-Caveat Lector-
The European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council
1 Northumberland Avenue
London
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England
Tel: 0207 872 5434
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Date of Publication: December 2000
SUDAN, THE UNITED STATES AND TERRORISM:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S
CLAIMS OF SUDAN'S INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM
You cannot have people saying 'We have proof of certain things' against
a whole country but nobody knows what that proof is. There is a
difference between whether something is proved sufficiently to bring a
man before a court...and whether it is sufficient to prove to adopt
one's political line.
Raymond Kendall, International Secretary-General of Interpol (1)
The cornerstone of the Clinton Administration's rationale for its
policies towards Sudan are repeated claims that Sudan is a supporter of
international terrorism. This is manifested in statements by
Administration officials and is constantly cited in media coverage. The
Clinton Administration listed Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism in
August 1993. Sudan joined Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria and Cuba
on the American list. Whatever other states on the list may or may not
have done, Sudan was included in spite of the fact that there was not a
single example of Sudanese involvement in any act of international
terrorism. And it is also clear that Sudan was listed without any
evidence of its support for terrorism. This much is a matter of record.
Former United States President Jimmy Carter, long interested in Sudanese
affairs, went out of his way to see what evidence there was for Sudan's
listing. Carter was told there was no evidence:
"In fact, when I later asked an assistant secretary of state he said
they did not have any proof, but there were strong allegations." (2)
This set the tone for all future American claims about Sudan and
terrorism. Amazingly, on 3 November 1997, President Clinton signed
executive order 13067, under the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (50 U.S.C. 1703 et seq) and the National Emergencies Act (50 USC
1641 c), which imposed comprehensive trade and economic sanctions
against Sudan. The order declared "that the policies of Sudan constitute
an extraordinary and unusual threat to the national security and foreign
policy of the United States" citing "continued support for international
terrorism." (3)
The focus for the Clinton Administration's allegations has been the
United States Department of State publication, Patterns of Global
Terrorism. It is important first of all to put Patterns of Global
Terrorism into its legal context. The publication states that it is
prepared in
"compliance with United States law, Title 22 of the United States Code,
Section 2656f (a), requiring the Department of State "to provide
Congress a full and complete annual report on terrorism for those
countries and groups meeting the criteria of Section (a) (1) and (2) of
the Act. As required by legislation, the report includes detailed
assessments of foreign countries where significant terrorist acts
occurred, and countries about which Congress was notified during the
preceding give years pursuant to Section 6 (j) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 (the so-called terrorism list countries that
have repeatedly provided support for international terrorism)." (4)
The 1992 Patterns of Global Terrorism, the year before Sudan's listing,
stated that: "There is no evidence that the Government of Sudan
conducted or sponsored a specific terrorist attack in the past year, and
the government denies supporting any form of terrorism activity." (5)
The report did record that: "In 1992 the Government of Sudan continued a
disturbing pattern of relationships with international terrorist
groups...Elements of the Abu Nidal organization (ANO), the Palestinian
Islamic Movement (HAMAS), and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
terrorist organizations continue to find refuge in Sudan". The London
Independent newspaper described this as "keeping dubious company".(6)
The same groups, and many others, can be found organised and active in
Western capitals across the world. In Britain many of the same
"elements" are living as refugees on state benefits. They have even
found a "refuge" in the United States. HAMAS, for example, held its
third world congress in Kansas city, and has held meetings in Phoenix
attended by Hamas leaders and 4000 supporters and sympathisers. (7)
The 1993 Patterns of Global Terrorism, the first report which included
Sudan on this list, once again clearly stated:
"Although there is no conclusive evidence linking the Government of
Sudan to any specific terrorist incident during the year, five of
fifteen suspects arrested this summer following the New York City bomb
plot are Sudanese citizens." (8)
Various newspapers and journals also recorded the simple lack of
evidence for terrorist support before and after Sudan's listing. The
London Independent of 9 June 1993, for example, stated: "So far, no
major terrorist incident has been traced to the Islamic regime in Sudan.
The Sudanese lack the logistical abilities to run terrorist
networks...even if they wished". The London Guardian of 19 August 1993
reported that: "Independent experts believe...that these reports [of
terrorist training camps] have been exaggerated, and that Sudan is too
short of money to make it an active sponsor of terrorism". The
Independent's Robert Fisk writing in December 1993, several months after
the American decision, described Sudan as:
"a country that is slowly convincing its neighbours that Washington's
decision to put Sudan on its list of states supporting 'terrorism'
might, after all, be groundless. Even Western diplomats in Khartoum are
now admitting privately that - save for reports of a Palestinian camp
outside Khartoum like those that also exist in Tunisia, Yemen, Syria and
other Arab countries - there may be no guerrilla training bases in the
country after all." (9)
One year after Sudan's listing, the Independent returned to the theme.
Referring to the presence of Palestinian and Lebanese dissidents:
"Intelligence assessments reckon that these groups are allowed to live
and study and perhaps to plot in apartments in the capital". (10)
THE LISTING OF SUDAN AS A STATE SPONSOR OF TERRORISM
It would appear, therefore, that despite no evidence whatsoever of
involvement in any act of terrorism, Sudan was listed as a state sponsor
of terrorism. In addition to former President Carter, Donald Petterson,
the United States ambassador to Sudan at the time of Sudan's listing,
stated that he was "surprised" that Sudan was put on the terrorism list.
Petterson said that while he was aware of "collusion" between "some
elements of the Sudanese government" and various "terrorist"
organisations:
"I did not think this evidence was sufficiently conclusive to put Sudan
on the U.S. government's list of state sponsors of terrorism." (11)
Moreover, it would seem that Ambassador Petterson, the Clinton
Administration's ambassador to Sudan, was not even briefed prior to the
decision to list Sudan being taken. When he queried the decision, he was
told by an assistant secretary of state that the "new evidence was
conclusive". (12) One can only speculate as to whether the assistant
secretary of state briefing Ambassador Petterson was the same assistant
secretary of state who told former President Carter a few days later
that the Clinton Administration did not have any proof, but that there
were "strong allegations".
It should be pointed out, in any instance, that the extent to which
inclusion on the list is dependent on policy considerations at any one
moment in time rather than evidence, is exemplified by the case of Iraq.
Iraq was first listed in 1979, was de-listed in 1982 when it went to
war against Iran, something seen as being in the American interest, and
was put back on after the Gulf war. Nothing had changed in the meantime
- Saddam Hussein's government was in power throughout. Expediency had
dictated Iraq's removal and then relisting.
The Clinton Administration's listing of Sudan served clear objectives.
Sudan was projected as a state sponsor of terrorism and thereby to a
great extent isolated internationally. The listing also brings with it
specific sanctions, financial restrictions and prohibitions on economic
assistance. These include a ban on arms-related exports and sales and a
tight control of "dual-use" goods and technologies. The United States
must also oppose any loan from international financial institutions for
a country on the terrorism list.
It is important to record the Sudanese government's response to claims
that Khartoum in any way supports terrorism:
"Sudan has not, and will not, allow its territory to be used for any act
of terror or to be used as a shelter for terrorists or by those who have
eluded justice. Sudan, like many other states, suffers day after day
with those innocent civilians who lose their lives or who are harmed as
a result of terrorist acts perpetrated in many parts of the world.
Killing women and children, terrorizing peaceful citizens, destroying
property and taking innocent civilians hostage cannot be accepted under
any divine law; nor can they be accepted by any human being who believes
in justice and peace." (13)
Speaking in 1994, the then director-general of the Sudanese Foreign
Ministry, and subsequently Sudanese ambassador to the United States,
Mahdi Ibrahim, touched on American double-standards:
"How can you prove a negative? We have always believed that in Western
countries the defendant is innocent until proven guilty. In our case, it
is not like that. Until today, no information has been provided about a
terrorist harboured in our country." (14)
The 1994 Patterns of Global Terrorism once again stated that: "There is
no evidence that Sudan, which is dominated by the National Islamic Front
(NIF), conducted or sponsored a specific act of terrorism in 1994". The
report did claim that people associated with ANO, the Lebanese
Hizballah, the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS), the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and Egypt's Islamic Group are present in
Sudan. In what was described as a "positive development", the report did
record that the international terrorist "Carlos", Illyich Ramirez
Sanchez, was extradited to France. (15)
It is clear that the Clinton Administration's listing of Sudan as a
state sponsor of terrorism, in the absence of any proof or evidence of
such activity, was an abuse of United States anti-terrorism legislation
for policy reasons.
An even more clear cut example of the Administration's misuse of anti-
terrorism legislation for political reasons followed the
Administration's cruise missile attack on the al-Shifa medicines factory
in Khartoum. It is now abundantly evident that this attack, allegedly on
a chemical weapons facility owned by Osama bin-Laden, was a disastrous
intelligence failure. As will be outlined, every one of the American
claims about the al-Shifa factory proved to be false. Clinton
Administration officials also subsequently admitted that when they
attacked the factory they did not know who the owner was, Under
Secretary of State Thomas Pickering stating that who owned the plant
"was not known to us".
When, several days later, the American government learnt, from
subsequent media coverage of the attack, who actually owned the factory,
that person, Mr Saleh Idris, was then retrospectively listed under
legislation dealing with "specially designated terrorists". On 26
August, 1998, the Office of Foreign Assets Control, the unit within the
U.S. Treasury Department charged with the enforcement of anti-terrorism
sanctions, froze more than US$ 24 million of Mr Idris's assets. These
assets had been held in Bank of America accounts. On 26 February 1999,
Mr Idris filed an action in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia, for the release of his assets, claiming that the government's
actions had been unlawful. His lawyers stated that while the law used by
the Clinton Administration to freeze his assets required a finding that
Mr Idris was, or had been, associated with terrorist activities, no such
determination had ever been made. Mr Idris had never had any association
whatsoever with terrorists or terrorism. On 4 May 1999, the deadline by
which the government had to file a defence in court, the Clinton
Administration backed down and had to authorise the full and
unconditional release of his assets. (16)
The listing of Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism provides a macro
example of the Clinton Administration's abuse of anti-terrorist
legislation. The case of Mr Idris provides us with a micro example of
this misuse. The Clinton Administration's clear perversion of anti-
terrorist legislation and its manipulation and distortion of legal
measures for political expediency and convenience is not just immoral;
it also discredits American anti-terrorist legislation internationally.
WAIVING ANTI-TERRORIST LEGISLATION FOR DEMOCRATIC PARTY DONORS
At the same time, when convenient, the Administration has chosen to
ignore its own anti-terrorist legislation for economic and business
reasons. The Clinton Administration has, for example, granted sanctions
exemptions for the import of Sudanese gum arabic, an indispensable
foods, soft drinks and pharmaceutical stabiliser, of which Sudan has a
near monopoly. And, in an equally clear cut instance of hypocrisy, it is
also the case that in late 1996 the Clinton Administration had sought to
grant an exemption to Occidental Petroleum, an American oil company, to
become involved in the Sudanese oil industry.
