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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ -- ARTICLE 05 – Interpersonal Skills Vital in Agent ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ -- By J. David Galland It is a complicated and time-consuming process to recruit foreign intelligence sources. During a period of personal cultivation by U.S. intelligence (USI), the potential source is assessed as to his or her interest in being recruited, as well as access to both established and future intelligence interests. One exception to the long-proven rule of pursuing and following a protracted recruitment process of a potential source, is the "walk-in." This is a person who suddenly presents himself, usually to an American embassy or consulate overseas. In most cases, the person is seeking reward for information that he believes is valuable to the United States. In my professional experience, walk-ins frequently overestimate the value of the information they claim to possess or have access to. In addition, many walk-ins have been found to fabricate purported intelligence information altogether. Once it has been determined that a walk-in is not a fabricator or mentally unstable, and that he or she may indeed be of value to USI, then the potential source must be cultivated accordingly. The first task is to confirm the potential source's actual identity, to determine his or her true motivation for volunteering as an intelligence source, and to confirm the actual access to critical information the potential source actually has. From this point on, all subsequent meetings with this intelligence source must be conducted in a fully secure and clandestine fashion and normally he or she will never see their initial point of contact again. As with any other potential intelligence source, the walk-in source must be subjected to a long process of extended cultivation and assessment by skilled USI operatives. This process will usually begin with an initial chance or contrived encounter, often one at a diplomatic reception. It is at this meeting that the case officer's highly developed interpersonal skills must immediately be brought into play. The goal at this encounter is to foster an aura of trust and common ground that will set the stage for subsequent meetings. The level of personal rapport and cordiality, that could lead to productive follow-up meetings, must be very carefully employed. It is imperative to avoid embarrassment for both parties if the source should decline recruitment. Not all walk-ins who are determined to be potential intelligence sources ultimately accept recruitment. In many instances, this is because they do not agree on the focus of the recruitment effort by USI case officers. A designated case officer is responsible for setting and planning any subsequent meetings agreed to by the source. Normally, only one case officer initially manages the source, but an exception to this rule occurs if the source has numerous areas of intelligence potential requiring several specialists (e.g. experts in nuclear weapons or secure communications) to handle the information. Normally, face-to-face contact between the case officer and his source is held to a minimum. In the event a personal meeting (PM) is required, anywhere between two and five other case officers - not known by the source - are employed for security monitoring and counter-surveillance duties. The latter tasking is critically responsible since effective counter-surveillance and surveillance detection can make or break an intelligence operation. Whether the newly-acquired source is the product of cultivation which leads to successful recruitment, or an effectively validated walk-in, he or she will require training and vetting from the very beginning. Very few sources normally possess the knowledge of how to effectively protect their own security. And often to the chagrin of both case officers and their superiors (operations officers), many new sources show surprisingly little concern for the security demands of their new activity. If a source is already "street-smart" and has some knowledge of these intelligence related protective measures, it constitutes an obvious area of concern. Initial training must focus on sharpening the source's sense of security and the security means by which the operation must establish and sustain its clandestine nature. This specifically refers to his or her role as a source, as well as the acquisition, temporary storage, and ultimate transmittal of sensitive intelligence information to the case officer. The source's success in training and the level of achieved skill is often the key factor in defining the success of the intelligence collection mission. Nothing will be achieved if the intelligence source is not skilled at conducting his or her movement to and from meetings with the case officer. Another critical factor is the source's ability to manage and conceal any clandestine gear used in the collection process, such as photographic equipment, communications gear or actual concealment devices cleverly designed to hide other items. The source's training must also explore, in depth, the vital matter of his precise access to intelligence information. This is essentially where the rubber meets the road in this business. The case officer must ensure that the source is able to exploit access to intelligence material without drawing undesirable attention to himself. Expanded and enhanced training may become necessary based on the unique characteristics of each mission. This may include one-way covert communications, emplacing and recovering dead-drops, microdot secret writing, coding and decoding messages, and clandestine photography. Throughout the life of any clandestine intelligence-collecting operation, there must be a thorough and ongoing review of training and operational aspects. In long-term intelligence operations, sources will often slip and be prone to grow careless, cut corners in the area of personal security and the professional use of intelligence tradecraft. This can be a costly and deadly mistake. Small failures can be exploited and easily become intelligence bonanzas for hostile intelligence services (HOIS). These ongoing re-evaluations must address the source's continuing motivation to serve as a clandestine source - because