-Caveat Lector-
Why are people such as Valeriu Zamfir ALWAYS described as mentally ill?
Why are their claims *never* thoroughly investigated?
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This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. � 480A.08, subd. 3 (1996).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
C1-97-369
In the Matter of:
Valeriu Zamfir.
Filed July 15, 1997
Affirmed
Randall, Judge
Hennepin County District Court
File No. P89760012
Gregory R. Solum, 5275 Edina Industrial Boulevard, Suite 105, Edina, MN
55439 (for appellant Zamfir)
Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Attorney General, Terri D. Yellowhammer,
Assistant Attorney General, 445 Minnesota Street, Suite 900, St. Paul,
MN 55101-2127 (for respondent)
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, E. George Widseth,
Assistant County Attorney, A-2000 Government Center, Minneapolis, MN
55487 (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Randall, Presiding Judge, Toussaint, Chief
Judge, and Kalitowski, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
RANDALL, Judge
The trial court committed appellant as mentally ill and authorized
involuntary administration of neuroleptic medication. Valeriu Zamfir
appeals from the commitment and the Jarvis order. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant has a detailed delusional belief that a dentist implanted him
with computer chips and that the FBI and other governmental agencies are
involved. Appellant told his roommate several times that the chips could
cause him to kill or be killed and told his landlord the chips could
inflict pain or alter behavior. He expressed his fascination with knives
to the point that his roommate hid most of them. Appellant also had
difficulty making timely rent payments. His landlord and roommate wanted
him to leave, and the landlord indicated if he did not, he would be
evicted.
Appellant was brought to the crisis unit of the Hennepin County Medical
Center for evaluation and a petition for commitment was filed. A member
of appellant's treatment team testified appellant is adamantly opposed
to treatment and has no insight into his illness. With appellant's
delusional system and grandiosity, he is "an accident waiting to
happen." While appellant is able to feed and clothe himself adequately,
he may no longer be able to make ends meet because of the large expenses
he is incurring to pursue his delusional beliefs; he paid out of his own
pocket for an expensive medical test in an effort to prove he had
implants. The treatment team member testified appellant poses a danger
to himself or others.
Dr. Terry Nelson, a psychologist and court-appointed examiner, diagnosed
appellant with schizophrenia, paranoid type. If his belief system were
challenged or threatened, he would have the capacity to physically harm
someone with a weapon. Dr. Nelson also believed that while appellant has
been able to care for himself, it is becoming increasingly difficult
because of his expenditure of large sums of money to pursue his
delusional beliefs. Dr. Nelson recommended appellant be treated with
neuroleptic medication and psychotherapy in a hospital setting.
The trial court committed appellant as mentally ill with schizophrenia,
paranoid type. A Jarvis hearing was then held. Appellant personally
insisted that he did not want his attorney to represent him because the
attorney had not talked to him about the case. Further, he claimed there
was a conflict of interest because his attorney was a "government"
attorney, and appellant had disputes with the government. The court
indicated it would allow appellant to obtain another attorney to
represent him in the future, but ruled that the hearing would go forward
that day. The court advised appellant he had to be represented and that
his attorney had the legal expertise. The court told his attorney to
object if necessary, but otherwise not to be involved.
The court then questioned the court-appointed examiner and psychiatrist,
Dr. Hildegard Graber. Dr. Graber diagnosed appellant with delusional
disorder of the persecutory type. He is competent except as to his
delusional system. She found that the recommended medication was
necessary and reasonable. Although appellant has been taking his
medication while hospitalized, he does not have a competent
understanding of the benefits. He adamantly denies that he has a mental
illness and stated he would not continue taking the medication after he
is discharged.
Appellant personally examined Dr. Graber about supersonic airplanes,
bugs implanted in government offices, and the FBI. Appellant also
testified as to the use of people by the government as guinea pigs.
The trial court determined appellant was not competent, that the use of
medication was necessary and reasonable, and that the benefits
outweighed the risks. It authorized administration of neuroleptic
medication to appellant.
Valeriu Zamfir appeals his commitment and the Jarvis order.
D E C I S I O N
1. A trial court must find a person mentally ill by clear and convincing
evidence. Minn. Stat. � 253B.09, subd. 1 (1996); see Minn. Stat. �
253B.02, subd. 13 (1996) (definition of mentally ill). The findings will
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. In re McGaughey, 536 N.W.2d
621, 623 (Minn. 1995). If the record does not show by clear and
convincing evidence that the statutory factors are met, the commitment
will be reversed. See id. at 624 (holding clear and convincing evidence
not present).
Appellant challenges only the finding that he posed a substantial
likelihood of causing physical harm. This can be shown by a failure to
provide necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical care or by a
recent attempt or threat to physically harm self or others. Minn. Stat.
� 253B.02, subd. 13(b); see In re Gonzalez, 456 N.W.2d 724, 729 (Minn.
App. 1990) (likelihood of harm to self shown where person refused to
apply for medical assistance, could not provide for own shelter, and
engaged in conduct that could outrage others and result in attack).
The trial court found that appellant posed a substantial likelihood of
causing physical harm as demonstrated by his recent spending of
resources for medical tests to try to locate the implants, when he
needed this money to pay his rent. It also cited his pending loss of
current housing due to the fact he carried knives around the apartment
in a manner perceived as threatening by his roommate, particularly in
view of his comments to the roommate that the implants could "cause him
to kill."