The Occidental issue caused the Administration considerable
embarrassment. At a January 1997 press briefing, a State Department
spokesman defended the Administration's position by stating:
"If...individual financial transactions are found not to have an impact
on any potential act of terrorism or to fund any group that supports
terrorism, then these transactions...may be permitted". (17) The New
York Times commented that:
"Recent days brought word that last summer business considerations led
the White House to waive a law prohibiting American companies from doing
business with countries that sponsored terrorism. Specifically,
officials gave approval to the Occidental Petroleum Corporation to take
part in a $930 million oil project in Sudan...Washington's policy toward
the Sudanese regime now seems hopelessly confused. Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright did little to clarify it at her introductory news
conference last Friday. Even as she called for new United Nations
sanctions against Sudan, she endorsed the decision to let Occidental bid
for the oil contract." (18)
The Washington Post also commented:
"[T]he elasticity of the law as it comes to US economic interests - and
especially when those interests also happen to contribute generously to
the Democratic National Committee - will not go unnoticed...It can only
undercut U.S. efforts to isolate what it considers - or says it
considers - rogue states." (19)
THE MUBARAK ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT
The American government has claimed Sudanese involvement in the 1995
attempted assassination of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak. In June
1995, while in Addis Ababa, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was the
target of an assassination attempt. Several Egyptian terrorists tried to
kill him in a gun attack on his limousine This was one amongst many
attempts by Egyptian extremists to kill Egyptian ministers and
government officials. Islamic extremists had tried to assassination
Mubarak on several occasions, the first attempt being on 25 April 1982.
The London Independent newspaper of 2 July 1995 reported that the
Egyptian government initially accused the Ethiopian government of
involvement in the assassination attempt: "Egyptian investigators
claimed three Ethiopian security officials took part in the failed
assassination attempt". The Ethiopian government issued an official
statement refuting the Egyptian claim, stating:
"Egyptian officials have over the past week been spreading all sorts of
self-serving fantastic stories solely based on their imagination...It is
now appearing that the Egyptian appetite for the fabrication of lies in
connection with the crime committed by Egyptian terrorists is proving to
have no limit and they have at this point reached a state where Ethiopia
can no longer refrain from putting the record straight...The Egyptian
authorities are being requested through this statement...to refrain from
continuing with their unacceptable campaign of lies and defamation, the
full motive of which is known only to themselves." (20)
The then Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin blamed the murder attempt
on "Islamic fundamentalists with the encouragement of Iran". The Iranian
government countered by accusing Israel of involvement in the incident.
(21)
Shortly after accusing Ethiopia of involvement, however, Egypt then
accused the Sudanese government of having been involved. Sudan had
condemned the incident and strongly denied any involvement whatsoever.
The Egyptians claimed that three of the gunmen had fled to Sudan.
Thirty-two days after the assassination attempt, the Ethiopian
authorities provided the government of Sudan with the details of one of
the suspects who left Addis Ababa by air on the same day as the
incident. Among the only descriptions of these suspects were that one
wore a Casio watch, and that one was married. Over the following weeks
and months the United Nations demanded that Sudan extradite these men.
The Sudanese government called in Interpol to assist with the manhunt.
The government also published prominent 'wanted' notices in all the
Sudanese Arabic daily newspapers for three days running. The notice was
also published in the weekly English-language newspaper. Similar notices
were broadcast on national television and radio. The notices were also
sent to all Sudanese states, municipalities and localities. By March
1996, the Sudanese government had exhausted most if not all of the
options open to it in its manhunt and stated that it was possible that
one or two of the wanted men may have transited through Sudan. None
could be found given the limited information provided by the Egyptian
and Ethiopian authorities.
The only named suspect in the assassination attempt, Mustafa Hamza, one
of the three said to be in Sudan, was subsequently located and
interviewed by the international media in Afghanistan. A long interview
with Hamza was published in Al-Hayat newspaper on 21 April 1996. Hamza
stated that the Egyptian group, Al Gamaa al Islamiya, was responsible
for the murder attempt. He stated that most of the gunmen involved came
from Pakistan, travelling on passports issued by an Arab country, and
that one or two men had entered Ethiopia from Sudan, having received
visas from the Ethiopian embassy in Khartoum. He said that only one of
the gunmen had left through Sudan and that he was now in a third
country. Hamza stated that Sheikh Omer Abdel Rahman was the movement's
spiritual leader. Al-Hayat reported that Hamza stated that there were
"deep differences between the ruling Islamic Front in the Sudan and his
Group (Gamaa Islamiya). He accused the Sudanese Government [of following
a] distorted and deviated application of Islam". Simply put, the
Sudanese model of Islam was too liberal for him.
In spite of the fact that at least one of the alleged gunmen was clearly
in Afghanistan, that another was said to be in a third country, and that
the otherwise forthcoming chief suspect denied that a third suspect had
even been in Sudan, the United Nations, under American pressure, still
imposed limited sanctions on Sudan for not extraditing these suspects.
As late as December 1996, and in the face of clear evidence such as the
above interview in Afghanistan, the Ethiopian government was still
insisting all three of the suspects were still in Sudan. (22) The
subsequent trial of those suspects caught in Ethiopia itself was held in
closed session.
Middle East International reported in its 7 July 1995 issue that: "It
will be difficult to prove - or to disprove - the Sudan government's
involvement in the assassination attempt...But this is not a police
investigation, it is a political clash." That the Egyptian attitude was
variable was also revealed when one year later, Middle East
International reported that, on the occasion of meetings between
Presidents Mubarak and al-Bashir during the 1996 Arab Summit, the issue
of assassination attempt was described as a "triviality" by the Egyptian
state media. (23)
Despite the questions surrounding the Mubarak assassination attempt, the
United Nations Security Council passed resolutions 1044, 1054 and 1070.
Resolution 1054 introduced limited diplomatic sanctions, the scaling
down of Sudanese embassy staff and restrictions on travel by Sudanese
government officials. Resolution 1070 had sought to impose restrictions
on the international flights of Sudanese airlines but was never
implemented. The fact that in May 1997, the United States government was
still expecting Sudan to extradite someone, Mustafa Hamza, under pain of
continued sanctions, who had clearly been in Afghanistan for almost two
years, beyond Sudanese jurisdiction, shows how the issue is being
clearly exploited for propaganda and policy reasons. (24)
It should be noted that the Sudanese Government assurances that no trace
has been found of the three men in question were subsequently accepted
by both Egypt and Ethiopia. Khartoum has consulted extensively with both
the Ethiopian and Egyptian authorities on the issue, stating that there
is "complete understanding with the two Governments on all security
issues, including that of the three suspects". (25)
In keeping with this understanding both Egypt and Ethiopia have
supported the lifting of sanctions in question. (26) The Egyptian
government stated that having seen "a number of positive and encouraging
indications from the part of the Sudanese government" aimed at improving
Sudan's relations with Egypt, it supported the rescinding of the
sanctions. (27) The Ethiopian government said that "it is the conviction
of the Ethiopian Government that the concerns that gave rise to the
sanctions...no longer apply...Ethiopia is, therefore, of the view that
it is now time for the lifting of the sanctions imposed on the Sudan".
(28)
THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND ISLAMIC TERRORISM
It may well be the case that the American government were eager to
deflect as much focus on the issue of "Islamic terrorism" onto other
parties. As James Adams, the London Sunday Times Washington
correspondent, has pointed out, it was the United States which had spent
three billion dollars in training, equipping and, where necessary,
motivating Islamic fundamentalist combatants:
"The roots of this new terrorism lie not in Tehran but in the ten-year
war in Afghanistan which began after the Soviets invaded the country in
1979. Following the invasion, the American government embarked on what
was to become one of the largest covert efforts ever to fund, arm and
train a guerrilla army. Over ten years, the US spent a total of £3
billion in secret aid, which was running at around £600m a year just
before the Soviets withdrew in 1989. That money was spent largely on
supplying the guerrillas who were trained and housed by the Pakistan
government. Other Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, also
contributed to the underwriting of the guerrilla effort...At the time
the covert operation was under way, there was little concern in
Washington about who actually received the money or guns." (29)
The Economist in April 1993, touching on Egyptian President Hosni
Mubarak's concerns about Islamic terrorism:
"During the 1980s, America provided full-scale support for the
fundamentalist mujahideen, including the 20,000 or so outsiders who at
one time or another joined the Afghan fighters...Times change, but the
Afghan veterans continue to cause trouble, in Algeria as well as Egypt.
Mr Mubarak blames America for creating the basis of a terrorist network;
some conspiracy-minded Arabs believe that the old links between
fundamentalists and their American ex-supporters cannot simply have
faded away." (30)
Adams echoes the Economist's reporting when he states that "Both the
Pakistanis and the Egyptians blame the CIA for this legacy of terror".
(31) The London Observer newspaper referred to this phenomena as the
"Frankenstein the CIA created". (32)
Given its own somewhat tangible involvement in the funding and
sponsorship of what it itself would subsequently come to describe and
define as Islamic terrorists and international terrorism, much of it
subsequently focused upon allies such as Egypt, Algeria and Saudi
Arabia, and then on America itself, it makes considerable sense for the
United States government to cast around for people they can transfer
blame to. Sudan is one such candidate. It is also convenient for the
Egyptian government to blame Sudan for its problems just as it has
previously blamed the USA for creating a terrorist network.
The fact is that the United States government through its various
defence and intelligence agencies had spent up to three billion dollars
in training Islamic fundamentalist guerrillas from around the world, as
well as Afghans, in not only the use of weapons of war and explosives
but also how to master the logistics of how to supply and carry out acts
of war and sabotage against a variety of targets. All this training took
place within CIA-supervised camps in Pakistan. The United States
government had also extensively armed these same Islamic
fundamentalists, providing them with assault rifles, machine guns,
rocket launchers, explosives and quantities of American Stinger
surface-to-air missiles
.
THE WORLD TRADE CENTER BOMBING: CONTRADICTION AND CONFUSION
The World Trade Center in New York was bombed in February 1993. One
person died and dozens were injured when a car-bomb parked in the
Center's car-park went off. In March 1994, four Arabs were convicted of
having caused the explosion. Ten other people were later also convicted
in connection with the World Trade Center bombing and other terrorist
conspiracies. In a remarkably clumsy way, the Clinton Administration has
from time to time sought to insinuate that Sudan was somehow involved in
the bombing.
Given the Clinton Administration's obvious eagerness to attribute any
act of terrorism to Sudan, it is clear that had there been the slightest
evidence of the Sudanese government's involvement in such a direct
attack on the United States, it would have both been heralded around the
world immediately and acted upon. Given that the World Trade Center/New
York conspiracies had been extensively penetrated by both the CIA and
FBI, as was clearly revealed during the trials (33), had there been the
remotest link between Sudan and the bombings it would have been
documented. It is an ironic fact, as the Economist has also documented,
that several of the suspects in the bombing of the World Trade Centre
had 'Afghani' connections. (34) One of the prime suspects, Mahmoud Abu-
Halima, was himself an 'Afghani', having been militarily trained in
Pakistan at an American-sponsored base.
In its attempts to implicate Sudan in the World Trade Center bombing,
the Clinton Administration has contradicted itself on several occasions.
In March 1993, for example, the United States government stated that the
World Trade Center bombing was carried out by a poorly trained local
group of individuals who were not under the auspices of a foreign
government or international network. (35) In June 1993, the American
authorities again stated there was no evidence of foreign involvement in
the New York bombing or conspiracies. (36) The American government then
reversed its position in August 1993 alleging Sudanese involvement in
the New York bomb plots. (37 (This may well have been related to the
fact that it was then convenient to do so given the policy decision to
list Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism). This finding was in any
event subsequently comprehensively contradicted in 1996 by Ambassador
Philip C. Wilcox Jr., the Department of State's Coordinator for
Counterterrorism. On the occasion of the release of the 1995 Patterns of
Global Terrorism, on 30 April 1996, Ambassador Wilcox made it very clear
that there was no Sudanese involvement whatsoever in the World Trade
Center bombings:
"We have looked very, very carefully and pursued all possible clues that
there might be some state sponsorship behind the World Trade Center
bombing. We have found no such evidence, in spite of an exhaustive
search, that any state was responsible for that crime. Our information
indicates that Ramzi Ahmed Yousef and his gang were a group of freelance
terrorists, many of whom were trained in Afghanistan, who came from
various nations but who did not rely on support from any state." (38)
Yet, earlier that month, on 3 April, the then American ambassador to the
U.N., Madeleine Albright, in meetings at the United Nations, claimed
that two Sudanese diplomats had been involved in the World Trade Center
bombing, and other "plots". (39) This presents an interesting situation.