motivations can change over time. This is quite unique to the highly complicated nature of human intelligence collection. A few of the most common motivational factors include personal family situations, worldwide political changes, and the potential loss of a source's access to bona-fide intelligence information. All of these factors can lead a source to begin fabricating information in order for him to retain the income and rewards he has become used to receiving. In the worst case scenario, motivational changes can be a clear indicator that the source has been discovered, is being controlled by a third party, or is in willful collaboration with another intelligence service - and has been doubled. These are the main challenges facing those who operate in the nether world of the second-oldest profession on earth - human intelligence collection. J. David Galland, Deputy Editor of DefenseWatch, is the pen name of a career U.S. Army senior Non-Commissioned Officer currently serving in Germany. He can be reached at [EMAIL PROTECTED] ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ -- ARTICLE 06 – Feedback: Readers Respond to Hack and DefenseWatch ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ -- Reserves and Guard Defended It goes without saying that reserve units will not be as well trained as active units. In the course of our work with active units, someone observed that the greatest problem we encountered was the active component's irrational belief that there were 30 days in a month instead of two! Yet reserve units have a longer unit memory. It is not unusual to find reserve units where 80 percent of the senior NCOs have spent over ten years in the unit, while most of the lower enlisted grades have been there throughout their military service. They don't need to be trained as frequently as a[n active] unit which will experience an 80+ percent turnover in personnel every three years. These units will also possess a cohesion (well illustrated by my Operations Sergeant in the 19th [Special Forces] Group who, when the unit went through Airborne School, made his fifth jump with a broken ankle rather than leave the unit) which is difficult to obtain in active units, and which will stand them in good stead when things go to hell in a handbasket …. I also remarked, in response to some comments by my classmates at the Battle Staff Course about the reserve components, that the willingness of people to accept military discipline and the hardships and inconveniences that service inevitably entails when they're not doing it for a living implies a substantially greater commitment than that shown by someone who accepts it because it is his living. Today, nobody joins the Reserves or the National Guard to get out of the draft. Nobody joins them to avoid participation in a conflict. They join because they want to serve their country, and they (and their families) give up one weekend a month and two weeks a year to do so. If members of the active component flatter themselves that they are good enough to be in the regulars, Reservists can point out that they are people who want to serve their country and are able to hold down jobs in the civilian sector. Both are shortsighted views. We have enough enemies (foreign and domestic) to satisfy the most pugnacious battler without picking fights among ourselves. Active personnel who bemoan the state of the reserves should ask for a tour with one of those units and help get it straightened out! I think they'll have more than a few surprises. --James M. Crain, Lt. Col. USAR (Ret.) Poor Recruiting Example I'm a former 11-B-10 and I'm trying to reenlist back into the Army or Marines. My age may be a problem, but I have my local congressmen helping me out with that. Soon after 9-11, I went to my local Army recruiting office to see what my options are. There are six recruiters working in this office, and out of the six, four were fat and out of shape. One E-5 was eating a sausage egg and cheese sandwich on a long hoagie roll, and the E-6 – the sergeant in charge – was playing games on the computer in plain sight of anybody walking into the office. Two of the recruiters, an E-5 and E-4, were looking lean and mean and both from the 82nd Airborne, and if it were not for these two recruiters, the office would not have a hint of being an Army recruiting station. Next door down was a different story altogether. At the Marine Corps recruiting Station, two E-5 and one E-4 looked just like the sign says above the door: Marines. I know that the Army is trying to change its image, and it should start with the recruiting stations because the first impression is most important. --Thomas Hospitality for the Military While traveling through Hartsfield International Airport in Atlanta, I came across a Military Lounge set up by Delta Airlines Employees for all active duty and retired military people to stop and visit. This was not a USO lounge, but set up by Delta Airlines to show appreciation for our military folks. I stepped into the lounge to find food, drinks and a large screen TV, Christmas decorations, magazines and much more. I made a promise to the Delta staff there who made me feel at home while waiting for my connecting flight to pass the word to all military personnel about the lounge. It is located at Concourse B right across from Gate B33, and is open from 0700-2300 seven days a week until Jan. 7. Please help me spread the word for any of our military travelers going through Atlanta during the remainder of this holiday season. --A Military Traveler Table of Contents *COPYRIGHT NOTICE** In accordance with Title 17 U. S. C. Section 107, any copyrighted work in this message is distributed under fair use without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for nonprofit research and educational purposes only.[Ref. http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml ] Want to be on our lists? Write at [EMAIL PROTECTED] for a menu of our lists! Write to same address to be off lists! <A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/";>www.ctrl.org</A> DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER ========== CTRL is a discussion & informational exchange list. Proselytizing propagandic screeds are unwelcomed. Substance�not soap-boxing�please! 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