Peter, what would be wrong with having a machine in the booth that prints any valid receipt BUT is not connected to the voting system. "To vote use the red machine; if you're being coerced you can use the blue machine to print as many receipts as intimidators."
A trade off between (mild) user complexity and the desire for receipts (without coercion). At 10:17 AM 4/7/04 -0400, Trei, Peter wrote: >This is kind of broken. Allowing the voter to get a receipt which >they take away with them for verification may allow the voter to verify >that their vote was recorded as cast, but also allows coercion and >vote buying. > >To their credit, the creators thought of this, and suggest a >partial procedural fix in the threat analysis document: > > P4. Let voters discard verification receipts in poll site trash > can and let any voter take them > Result: Buyer/coercer can't be sure voter generated verification >receipt > > P5. Have stacks of random printed codebooks freely available in poll >site > Result: Vote buyer/coercer can't be sure captured codebook was used > > P6. Have photos of on-screen codebooks freely available on-line > Result: Vote buyer/coercer can't be sure captured codebook was used > >The first problem, or course, is that a person under threat of >coercion will need to present the coercer with a receipt showing >exactly the mix of votes the coercer required. This is leads >to a combinatorial explosion of fake receipts that need to be available. > >Having only one vote on each receipt might mitigate this, but it still >gets really messy. > >Second, it's not clear how this protects against the coercer checking the >ballot online - will every fake also be recorded in the system, so >it passes the online check? Having both real and fake ballots in >the verification server makes me very nervous. > >Its possible I've missed something - this is based on a quick glance >through the online documents, but I don't see any advantage this >system has over the much more discussed one where the reciept is >printed in a human readable way, shown to the voter, but retained >inside the machine as a backup for recounts. > >Just my private, personal opinion. > >Peter Trei >