The political appointee, Mrs Albright, with a political and policy line
to follow, claiming one thing, and the professional anti-terrorism
expert, Ambassador Wilcox, saying something completely different. On an
issue as serious as allegations of terrorism, allegations involving the
murderous bombing of the World Trade Center and a conspiracy to bomb
other targets in New York, such as divergence is totally unacceptable
and once again only but undermines the credibility of American claims
with regard to Sudanese "involvement" in terrorism.
It is disturbing to note that in March 2000, seven years after the World
Trade Center bombing, and four years after Ambassador Wilcox gave the
definitive answer stating there was no Sudanese involvement, President
Clinton's special envoy to Sudan, former Congressman Harry Johnston, was
still insinuating Sudanese complicity, stating that all those involved
in the bombing has carried Sudanese passports. (40) First of all, as
stated above, only five of the fifteen people arrested were Sudanese.
Nationality in and of itself is no evidence for a state's involvement in
terrorism, and particularly in the case of the World Trade Center
bombing. A number of those involved were Egyptian, would this mean that
Egypt was complicit in the bombing? Others were Americans and
Palestinians. Two other American citizens have been indicted for their
involvement in the East African embassy bombings. Does this necessarily
imply that the American government was somehow involved?
THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION AND THE AL-SHIFA FACTORY BOMBING FIASCO
[T]he strike in regards to the Khartoum chemical plant cannot be
justified...These are pretty harsh words. I know one thing for sure. The
intelligence agencies of other countries look at that and they think,
'Wait a minute, if you hit the wrong target or if in fact the
justification was not accurate, it is either ineptitude or, to get back
to the wag-the-dog theory, something else is going on. That gets to our
credibility. And that is why both the administration and the Congress
must insist on a foreign policy where if you draw a line in the sand, if
you make a statement, your credibility is tremendously important.
U.S. Senator Pat Roberts (41)
The Clinton Administration's cruise missile attack on the al-Shifa
medicines factory in Khartoum in August 1998 provides a case study of
the Administration's bumbling and incompetent intelligence and policy
process with regards to claims of Sudanese involvement in international
terrorism.
On 7 August 1998, terrorist bombs devastated United States embassy
buildings in Kenya and Tanzania. Hundreds of people, some of them
American, were killed in the explosion in Nairobi and dozens in the
blast in Dar-es-Salaam. Thousands more were injured. The American
government linked Osama bin-Laden, the Saudi-born millionaire funder of
Islamic extremism with these attacks. It is worth noting that the
Sudanese government immediately and repeatedly condemned the embassy
bombings. The Sudanese foreign minister, Dr Mustafa Osman Ismail,
stated, for example, that: "These criminal acts of violence do not lead
to any goal." (42) On 11 August, Agence France Presse reported the
Sudanese foreign minister's statement that "We must pool our efforts to
eradicate all the causes of terrorism" and he had called for:
"the solidarity and cooperation of all the nations in the region and the
international community to stand up to international terrorism." (43)
It is a matter of record that the Sudanese government took its
condemnation of the Kenyan and Tanzanian bombings one step further.
Sudan offered to help in tracking down the terrorists involved. The
foreign minister stated that: "Sudan supports Kenya in its efforts to
reach the people who committed the incident and is prepared to cooperate
fully with it in this regard." (44) The government of Sudan also
immediately granted United States requests for access to Sudanese
airspace to evacuate American diplomatic staff and citizens from Kenya,
and to provide emergency assistance to those affected in the bombing.
When the United States requested further humanitarian overflight
authorisations they too were granted. No one, not even the Clinton
Administration, can claim that the Sudanese Government in any way
supported or even sympathised with these despicable bombings.
On 20 August, the United States government launched missile attacks,
involving 75 Cruise missiles, on installations said to be part of Osama
bin-Laden's infrastructure inside Afghanistan. Washington also chose to
attack the al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum, the capital of
Sudan, alleging that it was making chemical weapons as part of Osama
bin-Laden's infrastructure of international terrorism. The al-Shifa
plant was badly damaged by the 17 Cruise missiles used in the American
attack. Several workers were injured in the attack. A nightwatchman died
of his injuries. Two food processing factories were also damaged in the
strike. (45)
The United States government made several, widely-reported, claims about
the al-Shifa factory. In the news briefing given by United States
Defence Secretary, William Cohen, on 20 August, he stated that the al-
Shifa factory "produced the precursor chemicals that would allow the
production of...VX nerve agent". Secretary Cohen also stated that Osama
bin-Laden "has had some financial interest in contributing to...this
particular facility".(46)
The American government also claimed that no commercial medicines or
drugs were made at the factory. The New York Times, for example,
reported: "statements by a senior intelligence official hours after the
attack that the plant in Khartoum...produced no commercial products."
(47) President Clinton's National Security Advisor, Sandy Berger, went
on record stating:
"There is no question in our mind that facility, that factory, was used
to produce a chemical that is used in the manufacture of VX nerve gas
and has no other commercial distribution as far as we understand. We
have physical evidence of that fact and very, very little doubt of it."
(48)
ABC News also stated that senior intelligence officials had claimed
that: "there was no evidence that commercial products were ever sold out
of the facility." (49)
In the briefings shortly after the bombing United States officials also
claimed that the al-Shifa facility was heavily guarded. (50) In a
briefing on the al-Shifa factory soon after the strike on Khartoum, a
senior American intelligence official told reporters in Washington that:
"The facility also has a secured perimeter and it's patrolled by the
Sudanese military." (51)
One would presume that the intelligence officials involved in these, and
other briefings, would have been the cream of the American intelligence
community. They would also be presenting the latest intelligence
material the United States government had to hand to justify its Cruise
missile attack on Sudan - information which would have been gathered by
the intelligence agencies of the most powerful country on Earth,
intelligence agencies which have budgets running into billions of
dollars. Every one of their claims proved to be demonstrably false.
Within hours of the attack, the Sudanese President, Omer al-Bashir, said
that Sudan would be bring an official complaint at the American action
before the United Nations Security Council and that the Sudanese
government would also ask the United Nations to establish "a commission
to verify the nature of the activity of the plant." (52) President
Bashir flatly denied American claims that the al-Shifa plant was being
used to make chemical weapons. He accused President Clinton of lying:
"Putting out lies is not new for the United States and its president. A
person of such immorality will not hesitate to tell any lie." (53)
President Bashir also stated that Sudan was critical of the United
States government, and not of American companies or citizens: "We have
no animosity towards the American people and non-government agencies."
(54) In a formal letter to the United Nations Security Council, Bishop
Gabriel Rorich, the Sudanese Minister of State for External Affairs,
condemned the American attack on the factory. The Sudanese government
stated that the factory was privately owned and had been financed by
several Sudanese investors and the Bank of the Preferential Trade Area
(PTA), also known as Comesa. The factory produced more than half of
Sudan's need for medicines. The Sudanese government stated:
"The allegations in U.S. statements that Osama bin-Laden owned this
factory and that it produced chemical weapons and poisonous gases for
terrorist purposes are allegations devoid of truth and the U.S.
government has no evidence for this."
Sudan requested the convening of the Security Council to discuss the
matter, and also requested a technical fact-finding mission to verify
American claims. (55) The United States deputy ambassador to the United
Nations, Peter Burleigh, dismissed Sudanese calls for independent
verification of the site:
"I don't see what the purpose of the fact-finding study would be. We
have credible information that fully justifies the strike we made on
that one facility in Khartoum." (56)
The Sudanese government also stated that it was prepared to allow
Americans to visit Khartoum to establish whether the al-Shifa factory
was involved in the production of chemical weapons. (57) The Sudanese
interior minister, Abdel Rahim Hussein, repeated invitations to
investigate the site to the London Sunday Times: "We are ready to
receive specialists from the Americans and the West to investigate that
the factory had nothing to do with chemical weapons." (58)
The Sudanese foreign minister also invited an investigation committee
from the United States government itself to come and investigate
"whether this factory...has anything to do with chemical (weapons)."
(59) On 22 August, the Sudanese President invited the United States
Congress to send a fact-finding mission: "We are fully ready to provide
protection and all other facilities to enable this mission to obtain all
information and meet anyone it wants." (60) In the weeks and months
following the al-Shifa bombing, the Sudan would repeatedly call on the
United Nations and United States to inspect the remains of the factory
for any evidence of chemical weapons production. The Americans have
steadfastly refused to inspect the site. This is ironic given that in
1998, the United States and Britain militarily attacked Iraq because
that country would not allowed the inspection of certain factories and
the remains of factories, but when the Sudanese requested a similar
inspection of a site claimed to have been a chemical weapons factory,
the Clinton Administration pointedly refused. The Washington Post quoted
a Sudanese diplomat at the United Nations:
"You guys bombed Iraq because it blocked U.N. weapons inspectors. We're
begging for a U.N. inspection and you're blocking it." (61)
Almost immediately following the American attack and their claims that
the factory was producing chemical weapons, credible voices began to
doubt the American justification for their strike. Amongst these voices
were several Britons who had either worked at the factory, or who had
visited it. What the factory produced, and its ownership, was addressed
by Ghazi Suleiman, the lawyer representing Salah Idris, the owner of the
al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory. It should be noted that that Mr
Suleiman is no friend of the present government in Sudan. He is, in the
words of The Economist, "the country's leading human-rights lawyer and
an outspoken critic of the regime". (62) He spent 25 days in detention
earlier in 1998. Mr Suleiman said that Mr Idris did not know Osama bin-
Laden, and that the factory produced only drugs, not chemical weapons.
He said:
"I think the Americans are under bad information and they are not well
briefed.... I think it would have been prudent before destroying the
plant to come and investigate the site."
The factory had been designed by an American, Henry Jobe, of the world-
renowned MSD Pharmaceutical Company. Interviewed by the London Observer
newspaper, Mr Jobe stated: "We didn't intend a dual use for it. We
didn't design anything extra in there. The design we made was for
pharmaceuticals." (63) It is perhaps indicative of the pattern of
American intelligence incompetence in its assessment of the al-Shifa
factory, that Mr Jobe revealed that he was interviewed for the first
time by the CIA about the plant and its equipment, one week after the
American missile strike. (64)
The Sudanese government invited journalists from the print and
electronic media into the country to inspect the bombed factory. The
Washington Post reported that whereas the government has "routinely
declined visas to American journalists because the United States has
declared it to be a terrorist state" it now "ushered in reporters by the
score...to photograph, videotape and broadcast live". The Washington
Post reported that visiting reporters from American, British, French,
German, Japanese and Arab media outlets were "picking through the
rubble". (65) Amongst the dozens of journalists and news services who
visited the site, was the flagship American international news gatherer,
CNN. It reported:
"The utter destruction in the wake of a missile attack...Laid out in
display: what the government says are remnants of the missiles salvaged
from the rubble, all part of a concerted campaign to persuade the
international community that Sudan has nothing to hide. And repeated
calls, too, for an independent inspection team to investigate the site.