Appellant challenges certain findings of fact. Our review of the record
shows the evidence and inferences from the evidence support the trial
court findings, which are not clearly erroneous. See McGaughey, 536
N.W.2d at 623 (findings not set aside unless clearly erroneous).
Appellant also argues that even if these findings are not clearly
erroneous, they do not show the standards for commitment were met. See
Minn. Stat. � 253B.02, subd. 13(b) (requirement of substantial
likelihood of physical harm to self or others). He argues that his
choice to spend part of his wages on medical tests is not grounds for
involuntary commitment because choosing a lifestyle "few would
voluntarily choose" does not justify involuntary commitment. See In re
Nadeau, 375 N.W.2d 85, 87-88 (Minn. App. 1985) (reversing commitment
because proposed patient did not meet statutory definition of mentally
ill, despite fact she chose lifestyle few others would choose). Further,
he argues that the trial court did not find that he made a recent
attempt or threat to physically harm himself or others, but instead
addressed the reasonableness of his roommate's fearful perceptions.
The experts agreed that appellant's expenditures in pursuit of his
delusional beliefs made it difficult for him to provide for himself. The
trial court assessed the evidence and determined appellant's conduct was
threatening and that loss of his housing was pending. The trial court
properly determined that appellant met the statutory standard for
commitment. Minn. Stat. � 253B.02, subd. 13(b).
2. Appellant next argues that the trial court did not have clear and
convincing evidence to conclude that treatment with neuroleptic
medication was necessary. Administration of neuroleptic medication to an
incompetent, nonconsenting committed person requires court approval.
Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139, 144-45, 148 n.7 (Minn. 1988); see
Minn. Stat. � 253B.03, subd. 6c (1996) (addressing administration of
neuroleptic medication to committed persons). The party seeking
authority to impose treatment must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the treatment is necessary and reasonable, which is to be
determined by consideration of six factors. Jarvis, 418 N.W.2d at 144-45
(discussing relevant factors). A trial court's findings will not be
reversed unless clearly erroneous. In re Martin, 527 N.W.2d 170, 172
(Minn. App. 1995).
Appellant first claims that because he does not meet the definition of
mentally ill, he is not committable, and, therefore, the Jarvis order is
not reasonable. We have upheld the commitment, and this argument
therefore fails.
Appellant next challenges the necessity of the treatment, contending the
medication has not been effective and he is competent to decide for
himself whether treatment is desirable. See Jarvis, 418 N.W.2d at 144
("the court shall determine the necessity and reasonableness of the
prescribed treatment"). At the time of the hearing, appellant had
received neuroleptic medication for only a short time. Dr. Graber
testified that the medication was effective and that the benefits
outweighed the risks. The fact that medication had not been effective
yet to treat appellant's symptoms did not mean the treatment is not
necessary and reasonable.
The clinical definition of competency to refuse neuroleptic medication
is as follows:
(1) [A]n awareness of having a mental disorder; (2) sufficient knowledge
about medication and the mental disorder; and (3) a refusal that is not
based upon delusional beliefs.
In re Peterson, 446 N.W.2d 669, 673 (Minn. App. 1989), review denied
(Minn. Dec. 1, 1989) (citation omitted). If any of the criteria is
lacking, the patient is incompetent. Id. The trial court found that
appellant denies he is mentally ill and does not have the ability to
understand and to use information about his mental illness, its
symptoms, and treatment. It concluded that he was not competent to give
or withhold consent for the use of neuroleptic medication.
Appellant cites evidence as to his abilities and Dr. Graber's conclusion
that except for his alleged delusions, he is "a competent and
responsible young man." As appellant acknowledges, however, Dr. Graber
specifically testified her statement did not mean that he was competent
with regard to his delusions. The trial court had clear and convincing
evidence from which to conclude that appellant was incompetent to decide
whether or not to take the neuroleptic medication.
3. The final issue concerns appellant's legal representation at the
Jarvis hearing.[1] A patient has the right to be represented by counsel.
Minn. Stat. � 253B.03, subd. 9 (1996); Minn. R. Civ. Commitment 3.01.
Neither the statute nor the rules gives a patient the right to represent
him or herself. See id. (containing no such provisions). The intent is
that the patient not be permitted to waive the right to representation.
Minn. R. Civ. Commitment 3, cmt. B; In re Irwin, 529 N.W.2d 366, 371
(Minn. App. 1995) (trial court that denied patient's motion to represent
himself but allowed his participation in cross-examination of some
witnesses did not abuse its discretion), review denied (Minn. May 16,
1995).
Appellant now argues on appeal that the trial court denied him the
effective assistance of counsel and he should be given a new trial
because it allowed him to represent himself. In re Dibley, 400 N.W.2d
186, 190-91 (Minn. App. 1987) (patient claimed ineffective assistance of
counsel but failed to establish counsel's action prejudiced results),
review denied (Minn. Mar. 25, 1987). Appellant has not discussed any
specific evidence that he believes should have been considered or
excluded, and the record supports the Jarvis order. Appellant has shown
no prejudice, and we see no reason to reverse. See id.
Affirmed.
[ ]1 This issue only applies to the Jarvis hearing; appellant was fully
represented by counsel at the commitment hearing.
++++++
M. F. Abernathy -- [[EMAIL PROTECTED]] -- 05/22/02
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