematics in Russia."
"We developed technology that would reduce computational costs of
solving problems in stealth technology by reducing the number of
calculations by an order of 10," Sarbora said.
Sarbora said his company scored its first major contract with
Cray, a supercomputer maker, and continued working on its
software-development project at the Pittsburgh Supercomputing
Center and at IBM.
In 1994, Elegant Mathematics was hired by Lockheed to improve the
efficiency and speed of computer simulations related to the
interaction between the aircraft and radar. That effectively
meant infusing MM3D with Yeremin's "solver" program.
The computer expert's job at Lockheed involved using computers to
simulate how a radar wave reflects off the surface of a plane.
The whole idea of stealth technology is to prevent that
reflection so the wave echo doesn't return to the radar antenna
and get read on a radar screen.
Over the next three years, the computer expert said, he met with
Yeremin at Skunk Works at least 15 times. The sprawling facility
in the Mojave Desert is surrounded by chain-link fences topped
with razor wire. Armed guards are stationed at the gates.
Access to secure buildings requires personal security codes and
badges that open electronic locks.
The former Lockheed security official said the company lusted
after Elegant Mathematics' promised cost-cutting technology.
"That was where the greed came in. Yeremin was offering this
tantalizing carrot in front of everybody."
"He's an interesting character," the computer expert said of
Yeremin. "I always liked him a lot because of his zeal for the
task at hand. But he leaves a trail of people very pissed off
because he's so arrogant. He's brilliant, but not as brilliant as
he thinks he is."
The expert, however, said he believed in Yeremin's algorithm.
"I have seen it solve big problems," he said. "Seeing is
believing. I don't think they were peddling snake oil."
Others disagree. Even before the security concerns were raised,
Yeremin's breakthrough was being officially snubbed.
Elegant Mathematics' grant application to continue research into
its algorithm failed to pass review at the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency, a Defense Department agency that
sponsors exotic research.
"The methods he (Yeremin) has developed are not considered
competitive in this country. He got attention for a while, until
his balloon was punctured," said University of Illinois professor
Eric Michielssen, an expert in the use of computer modeling of
radar problems.
Fear of bugged software
The computer expert said he sent Yeremin sections of source code,
the underlying components of the MM3D program, by e-mail in early
1997.
He said the source code was not classified, and the portions he
sent were not related to the physics of stealth, but to technical
requirements of inputting and retrieving data that Yeremin needed
for his work.
The expert was testing Yeremin's software on supercomputers at
the NASA Ames Research Center in California, the Oak Ridge
National Laboratory in Tennessee and at IBM in New York. The
entire MM3D program was loaded on the NASA Ames and IBM
computers, as well as on his home computer, he said.
Federal agents told the expert there were worries over whether
Yeremin's software might have been implanted with the hacking
capability of e-mailing information from those computers back to
Russia. And Yeremin had direct, online access to the IBM
supercomputer, the expert said.
The expert said the agents "were never 100 percent sure that I
had not sent the whole (MM3D) source code to Yeremin. I could
have sent the whole farm to him. Which, of course, I did not."
There was also the concern that Yeremin or one of his Russian
colleagues could have hacked into the computer expert's home
computer. The expert said he followed the rules by reporting his
e-mail exchanges with Yeremin to Lockheed security. Security
people later turned over to Air Force OSI agents information on
the e-mails, triggering the investigation.
What the Air Force calls a "Red Team" -- a group of technology,
military and security experts -- was mobilized to assess the
potential damage to national security. One inside source said
the team called it "catastrophic." Other investigators are not
convinced that Yeremin was involved in espionage, federal sources
said.
Like Muellner, the retired general, the former Lockheed computer
expert worries that the Russians might have stolen technology
that gives them a big boost in the design and construction of
stealth aircraft.
"We don't know if he got the source codes," the computer expert
said. "That was the supposition due to the fact that we were
working on the same computer. A routine hacker with the kind of
access Yeremin had could have gotten the codes."
When federal agents came calling on the computer expert on June
23, 1997, he was aghast. They entered his home in California's
Tehachapi Mountains and demanded that he turn over his computer.
He said he cooperated fully.
'Traumatized beyond belief'
They told him he may have seriously damaged national security.
"I was traumatized beyond belief," he said.
That was more than three years ago.
The agents still have his hard drive. He hasn't been arrested
since then, he asserts, because he didn't deliver classified
information to Yeremin, had permission to work on his home
computer and had no intent to damage national security.
The FBI paid a similar call on Sarbora in 1997. Sarbora says it
marked the beginning of the end for Elegant Mathematics.
Lockheed soon cut its ties to the company. The specter of an
espionage investigation scared off almost everyone else.
The FBI, Sarbora said, interviewed "our customers and prospective
customers; anyone we had a relationship with. That had a very
chilling effect on business. It pretty much put a box around it
and shut it down."
In 1997 and 1998, Sarbora was questioned several times by the
FBI. So was Yeremin, who has not been seen in the United States
since 1999. While Yeremin is still considered a "person of
interest" in the spy case, Sarbora said the agents ultimately
told him he was no longer under suspicion.
By then, it was too late. The dreams of Yeremin and Sarbora had
been dashed. So were the hopes of the crack team of Russian
scientists. They "are all scratching for jobs," Sarbora said.
"Elegant was on life-support -- comatose -- and remains so."
P-I reporter Paul Shukovsky can be reached at 206-448-8072 or
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
=================================================================
Kadosh, Kadosh, Kadosh, YHVH, TZEVAOT
FROM THE DESK OF:
*Michael Spitzer* <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
The Best Way To Destroy Enemies Is To Change Them To Friends
=================================================================
<A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/">www.ctrl.org</A>
DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER
==========
CTRL is a discussion & informational exchange list. Proselytizing propagandic
screeds are unwelcomed. Substance�not soap-boxing�please! These are
sordid matters and 'conspiracy theory'�with its many half-truths, mis-
directions and outright frauds�is used politically by different groups with
major and minor effects spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought.
That being said, CTRLgives no endorsement to the validity of posts, and
always suggests to readers; be wary of what you read. CTRL gives no
credence to Holocaust denial and nazi's need not apply.
Let us please be civil and as always, Caveat Lector.
========================================================================
Archives Available at:
http://peach.ease.lsoft.com/archives/ctrl.html
<A HREF="http://peach.ease.lsoft.com/archives/ctrl.html">Archives of
[EMAIL PROTECTED]</A>
http:[EMAIL PROTECTED]/
<A HREF="http:[EMAIL PROTECTED]/">ctrl</A>
========================================================================
To subscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email:
SUBSCRIBE CTRL [to:] [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To UNsubscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email:
SIGNOFF CTRL [to:] [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Om