The government here apparently confident that no trace of any agent used
in the manufacture of chemical weapons will be found." (66)
It is evident that there was distinct unease amongst Khartoum's foreign
diplomatic corps at the targeting of the al-Shifa factory. It was
reported that the German ambassador to Sudan, Werner Daum, had
immediately contradicted United States claims about the factory. In a
communication to the German foreign ministry, he stated: "One can't,
even if one wants to, describe the Shifa firm as a chemical factory."
(67) The German ambassador also stated that the factory had no disguise
and there was nothing secret about the site.(68) The Guardian, reporting
from Khartoum, stated that "most European diplomats here are as aghast
at the raid, and above all the choice of target, as they (the Sudanese
government) are". The paper interviewed a senior European diplomat who
said that: "There was absolutely nothing secret about the plant and
there never has been." (69)
THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION AND THE AL-SHIFA FACTORY: UNTENABLE CLAIMS
The American intelligence claims about the al-Shifa factory fell by the
wayside one by one. The United States government made five claims about
the al-Shifa factory in its attempts to justify its Cruise missile
attack on the plant. These were as follows: the al-Shifa plant was
making precursors to the VX nerve gas, namely a compound known as Empta;
that Osama bin-Laden either owned or had a financial link to the al-
Shifa factory; that the al-Shifa factory did not produce any medicines
or drugs; that the al-Shifa factory was a high security facility guarded
by the Sudanese military; and that there were weapons of mass
destruction technology links between Sudan and Iraq. An examination and
assessment of the evidence released by the United States found it to be
confused, inconclusive and contradictory. After just over one week of
sifting through American government claims, The Observer newspaper spoke
of:
"a catalogue of US misinformation, glaring omissions and intelligence
errors about the function of the plant." (70)
The claim that the al-Shifa plant was making precursors to the VX nerve
gas was immediately challenged by American and European scientists,
chemists and chemical warfare experts. Evidence of such claims was
demanded. While claiming to have "physical evidence" to support their
attack on al-Shifa, United States officials initially said that they
would not be able to release it for security reasons. Speaking on CNN's
Late Edition on 22 August, the President's National Security Adviser,
Sandy Berger, refused to describe the "physical evidence" the government
had, saying that it was necessary to protect intelligence methods and
sources. In the days following the attack, Bill Richardson, the United
States ambassador to the United Nations, said that that the United
States government was in possession of "undeniable physical evidence"
that al-Shifa was being used to manufacture chemical weapons. He
admitted that the American government had not presented this evidence to
the United Nations Security Council, but that it had been shown to
United States congressional leaders. Richardson stated that "We believe
that is sufficient". (71)
After further international pressure, the United States government
officials then stated on 24 August that the United States had material
from the plant, including equipment and containers which carried
residues of a chemical substance with no commercial uses, but which it
was said was exclusively used in VX nerve gas. (72) It was additionally
stated by the two anonymous officials that the CIA had used light
spectrum data collected by spy satellites to analyse emissions from the
plant and that they may also have employed banded migratory birds that
fly through Khartoum to gather information about production at the
plant. (73)
The United States position then shifted, and on 25 August it claimed
that the key evidence justifying its destruction of the al-Shifa plant
was in fact a soil sample of a precursor chemical in the making of the
VX nerve gas obtained months previously from the factory. (74) The
United States government then refused to identify what they claimed to
be the precursor. (75) The White House press spokesman, Mike McCurry,
speaking on 24 August, stated, for example, that: "The nature of that
information is classified now." (76) After several days of attempting to
avoid naming the compound, the American government stated that the
chemical was said to be O-ethylmethyl-phosphonothioic acid, or EMPTA.
The American Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering went on record to
claim that:
"The physical evidence is a soil sample, analysis of it shows the
presence of a chemical whose simple name is EMPTA, a known precursor for
the nerve agent VX....We think that it was this evidence, and evidence
like it, which made our decision to carry out this strike on this
particular target the correct and proper decision under the
circumstances." (77)
The soil samples were said to have been obtained from the factory
itself. (78) An American intelligence official added that:
"It is a substance that has no commercial applications, it doesn't occur
naturally in the environment, it's not a by-product of any other
chemical process. The only thing you can use it for, that we know of, is
to make VX." (79)
This was immediately challenged by the New York Times, which stated
that: "The chemical precursor of a nerve agent that Washington claimed
was made at a Sudanese chemical factory it destroyed in a missile attack
last week could be used for commercial products." (80) The New York
Times cited the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
(OPCW) as stating that the chemical could be used "in limited quantities
for legitimate commercial purposes". These purposes could be use in
fungicides, and anti-microbial agents. It should be noted that the OPCW
is an independent international agency which oversees the inspections of
governments and companies to ensure they are not making substances that
contravene the chemical weapons ban treaty.
There also appeared to be confusion in the official American government
claims about the Empta compound. On 26 August, the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency stated that Empta was listed as a so-called Schedule
1 chemical - an immediate chemical weapons precursor with no recognised
commercial use - by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons. The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency then changed its
public stance within a matter of hours, after OPCW officials said that
Empta could have commercial uses. Contradicting American government
claims, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons said
that the organisation classifies Empta on its Schedule 2b of compounds
that could be used to make chemical weapons but which also have
commercial uses. The OPCW said that Empta is identified with a process
to make plastics flexible and also with some fungicides and anti-
microbial agents. (81)
Sources at the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons also
pointed out that Empta is difficult to isolate when in soil. A chemical
weapons expert at OPCW also stated that pesticide traces in the soil
could result in a false-positive result. (82) Mike Hiskey, an expert at
the world-renowned Los Alamos National Laboratory in the United States,
said that the chemical had commercial uses, including the manufacture of
some herbicides and pesticides. (83) The Guardian also reported that: "a
search of scientific papers showed that it could be used in a variety of
circumstances." (84)
The London Observer also stated that:
"US credibility has been further dented by Western scientists who have
pointed out that the same ingredients are used for chemical weapons and
beer, and that mustard gas is similar in make-up to the anti-clogging
agent in biro ink. It has also been pointed out that the cherry
flavouring in sweets is one of the constituent parts of the gas used in
combat. Empta also has commercial uses not linked to chemical weapons."
(85)
The Sudanese government directly challenged American claims to have a
soil sample. The Sudanese information minister, Dr Ghazi Saleheddin,
stated:
"They have not produced any convincing evidence. We have to be satisfied
that the United States is not making this up. It's not enough to produce
soil which could have been made up in the United States itself, and to
claim that the soil contains toxic agents. For a factory to produce
toxic agents, you need special facilities, special preparations, special
storage areas and preparations facilities. You can't keep things to
yourself and keep claiming you have the final proof without allowing
people to verify your claims." (86)
The Observer reported that American intelligence sources were moving to
"less and less credible positions". (87) On 6 September 1998, The
Washington Post, in an editorial entitled 'Intelligence Lapse?', called
American intelligence claims about the al-Shifa factory into question:
"the possibility of an intelligence failure in the choice of targets in
Sudan is so awful to contemplate...But enough questions have been
raised, and the administration's story has been often enough revised, to
warrant further inquiry...How could the CIA not have known more about
the factory - not have known what so many ordinary citizens apparently
knew? Some officials reportedly pointed to a search of the factory's
Internet site that listed no products for sale. We can only hope that,
if the administration could speak more openly, it could make a more
persuasive case. At a minimum, there is room here for congressional
intelligence committees to inquire further."
This Washington Post editorial was amongst the first of many American
newspaper editorials and articles explicitly questioning the Clinton
Administration's attack on the al-Shifa factory. In February 1999,
extensive tests by Professor Thomas Tullius, chairman of the chemistry
department at Boston University, on samples taken from the wrecked al-
Shifa plant and its grounds, found that "to the practical limits of
scientific detection, there was no Empta or Empa, its breakdown
product." (88)
The claim that Osama bin-Laden either owned or had a financial link to
the al-Shifa factory also quickly unravelled. The United States
government claimed that Osama bin-Laden either owned or had a financial
interest in the al-Shifa factory. This was denied both by the owner and
the Sudanese government. Mr Suleiman, the al-Shifa company's lawyer
confirmed that the owner was a Sudanese businessman, Salah Idris. The
plant had been established by Bashir Hassan Bashir, and had been sold in
March 1997 to Mr Idris. (89) Interviewed in late 1999, Under Secretary
of State Thomas Pickering admitted that when the U.S. Government
attacked the al-Shifa factory, who actually owned the plant "was not
known to us". (90) That is to say that despite the fact that Mr Idris
had owned the factory for 18 months prior to the American attack, the
American intelligence community were unaware of that fact. All any of
the U.S. government's many intelligence agencies had to do to ascertain
who owned the al-Shifa factory was telephone the factory, or ask any of
the European ambassadors - including the British ambassador - who had
visited the plant and knew the owner.
On 25 August a United States intelligence official, giving an official
briefing to the media on the American missile strikes admitted that the
ties between bin-Laden and the al-Shifa factory were "fuzzy". (91) On
the same day, Reuters reported that a United States intelligence
official had said that he: "could not confirm any direct financial link
between Bin Laden and the plant." (92) The Washington Post reported
that: "Within days, however, U.S. officials began pulling back from
directly linking bin Laden to El Shifa Pharmaceutical." (93) By 31
August, it was being reported by The New York Times that: "Some U.S.
officials now say Mr. bin Laden's financial support...did not directly
flow to the plant itself"
In a 1 September briefing, American Defence Secretary Cohen was forced
to admit that the evidence linking bin-Laden to the al-Shifa plant "was
a little tenuous". (94) That is to say, two weeks after the American
government destroyed the al-Shifa factory because, in large part,
American intelligence claimed that Osama bin-Laden either owned, part-
owned, or had a financial interest in, the al-Shifa factory, the best
the American Defence Secretary could come up with was that the claimed
link was "a little tenuous".
The Clinton Administration's claim that the al-Shifa factory had no
commercial products was also quickly disproven. The American news
service, ABC News, stated that senior intelligence officials had claimed
in relation to the al-Shifa factory that: "there was no evidence that
commercial products were ever sold out of the facility." (95) President
Clinton's National Security Advisor, Sandy Berger, personally stated
that the Al-Shifa factory: "has no other commercial distribution as far
as we understand. We have physical evidence of that fact and very, very
little doubt of it." (96)
The factory's lawyer, and Sudan's most prominent anti-government
activist, Ghazi Suleiman, said that the factory produced 60 percent of
Sudan's pharmaceutical drugs, including antibiotics, malaria tablets and
syrups, as well as drugs for diabetes, ulcers, tuberculosis, rheumatism
and hypertension. (97) He stated that the factory had employed three
hundred workers, supporting some three thousand people. (98) Mr Suleiman
also echoed Sudanese government calls for a fact-finding mission to
examine the factory ruins to verify American claims of chemical weapons
production. (99) The factory's components had been imported from the
United States, Sweden, Italy, Switzerland, Germany, India and Thailand.
(100) Mr Bekheit Abdallah Yagoub, the deputy commissioner of the
Sudanese Humanitarian Aid Commission, said the factory supplied 70
percent of the drug needs of southern, eastern and western Sudan, areas
wracked by famine and disease. (101) Journalists who visited the site
were able to find thousands of containers and bottles of human
medication and animal drugs, clear evidence of the factory's commercial
production.
If this was not enough evidence, al-Shifa had been in the process of
filling a United Nations-approved contract to provide Iraq with $200,000
worth of 'Shifzole 2.5 percent (Albndazole 2.5 percent for Levamisole)',
a deworming drug for animals, a contract approved in January 1998 by the
United Nation's Iraqi sanctions committee in January 1998 as part of the
"oil for food" programme. (102) One would have presumed that the
American government, and particularly its intelligence agencies, would
have been vigorously monitoring any of the United Nations contracts for
Iraq.
The United States government eventually conceded that the al-Shifa
factory had in fact been commercially producing medicines and drugs.
Some days after the missile strike, State Department spokesman James
Foley admitted, for example: "That facility may very well have been
producing pharmaceuticals." (103) The London Times also confirmed the
Clinton Administration's belated acceptance of this fact: "Now they
admit it made 60 percent of Sudan's medicine." (104) On 31 August, it
was reported that the Pentagon itself admitted that there had been an
intelligence failure on the part of the United States government in not
being aware of the commercial production of medicines and drugs: "Some
of the intelligence people didn't know they would find any of that
there." (105)
For the National Security Advisor to have publicly made such a mistake
over what should have been the very easily verifiable issue of whether
al-Shifa produced medicines or is yet another key indicator as to the
quality and accuracy of American intelligence on the factory. A simple
telephone call to the Sudanese chamber of commerce would have sufficed.
On 1 September 1998, in an extraordinary development, in a special
briefing to United States senators by a senior intelligence officer, it
was further stated that the al-Shifa plant had been targeted, at least
in part, because, in the words of Associated Press, "no evidence that
any pharmaceuticals were being produced or sold" by the al-Shifa factory
had been was available on the al-Shifa website. That is to say, one of
the official reasons given as to why the factory was hit by Cruise
missiles was in effect because it had not updated its internet site.
(106)
The Clinton Administration had also claimed that the al-Shifa factory
was a high security facility guarded by the Sudanese military. In a
briefing on the al-Shifa factory soon after the strike on Khartoum, a
senior American intelligence official told reporters in Washington that:
"The facility also has a secured perimeter and it's patrolled by the
Sudanese military." (107) United States government claims that the
factory was a heavily-guarded, military installation with restricted
access, were almost immediately comprehensively contradicted by western
journalists. The Economist, for example, reported that the al-Shifa
factory was "open to the street", contrasting with other heavily guarded
areas of Khartoum. (108) Associated Press stated that: "There are no
signs of secrecy at the plant. Two prominent signs along the road point
to the factory, and foreigners have been allowed to visit the site at
all hours." (109) The only "military" guard was the old nightwatchman
killed in the missile attack.
The Clinton Administration also attempted to justify its strike with the
claim that there were weapons of mass destruction technology links
between Sudan and Iraq. Some four days after the attack on the al-Shifa
factory, the United States government position and focus shifted once
again. Unable to prove anything specific, the American government then
fell back on to broader claims. In a news article on 25 August 1998,
entitled 'U.S. Intelligence Cites Iraqi Tie to Sudan Plant', for
example, Associated Press reported that: "Intelligence officials are
leaning toward the theory that Iraq was spreading its knowledge of
chemical weapons production to other Muslim countries." (110)
On the same day, in an article entitled 'Times: U.S. says Iraq aided
Sudan on chemical weapons', Reuters reported on American government
claims of weapons of mass destruction technology transfer from Iraq to
Sudan. (111) The United States government then claimed that the factory
was attacked because of alleged links with Iraq. The Guardian reported,
for example, that:
"President Clinton's decision to launch the strikes was at least partly
influenced by reports that intelligence officers had intercepted phone
calls between scientists at the factory and top officials in Iraq's
chemical weapons programme." (112)
It is perhaps needless to say that the Clinton Administration refused to
name the Sudanese scientists who were said to be in telephone contact
with people in Iraq, and has not released transcripts or tapes of the
alleged conversations. It is a matter of record, however, that in
February 1998, the United States government had itself denied that there
was no evidence for chemical weapons or technology transfers from Iraq
to Sudan, stating that
"We have no credible evidence that Iraq has exported weapons of mass
destruction technology to other countries since the (1991) Gulf War."
(113)
In addition to the American government, in February and March 1998, the
British government also stated that there was no evidence for any
weapons of mass destruction technology transfers from Iraq to Sudan.
This was the view of both the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the
Defence Intelligence staff of the British Ministry of Defence. On 19
March 1998, Baroness Symons, the then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, stated in the House of Lords
in relation to claims of weapons of mass destruction technology
transfers, including chemical and biological weapons, from Iraq to
Sudan, that:
"We are monitoring the evidence closely, but to date we have no evidence
to substantiate these claims.... Moreover, we know that some of the
claims are untrue...The defence intelligence staff in the MoD (Ministry
of Defence) have similarly written a critique which does not support the
report's findings." (114)
Baroness Symons also stated that: "Nor has the United Nations Special
Commission reported any evidence of such transfers since the Gulf War
conflict and the imposition of sanctions in 1991." (115) Even the broad
American claim of weapons of mass destruction technology transfer from
Iraq to Sudan was simply unsustainable.
The Clinton Administration's attack on al-Shifa was roundly condemned
within the international community. On 23 August, 1998, both the
Organisation of the Islamic Conference, a pan-Islamic organisation
representing Islamic countries, and the League of Arab States, made up
of 22 Arab countries, condemned the United States missile strike on
Sudan, calling the attack "a blatant violation" of the Charter of the
U.N. (116) The Organisation of African Unity also called for an
independent investigation of the al-Shifa site. American allies such as
France and Italy also expressed doubts about Washington's claims about
al-Shifa. (117)
On 3 September 1998, the summit meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement,
meeting in Durban, South Africa, and representing well over one hundred
countries, passed the following resolution:
"The Heads of State or Government...expressed their deep concern over
the air attack carried out by the United States Government against the
El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Plant in the Sudan on 20 August 1998, and
considered this as a serious violation of the principles of
international law and the UN Charter and contrary to the principles of
peaceful settlement of disputes as well as a serious threat to the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Sudan and the regional
stability and international peace and security. They further considered
this attack as a unilateral and unwarranted act. The Heads of State or
Government condemned this act of aggression and the continuing threats
made by the United States Government against the Sudan and urged the US
Government to refrain from such unilateral acts. They further expressed
support to the Sudan in its legitimate demands for full compensation for
economic and material losses resulting from the attack." (118)
Far from isolating Sudan, American policy had led to an unprecedented
level of international support and sympathy for the Khartoum
authorities, as well as strengthening the government domestically.
What was perhaps even more disturbing than the systematic unravelling of
the Clinton Administration's stated reasons for attacking the al-Shifa
factory itself, was the shambolic way in which the factory was targeted.
It was revealed in the weeks after the raid that the decision to attack
the factory was taken by a very small number of predominantly civilian
aides to President Clinton. The White House went ahead with the attack
on al-Shifa without informing four of the five members of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. Neither was the FBI informed, even though the agency
was directly responsible for investigating the terrorist bombings of the
two American embassies which precipitated the attack. The US Attorney
General Janet Reno was informed, but she was ignored when she questioned
the strength of the evidence available. The Defense Intelligence Agency,
the Pentagon's own intelligence service, was also not informed of the
attack. (119)
It has, of course, been openly speculated upon that the decision to
attack Afghanistan and Sudan was intimately linked to the Monica
Lewinsky scandal. Articles such as Vanity Fair's 'Weapons of Mass
Destruction' articulated just such concerns.(120) It might be pointed
out, in passing, that President Clinton showed a marked reluctance to
agree to scientific tests in both cases.
In a New York Times article published one year after the bombing,
further details of the intelligence blunders surrounding the decision to
attack al-Shifa emerged. There was considerable doubt about the
targeting of al-Shifa even within the small group of people involved in
the decision to attack. The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence
and Research had cautioned the Secretary of State before the attack,
questioning the links between al-Shifa and bin Laden. These concerns
were put in writing. Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering conceded
that intelligence analysts had expressed concerns about the target
before the attack. Asked how serious these concerns were, Pickering
stated that "[t]hey were serious enough to send a memorandum..." When
the Bureau of Intelligence and Research attempted to raise the issue
again following the attack, their report was spiked by Pickering.
Following the attack other intelligence officials questioned the
validity of the al-Shifa strike. These have included the head of the
CIA's Directorate of Operations, the Directorate's Africa chief and the
head of the CIA Counterterrorism Center. (121)
The al-Shifa bombing has been compared to the bombing of the Chinese
embassy in Belgrade during NATO's war over Kosovo. While the Belgrade
incident was the result of similarly mistaken targeting by CIA
intelligence sources, that is where the comparison ends. The Chinese
embassy bombing was one of thousands of targets selected during NATO's
intensive bombing campaign against Yugoslav targets. It is a sad reality
that when one bombs thousands of targets, some mistakes will be made. No
such excuse exists for the bombing of the al-Shifa factory. Given the
Clinton Administration's repeated claims of Sudanese state sponsorship
of terrorism, and that the al-Shifa factory had allegedly been under
suspicion and observed for months, there is simply no excuse for such an
intelligence failure.
THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION AND SUDAN: A SYSTEMIC INTELLIGENCE FAILURE
Highlighted by the al-Shifa fiasco, the Clinton Administration's
intelligence and information on Sudan in general and "terrorism" in
particular, and the way the administration has chosen to interpret and
use intelligence, has self-evidently been abysmal. The Clinton
Administration is served by thirteen separate intelligence agencies.
Their budget amounts to almost thirty billion dollars a year: 85 percent
of this budget is dedicated to military intelligence. The primary
mission of these intelligence agencies is "to collect, evaluate, and
disseminate foreign intelligence to assist the President and senior US
Government policymakers in making decisions relating to the national
security". (122) Amongst the many resources at the disposal of these
intelligence agencies are satellites that can see everything imaginable
and that can monitor every electronic communication on the face of the
earth.
One would have assumed that allegations of weapons of mass destruction
technology, and factories allegedly engaged in the production of such
weapons, particularly in the hands of people apparently of people such
as Osama bin Laden, would have been of considerable significance to
American "national security". One would have imagined that some of the
immense resources briefly mentioned above would have been focused on
every facet of the al-Shifa factory in Khartoum. Indeed, the Clinton
Administration claimed that the al-Shifa medicines factory had been
under surveillance for several months before the Cruise missile attack
which destroyed the plant. (123)
It would appear, however, that despite having monitored the al-Shifa
factory for all that time and despite the awesome array of intelligence
resources and assets at their disposal, it was beyond the ability of the
American intelligence community to ascertain who owned Sudan's biggest
pharmaceutical factory, and in spite of the fact that the factory was
publicly mortgaged. It is also clear that far from being able to
ascertain whether the al-Shifa medicines factory produced any chemical
weapons, the American intelligence community were not even able to
ascertain whether al-Shifa produced any commercial products - despite
the fact that the factory produced two-thirds of Sudan's medicines and
animal drug needs, and held United Nations drug contracts. A simple low-
tech telephone call to the Sudanese chamber of commerce, or to the
factory itself, or to any of the various ambassadors - including the
British ambassador - who had visited the factory, would have answered
several of the questions which the Clinton Administration so publicly
got wrong in the days following the bombing. This almost unbelievable
intelligence failure is also all the more surprising given the fact that
Washington had previously enjoyed a warm military and intelligence
relationship with Sudan in the 1980s, and despite the fact that unlike
intelligence gathering in other countries such as Libya, Iraq or Iran,
which is very difficult given the closed nature of those countries,
Sudan is, in the words of the Guardian, "one of the most open and
relaxed Arab countries". (124)
That the Clinton Administration chose to act on what has subsequently
been seen to be faulty intelligence is a reflection of poor judgement on
the part of the Administration. Equally unacceptable has been the
Administration's tendency to ignore intelligence concerns when they
conflicted with stated policy. To have allowed intelligence gathering
and analysis on Sudan to degenerate as much has it clearly did is a
reflection of bad government. Both are compounded by the
Administration's clear attempts to then defend questionable stances
towards Sudan by hiding behind "intelligence" which could not be
"revealed."
Former President Carter established in 1993 that, despite listing Sudan
as a state sponsor of terrorism, the Clinton Administration had no
evidence, and no intelligence, to support the listing. Several years
later the absence of any intelligence to support the Clinton
Administration's continuing allegations of Sudanese involvement in
terrorism continued to be documented. In a 26 December 1996
International Herald Tribune article by veteran American investigative
reporter Tim Weiner, it was clear that no evidence or proof had emerged:
"U.S. officials have no hard proof that Sudan still provides training
centers for terrorists". The article stated that "The big issue for the
United States is that Sudan has served as a safe house for stateless
revolutionaries". Mr Weiner also interviewed key American officials
"responsible for analyzing the Sudan". The answer to whether or not
Sudan was involved in supporting terrorism, was "we just don't know".
Sudan, nevertheless, continued to be listed as a state sponsor of
terrorism. (125)
What is clear is that American intelligence agencies have not able to
find any proof of Sudanese involvement in international terrorism,
before or after the Clinton Administration listed Sudan as a state
sponsor of terrorism. The singular lack of judgement on the part of the
Clinton Administration and the American intelligence community was amply
illustrated by its eagerness to accepted fabricated claims concerning
the Sudanese government.
THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S WITHDRAWAL OF OVER 100 "FABRICATED"
REPORTS ON SUDAN AND "TERRORISM"
Not only were American int elligence agencies unable to accurately
analyse events and trends in Sudan, there is ample evidence that they
actually accepted as facts claims about Sudanese involvement in
terrorism which were subsequently revealed to have been fabricated. In
September 1998, in the wake of the al-Shifa fiasco, both the New York
Times and the London Times reported that the Central Intelligence Agency
had previously secretly had to withdraw over one hundred of its reports
alleging Sudanese involvement in terrorism. The CIA had realised that
the reports in question had been fabricated. The London Times concluded
that this:
"is no great surprise to those who have watched similar CIA operations
in Africa where "American intelligence" is often seen as an oxymoron."
(126)
A striking example of this was the closure by the Clinton Administration
of the American embassy in Khartoum in 1996. This decision was presented
as yet one more example of concern over Sudan's alleged support for
international terrorism. CIA reports were said to have stated that
American embassy staff and their families were in danger. (127) The
Clinton Administration's spokesman, Nicholas Burns, stated at the time
that:
"We have been concerned for a long period of time about the activities
and movements of specific terrorist organizations who are resident in
Sudan. Over the course of many, many conversations with the Sudanese
Government, we simply could not be assured that the Sudanese Government
was capable of protecting our Americans against the specific threats
that concerned us...[T]he specific nature of these threats, the
persistence of these threats, and our root belief at the end of all
these conversations that this particular government could not protect
them led us to take this extraordinary measure of withdrawing all of our
diplomats." (128)
It is now admitted the reports cited in justifying this decision were
subsequently withdrawn as having been fabricated. As the New York Times
investigation documented:
"In late 1995 the CIA realized that a foreign agent who had warned
repeatedly of startling terrorist threats to U.S. diplomats, spies and
their children in Khartoum was fabricating information. They withdrew
his reports, but the climate of fear and mistrust created by the reports
bolstered the case for withdrawing personnel from the U.S. Embassy in
Khartoum, officials said...The embassy remained closed, even though, as
a senior intelligence official put it, "the threat wasn't there" as of
1996." (129)
The New York Times also reported that there were similar unverified and
uncorroborated reports that the then national security advisor, Antony
Lake, had been targeted for assassination by terrorists based in Sudan.
Lake was moved into Blair House, a federal mansion across the street
from the White House and then to a second, secret, location. The New
York Times reported that Lake "disappeared from view around the time the
embassy's personnel were withdrawn". There is little doubt that the
supposed threat to Lake was as fabricated as the CIA reports concerning
the American embassy in Khartoum. The newspaper stated that: "The threat
to Tony Lake had a chilling effect on the National Security Council."
There is no doubt that the equally spurious "threats" to American
diplomats and their children in Khartoum had an equally chilling effect
on the State Department and other agencies. The fact remains however
that these "threats", then seen as proof of Sudanese complicity in
terrorism, were contained in the over one hundred reports that the CIA
later admitted it had to withdraw because they had been fabricated. To
have to withdraw one or two intelligence reports on such serious matters
is bad enough. To have to withdraw over one hundred such reports can
only be described as a massive systemic intelligence failure. One can
only but point out that the Clinton Administration used the Sudanese
government's inability to react to "specific" threats made by "specific"
terrorist organisations against American diplomats, non-existent
fabricated threats, as one more example of Sudan's involvement with
terrorism.
The American embassy in Khartoum was subsequently partly re-opened in
October 1997, and Antony Lake eventually did come out of hiding. And
yet, as late as March 2000, four years after the above intelligence
fiasco, the White House was still falsely stating: "In 1996, we removed
full-time staff from the Embassy and relocated them to Nairobi for
security reasons." (130) In what could pass for a snapshot of the
accuracy of Clinton Administration claims about Sudan and terrorism in
general, the New York Times stated that:
"the Central Intelligence Agency...recently concluded that reports that
had appeared to document a clear link between the Sudanese Government
and terrorist activities were fabricated and unreliable...The United
States is entitled to use military force to protect itself against
terrorism. But the case for every such action must be rigorously
established. In the case of the Sudan, Washington has conspicuously
failed to prove its case." (131)
Ambassador Petterson, the United States ambassador to Sudan from
1992-95, clearly documents an earlier example of the Clinton
Administration acting upon fabricated and unreliable claims of Sudanese
complicity in "terrorism". In his memoirs of his time in Sudan
Ambassador Petterson reveals that in August 1993, "information about a
plan to harm American officials led the State Department to order an
evacuation of our spouses and children and a reduction of my American
staff by one-third". Petterson stated that "[w]e at the embassy had seen
or heard nothing manifesting a clear and present danger from either
terrorists or the Sudanese government. But the order was firm and
irrevocable". (132) Petterson also documented that subsequently "new
information" had been "acquired" which indicated "an increasingly
precarious situation for Americans in Khartoum". Ambassador Petterson
later reveals that the allegations in question were unfounded:
"The months wore on, no credible threat to embassy Americans
materialized, and eventually serious doubt was raised about the validity
of the information that had led to the evacuation." (133)
It perhaps goes without saying that for a government to evacuate the
spouses and children of diplomats, and to reduce its embassy staff, is a
serious matter. It is an even more serious matter when a government
totally closes an embassy, withdrawing all diplomats and dependants.
This was done on two occasions in Sudan. The partial evacuation happened
in 1993. The total evacuation was carried out in 1996. The Clinton
Administration ordered both evacuations on the basis of intelligence
information received which supposedly warned of threats to American
diplomats and their families. On both occasions the Administration also
demanded that the Sudanese government somehow deal with these threats,
and it was inferred that if Khartoum did not do so this would be more
evidence of Sudan's involvement with terrorism. It is now clear, as
outlined by independent sources such as Ambassador Petterson, and the
New York Times, that both the partial evacuation of American embassy
staff and dependants in 1993, and the full withdrawal of the embassy in
1996, were the results of faulty intelligence reports based on claims
subsequently revealed to have been fabricated.
THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S REFUSAL OF SUDANESE REQUESTS FOR COUNTER-
TERRORISM TEAMS TO VISIT SUDAN
The Clinton Administration's poor record and questionable judgement with
regard to intelligence and the issue of terrorism was further
highlighted by the September 1998 New York Times revelation that:
"In February 1997, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir sent President
Clinton a personal letter. It offered, among other things, to allow U.S.
intelligence, law-enforcement and counterterrorism personnel to enter
Sudan and to go anywhere and see anything, to help stamp out terrorism.
The United States never replied to that letter."
In April 1997, there was another invitation, once again inviting the
Clinton Administration to send FBI counterterrorism units to Sudan to
verify any information they may have had about terrorism. The letter was
addressed to Representative Lee Hamilton, the then chairman of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, and is part of the Congressional Record.
(134) This offer was eventually turned down four months later.
There is a further, even more disturbing example of the Clinton
Administration's questionable judgement regarding Sudan and
international terrorism. In a series of investigative articles entitled
"U.S. Fumbles Chance to Nab Bombers: State Department Stopped FBI from
Pursuing Leads in East Africa Blasts", "State, FBI Questioned Over
Africa Blasts: Congress Questions Sudan Missile Strike, 'Missed
Opportunities'" and "Was Sudan Raid on Target? Did FBI Botch Chance to
Grab Embassy Bombing Suspects?", the American MSNBC new network reported
that in early August 1997, shortly after the terrorist bombings of the
American embassies (and before the bombing of the al-Shifa factory), the
Sudanese authorities had arrested two prime suspects in the embassy
bombings. These suspects had been observed monitoring the American
embassy in Khartoum, and were arrested after attempting to rent an
apartment across the street from the embassy. The two men had Pakistani
passports, Afghani accents, and a list of known bin-Laden contacts in
Sudan. They had also both been in Kenya for the three weeks before the
embassy bombing. The reference on their visa applications to enter Sudan
was the same company accused by the American authorities of supplying
explosives and weapons to Osama bin-Laden.
The Sudanese authorities notified the FBI and repeatedly offered to turn
the two suspects over to the American authorities. Senior American law
enforcement officials have subsequently stated that while the FBI were
eager to taken up the offer, the State Department prevented any such
investigation. After the bombing of the al-Shifa factory, the Sudanese
government deported the two men to Pakistan. (135) In July 1999, MSNBC
further documented that there had been Sudanese offers to assist even
after the al-Shifa bombing:
"Still, despite fierce protests from Sudan over the missile attack, the
Sudanese government has continued to court U.S. officials with
intelligence allegedly collected during the interrogations of the two
before they were deported and observations made during the period
between their release and deportation. As late as last month, FBI
officials had renewed their requests to the State Department to sanction
official contacts with Sudan that might lead to new information about
the bin Laden network's plans. Again, the State Department declined."
(136)
The MSNBC report also quoted a Kenyan diplomat, who described his
government as "furious" that the U.S. had passed up on an opportunity to
apprehend men suspected of involvement in the bombing which killed
hundreds of Kenyans.
It is a matter of record that both House and Senate intelligence
committees began an investigation into why the Clinton Administration
passed up on the chance of interviewing two prime suspects in the
embassy bombings. By any standard, the Administration's studied
disinterest in the opportunity of interrogating these two suspects in
the bombing of two American embassies is deeply questionable. Perhaps it
was ineptitude on the part of politicians, intelligence and law
enforcement officials. Perhaps it was an unwillingness on the part of
sections of the Clinton Administration to address any development that
might have invalidated the attack on Sudan and the al-Shifa factory that
was to follow a week or so afterwards, a strike that was necessary and
urgent in order for President Clinton to appear "presidential" in the
midst of the Lewinsky scandal.
THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION, SUDAN AND OSAMA BIN-LADEN
The Clinton Administration's capacity for own goals is clear. The issue
of Osama bin-Laden is a case in point. As was outlined in the 1993
Patterns of Global Terrorism, Pakistan had then begun to "expel Arab
militants affiliated with various mujahedin groups and nongovernment aid
organisations". (137) It is no secret that many of these individuals,
denied entry to their own countries, took advantage of Sudan's then non-
visa policy for Arab nationals and sought refuge in Sudan. One such
person was the Saudi Osama bin-Laden. Previously a CIA asset and the
recipient of considerable American funding during the Afghan war, Osama
bin-Laden chose not to return to his home country, and also went to
Sudan. A man of considerable wealth, bin Laden became commercially
involved in Sudan. One of his construction companies began building
roads.
The Clinton Administration brought pressure to bear on the Khartoum
authorities to expel him from the Sudan. The Sudanese minister of
information, Dr Ghazi Saleheddin, revealed that:
"We gave [U.S. officials] a piece of advice that they never followed. We
told them: 'Don't send him out of Sudan because you will lose control
over him...Now, the United States has ended up with war with an
invisible enemy'". (138)
In May 1996, at the insistence of the United States, Sudan expelled bin
Laden and over one hundred of his followers and their dependants. They
chose to leave for Afghanistan, perhaps the single most difficult place
in the world from which to monitor bin Laden and his activities. The
results of this relocation are sadly all too well known. While in Sudan
he did not engage in any terrorist activities. It was comparatively easy
for the Sudanese and American authorities to monitor his activities,
and, in the case of the Sudanese authorities probably to exercise a
moderating influence of sorts.
IGNORING THAT WHICH IS INCONVENIENT TO POLICY
It is evident that the Clinton Administration has barely, if at all,
acknowledged Sudan's efforts to address American concerns about its
alleged support for terrorism. It is difficult to see what more Khartoum
could have done in this respect. Sudan arrested and extradited Illyich
Ramirez Sanchez, "Carlos the Jackal" to France, and, as requested by
Washington, it expelled Osama bin Laden, and his associates, from Sudan.
In September 1995 Sudan imposed strict visa requirements on visitors to
Sudan, ending its no visa policy for Arab nationals.
In May 2000, Sudan completed the process of acceding to all of the
international instruments for the elimination of international
terrorism. It has signed the following international agreements:
* The 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings
* The 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing
of Terrorism.
* The 1988 International Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation (Montreal
1988)
* The 1980 International Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material (Vienna 1980)
* The 1992 International Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf.
* The 1963 International Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts
Committed on board Aircraft.
* The 1991 International Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives
for the Purpose of Detection.
Sudan has also become a party to regional agreements and a participant
in regional programmes for the suppression and elimination of terrorism
on the African continent through the Organisation of African Unity.
Sudan has also signed similar agreements within the framework of the
Arab League and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference. In April
1998, for example, Sudan became a signatory to the Arab Agreement for
Combating Terrorism. The Sudanese ministers of internal affairs and
justice signed the agreement on behalf of Sudan. (139) In August, 1998,
the Sudanese ambassador to Egypt stated Sudan welcomed an Egyptian
proposal to convene an international conference on combating terrorism.
(140) Sudan has also signed the chemical weapons convention in May 1999.
(141) Furthermore in March 2000, Sudan also comprehensively updated its
own legislation for the suppression of terrorism. The Sudanese
Government has repeatedly invited the United States to send its own
anti-terrorist teams to Sudan to investigate and follow-up any
information they may have about Sudan's alleged involvement in
terrorism. The Clinton Administration eventually did so in early 2000.
So far there has been no statement of its findings.
CONCLUSIONS
For all the allegations it has made, and despite the awesome and
unprecedented intelligence, information-gathering and surveillance tools
at its disposal, the Clinton Administration has not been able to point
to a single act of terrorism sponsored or supported by the government of
Sudan. It has admitted as much in its own reports. Neither has the
Administration identified a single "terrorist training camp" in Sudan:
had any such camp been located it would undoubtedly been attacked at the
same time as the al-Shifa factory. Senior European diplomatic sources in
Khartoum have questioned whether these camps ever existed. The hundreds
of news and sensation hungry journalists who flooded into Khartoum
following the attack on the al-Shifa factory, all eagerly exploring any
terrorist link, were also unable to find any evidence of terrorists or
terrorist camps. What the Administration did "identify" as a chemical
weapons-producing facility, the al-Shifa plant, is now internationally
acknowledged to have been nothing more than a medicines factory.
The Clinton Administration is also guilty of turning a blind eye to
crucial intelligence opportunities in the war against terrorism. The
Administration chose not to accept two offers by the Khartoum
authorities for American intelligence and counterterrorist personnel to
carry out whatever investigations they wished to in Sudan. In 2000 it
eventually accepted a third such invitation. An even more questionable
Clinton Administration decision was to ignore repeated Sudanese requests
that they interrogate two suspects in the Nairobi embassy bombing who
had been arrested by the Sudanese authorities in Khartoum while renting
accommodation overlooking the American embassy. The Clinton
Administration would appear to have ignored this vital opportunity as it
would have been inconvenient given that they intended to attack Sudan
because of its alleged complicity in the Nairobi bombings.
The Clinton Administration's policy and actions with regard to Sudan
have been characterised by repeated intelligence failures. These have
included failures with regard to evaluating the nature of the Sudanese
government and the Islamic model it presents. There has also been a
failure in that the Administration has not been able to substantiate any
allegations of Sudanese involvement in terrorism, despite Washington's
listing of Sudan as a state sponsor of terrorism. The Clinton
Administration partially evacuated its embassy in 1993, and actually
withdrew all its diplomats and their dependants in 1996, on the basis of
intelligence reports subsequently revealed to have been based on
fabricated claims by unreliable sources. The Administration then used
the fact that the Sudanese government had been unable to respond to
these fabricated "terrorist threats" as yet more evidence of Khartoum's
complicity with terrorist elements. Washington has consistently refused
to justify any of its claims, invoking the need to protect
"intelligence" sources. On the only occasion when the Administration
reluctantly attempted to justify its claims, allegations that the al-
Shifa medicines factory was owned by terrorists and manufacturing
chemical weapons, its "intelligence" crumbled in the face of media
reporting.
NOTES
1 Cited in Fenton Bresler, Interpol, Mandarin, London, 1992, p.265.
2 The Independent, London, 17 September 1993.
3 'The U.S. Imposes New Sanctions on Sudan', Thomson Financial
Publishing, http://www.tfp.com/news/USSudan.htm, 4 November 1997.
4 Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1992, United States Department of
State, Washington-DC, 1993, iv.
5 Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1992, United States Department of
State, Washington-DC, 1993, p.4.
6 The Independent, London, 9 June 1993.
7 'Iran's War on the West', Reader's Digest, January 1994, p.74.
8 Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1993, United States Department of
State, Washington-DC, 1994, p.25.
9 The Independent, London, 8 December 1993.
10 The Independent, London, 23 August1994.
11 Donald Petterson, Inside Sudan: Political Islam, Conflict and
Catastrophe, Westview Books, Boulder, 1999, p.69.
12 Ibid.
13 Speech by the Sudanese Permanent Representative to the United
Nations, before the Security Council, 16 August 1996.
14 The Independent, London, 23 August 1994.
15 Patterns of Global Terrorism 1994, United States Department of
State, Washington-DC, 1995, p.23.
16 See, 'US Unfreezes Assets of Sudan Factory Owner', Agence France
Press, 4 May, 1999, 20:51 GMT; 'US Oks Payout for Sudan "Mistake":
Faulty Intelligence Blamed for Air Strike', The Washington Times, 5 May
1999; 'US Admits Sudan Bombing Mistake', The Independent, London, 4 May
1999; 'US to Unfreeze Accounts Frozen Over Plant', The Asian Wall Street
Journal, 5 May 1999.
17 'U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing', by Nicholas Burns,
17 January 1997.
18 'Oil Deals and Arms Sales', Editorial, The New York Times, 28
January 1997.
19 'Commerce and Terrorism', Editorial, The Washington Post, 24 January
1997.
20 Statement by the Ministry of Information of the Transitional
Government of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, 3 July 1995.
21 The Independent, London, 28 June 1995.
22 'Showdown in Sudan', The Middle East, December 1996.
23 Middle East International, London, 19 July 1996.
24 See the testimony of US Assistant Secretary of State George Moose
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Reported by USIA, 15 May
1997.
25 Letter from the Sudanese Minister of External Relations to the
President of the Security Council, annexed to Letter dated 1 June 2000
from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the Security Council, S/2000/513.
26 'Arabs and Non-Aligned Nations Call for End to Sudan Sanctions at
UN', News Article at Agence France Presse on 6 June 2000 at 03:31:37-.
27 Letter from the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the
President of the United Nations Security Council, 8 June 2000
28 Letter from the Ethiopian Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs to the
President of the United Nations Security Council, 5 June 2000.
29 James Adams, The New Spies, Hutchinson, London, 1994, p.180.
30 The Economist, 14 April 1993.
31 Adams, op.cit., p.188.
32 See, 'Frankenstein the CIA Created', The Observer, London, 17
January 1999.
33 See, for example, 'US Terrorist Trial', Middle East International,
London, 14 April 1995. The chief bomb maker, Emad Saleh, had been
working for the FBI since 1991.
34 The Economist, 5 June 1993.
35 The New York Times, 26 March 1993.
36 The New York Times, The Washington Post, 25 June 1993.
37 The New York Times, 18 August 1993.
38 Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1996 Briefing, Press briefing by
Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox Jr, Washington-DC, 30 April 1996 on US
Government Home Page, at http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/96043
0.html
39 'U.S. Expels Sudanese Diplomat: Diplomat Implicated in U.N. Bomb
Plot', News Article by United States Information Agency, 10 April 1996.
40 'U.S. Envoy Upbeat After Talks With Sudan', News Article by CNN on 6
March 2000 at 9:50 PM EST.
41 'Roberts Calls US Missile Attack on Sudan Unjustified', by Dennis
Pearce, The Wichita Eagle, 28 October 1998. Senator Roberts is a member
of both the Senate Intelligence and Armed Forces Committees.
42 'Sudan Condemns Bombings of U.S. Embassies', News Article by Reuters
on 8 August 1998 at 08:54:19.
43 'Sudan Offers Nairobi Help to Track Down the "Guilty Men", News
Article by Agence France Presse on 11August 1998 at 12:33
44 'Sudan Offers to Help Find Kenya Bombings', News Article by Reuters
on 11 August 1998 at 12:28:46.
45 'Two Food Processing Factories Hit in US Raid: Witness', News
Article by Agence France Press on 21August 1998 at 09:05:12.
46 'Text of news briefing given by Defence Secretary William Cohen and
Gen. Henry Shelton on military strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan', the
Guardian website, at http://reports.guardian.co.uk/sp_reports/usbombs/37
6.html.
47 The New York Times, 'Possible Benign Use Is Seen for Chemical at
Factory in Sudan', 27 August 1998.
48 'Sample From Sudan Plant Said to Link It to Weapons', International
Herald Tribune, 25 August 1998.
49 'White House Has Trouble Explaining Attack on Sudan. More Questions
Than Answers', ABCNews.com, Barbara Starr, Washington, 26August 1998.
50 The New York Times, 'Possible Benign Use Is Seen for Chemical at
Factory in Sudan', 27 August 1998.
51 'CIA "has residue from Shifa plant"', The Guardian, London, 25
August 1998.
52 See, 'Sudan to Protest to UN Over US strike - Adds Beshir Comments',
News Article by Agence France Presse on 20 August1998 at 22:17:17.
53 Sudan to Protest to UN Over US strike - Adds Beshir Comments', News
Article by Agence France Presse on 20 August 1998 at 22:17:17.
54 'U.S. Tells Sudan It Wasn't Personal', News Article by Associated
Press on 24 August 1998 at 09:52:42.
55 'Letter of H.E. Bishop Gborial Roric, State Minister at the Ministry
of External Affairs to the President of the United Nations Security
Council on the flagrant American aggression against the Sudan', Ministry
of External Affairs, Khartoum. See, also, 'Sudan Formally Asks for UN
Meeting, Probe of Plant', News Article by Reuters on 22 August 1998 at
05:44 pm EST; 'Khartoum Seeks Condemnation, Damages and Fact-Finding
Team', News Article by Agence France Presse on 23 August 1998 at
19:03:09
56 'US "Reveals" Nerve Gas Evidence', BBC World: Africa news, Tuesday,
25 August 1998 Published at 10:42 GMT 11:42 UK.
57 'Sudan Willing to Accept US-led Probe into Factory Attack', News
Article by Agence France Presse on 23 August 1998 at 18:03:59.
58 'Was the Sudan Plant Really Linked to Nerve Gas', The Sunday Times,
London, 23 August 1998.
59 'Minister: Sudan Invites an American Verification Committee', News
Article by Associated Press on 22 August 1998 at 00:16.
60 'Sudan President Invites Fact-Finders, Warns of Retaliation', BBC
Online Network, World Mediawatch, Saturday, 22 August 1998 Published at
17:47 GMT 18:47 UK.
61 'Absent at Conference, Sudan is Still Talking With U.S.', The
Washington Post, 17 March 2000.
62 The Economist, 29 August 1998.
63 'Sudanese Plant "Not Built for Weapons"', The Observer, London, 30
August 1998.
64 'More Doubts Rise Over Claims for U.S. Attack', The Wall Street
Journal, 28 August 1998.
65 'U.S., Sudan Trade Claims on Factory', The Washington Post, 25
August 1998.
66 'Sudan's President Says Blame Falls on Clinton, Not the American
People', 24 August 1998 at 4:14 p.m. ET.
67 'Sudanese Plant "Not Built for Weapons"', The Observer, London, 30
August 1998.
68 'Destroyed Sudanese Factory Produces only Drugs: German
Ambassador', News Article by Xinhua on 30 August 1998 at 00:00:31.
69 The Guardian, London, 27 August 1998.
70 'Sudanese Plant "Not Built for Weapons"', The Observer, London, 30
August 1998.
71 'Sudan's Plea for Inquiry is Spurned', The Financial Times, 25
August 1998.
72 'CIA "Has Residue from Shifa Plant"', The Guardian, London, 25
August 1998.
73 'Britain and Sudan Trade Blows as US Claims VX Gas "Evidence"', The
Independent, London, 25 August 1998.
74 'U.S. Says Iraq Aided Production of Chemical Weapons in Sudan', The
New York Times, 25 August 1998.
75 'US Had "Precursor" to Nerve Gas Sample from Sudanese Plant:
Newsweek', News Article by Agence France Presse on August 23, 1998 at
19:49 GMT.
76 'US Confident of Attacks' Success', News Article by UPI on 24 August
1998 at 26:50:41
77 'U.S. State Dept. Says Soil Showed VX-Sudan Link', News Article by
Reuters on 26 August 1998 at 6:43 AM EDT.
78 'US Strives to Justify Aid Strike on Sudan Attack on Factory', The
Independent, 26 August 1998.
79 'US strives to Justify aid Strike on Sudan Attack on Factory', The
Independent, 26 August 1998.
80 'Chemical Made at Bombed Sudanese Factory had Commercial Uses:
Report', News Article by Agence France Presse on 27 August 1998 at 11:38
GMT.
81 '"Smoking Gun" for Sudan Raid Now in Doubt', The Chicago Tribune, 28
August 1998.
82 'More Doubts Rise Over Claims for U.S. Attack', The Wall Street
Journal, 28 August 1998.
83 '"Smoking Gun" for Sudan Raid Now in Doubt', The Chicago Tribune, 28
August 1998.
84 'Expert Queries US Labelling of Sudan chemicals', The Guardian,
London, 28 August 1998.
85 'Sudanese Plant "Not Built for Weapons"', The Observer, London, 30
August 1998.
86 'Sudan Demands U.S. Evidence That Factory Made Nerve Agents', News
Article by Associated Press on 25 August 1998 at 12:50:46.
87 'Sudanese Plant "Not Built for Weapons"', The Observer, London, 30
August 1998.
88'Experts Find No Arms Chemicals at Bombed Sudan Plant', The New York
Times, 9 February 1999.
89 'Sudan Tells British Ambassador to go as Diplomatic Row Grows', The
Guardian, London, 25 August 1998.
90 'Was Sudan Raid on Target? Did FBI Botch Chance to Grab Embassy
Bombing Suspects?', MSNBC TV News, 29 December 1999, http://www.msnbc.co
m/news/351435.asp
91 'U.S. Intelligence Cites Iraqi Tie to Sudan Plant', News Article by
Associated Press on 25 August 1998 at 20:23:36.
92 'U.S. Intelligence defends VX-Sudan link', News Article by Reuters
on 25 August 1998 at 7:27 PM EDT.
93 'Employees Dispute Charge That Plant Made Nerve Agent', The
Washington Post, 26 August 1998.
94 'Administration Officials Detail Missile Strike Strategy', News
Article by Associated Press on 2 September 1998 at 09:25:00.
95 'White House Has Trouble Explaining Attack on Sudan. More Questions
Than Answers', ABCNews.com, Barbara Starr, Washington, 26 August 1998.
96 'Sample From Sudan Plant Said to Link It to Weapons', International
Herald Tribune, 25 August 1998.
97 'US Bombing Accelerates Health Crisis, Says Sudan', Electronic Mail
& Guardian, South Africa, 25 August 1998.
98 'Sudanese Lawyer Claims Factory Had No Links to bin Laden', News
Article by NN on 23 August 1998 at 09:41:34.
99 'Sudanese Rally Behind Government over US Attack', News Article by
Agence France Presse on 29 August 1998 at 23:27:18.
100 'US Bombing Accelerates Health Crisis, says Sudan', Electronic Mail
& Guardian, South Africa, 25 August 1998.
101 'Sudan Dismisses US Factory-Attack Explanation', News Article by
Agence France Presse on 25 August 1998 at 12:55:34.
102 'Pharmaceutical is Sudan's Only "Oil-for-Food" Export', News Article
by Reuters on 25 August 1998 at 4:57 PM EDT.
103 'Sudan's Rogue Regime Savours Sudden Public Relations Victory.
Harshest Critic a Poster Boy in Counter-Attack Against U.S., The Toronto
Star, 29 August 1998.
104 'America Reviews Sudan Chemical Evidence', The Times, London, 29
August 1998.
105 'Doubts Surround U.S. Explanation for Attacking Sudan Factory', The
New York Times, 31 August 1998.
106 'Administration Officials Detail Missile Strike Strategy', News
Article by Associated Press on 2 September 1998 at 09:25:00.
107 'CIA "Has Residue from Shifa Plant"', The Guardian, London, 25
August 1998.
108 The Economist, 29 August 1998.
109 'Questions Remain, but Some Sudanese Claims on Factory Prove True',
News Article by Associated Press on 24 August 1998 at 08:34:09.
110'U.S. Intelligence Cites Iraqi Tie to Sudan Plant', News Article by
Associated Press on 25 August 1998 at 20:23:36.
111 'Times: U.S. says Iraq Aided Sudan on Chemical Weapons', News
Article by Reuters on 25 August 1998 at 7:45 AM EDT.
112 'Expert Queries US Labelling of Sudan Chemical', The Guardian,
London, 28 August 1998.
113 'White House Says No Sign Iraq Exported Arms', News Article by
Reuters on 17 February 1998 at 10:20:45.
114 House of Lords Official Report, London, 19 March 1998, cols.
818-820.
115 House of Lords Official Report, London, 19 March 1998, cols.
818-820.
116 'League of Arab States Supporting Sudan', News Article by Xinhua on
23 August 1998 at 18:29:38.
117 'Allied Doubts Grow About the US Strike on Sudanese Plant', The
Boston Globe, 24 September 1998.
118 Final Document, XII NAM Summit, Durban, 29 August - 3 September
1998.
119 See, Seymour Hersch's article 'Missiles of August', The New Yorker.
12 October 1998: Wire service coverage such as 'Report: Raid Planned
Without FBI', News Article by Associated Press on 4 October 1998 at
20:26:14 is also typical.
120 Christopher Hitchens, 'Weapons of Mass Destruction', Vanity Fair,
March 1999.
121 'To Bomb Sudan Plant, or Not: A Year Later, Debates Rankle', The
New York Times, 27 October, 1999.
122 'Frequently Asked Questions', Central Intelligence Agency Official
Website at http://www.ocdi.gov/cia/public_affairs/faq.html
123 'U.S. Intelligence Defends VX-Sudan Link', News Article by Reuters
on 25 August 1998 at 14:22:54.
124 'Western Envoys in Sudan Faced with Divided Loyalties', The
Guardian, London, 27 August 1998.
125 See, Unproven, Unsustainable and Contradictory: United States
Government Allegations of Sudanese Involvement in International
Terrorism, The British-Sudanese Public Affairs Council, London, 1999,
available at http://www.espac.org
126 The Times, London, 22 September 1998; The New York Times, 21 and
23 September, 1998.
127 'Withdrawal of US Diplomats - Security Council Condemnation',
Keesings Archives, Volume 42, 1996.
128 Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State, 1 February 1996
available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/daily_briefings/1996
/9602/960201db.html
129 'Decision to Strike Factory in Sudan Based on Surmise', The New
York Times, 21 September 1999.
130 Extract on Sudan from the Daily Press Briefing, the United States
Department of State, 3 March 2000, 12:35 PM.
131 'Dubious Decisions on the Sudan', Editorial, The New York Times, 23
September 1998.
132 Petterson, op.cit., p.71.
133 Petterson, op.cit., p.91.
134 'Perspective on Terrorism - Olive Branch Ignored', The Los Angeles
Times, 30 September 1998.
135 "State, FBI Questioned Over Africa Blasts: Congress Questions Sudan
Missile Strike, 'Missed Opportunities'", 19 August 1999; and 'Was Sudan
raid on target? Did FBI Botch Chance to Grab Embassy Bombing Suspects?',
MSNBC TV News, 29 December 1999, http://www.msnbc.com/news/351435.asp
136 'U.S. Fumbles Chance to Nab Bombers: State Department Stopped FBI
from Pursuing Leads in East Africa Blasts', News Article by MSNBC on 29
July 1999, available at http://www.msnbc.com/news/294848.asp
137 Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1993, United States Department of
State, Washington-DC, 1994, p.4.
138 'Sudan Seeks an Apology from the United States along with U.N.',
News Article by Associated Press on 24 August 1998 at 08:26:28
139 'Internal Affairs Minister: Arab Agreement For Combating Terrorism
is a Strong Reply to Enemies', SUNA, 25 April 1998.
140 'Sudan Welcomes Egypt's Anti-Terrorism Conference Proposal', News
Article by Xinhua on 22 August 1998 at 14:32:43.
141 'Sudan Says Joins Pact Against Chemical Weapons', News Article by
Reuters on 19 August 1999 at 10:31:52.
ENDS
--
European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council
1 Northumberland Avenue, London, WC2N 5BW
Tel: 0207 872 5434 Fax: 0207 753 2848
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