There's now precedent to suggest that providing FISA-ordered data in a deliberately inconvenient format can be considered contempt of court. The case establishing it? Lavabit printing out their server TLS keys in small font. That's not even such a big deal, because OCR could still be used trivially if the opponents weren't tech-illiterate. Depending on the type of key, you could probably even detect OCR errors quickly by checking for primality or group-compatibility for the key subunits.
So that's even less technically troublesome than what you're suggesting, and it was contempt. I don't think the telecoms would get away with it, even if they did care a damn about customers. On 14/05/14 06:11, jim bell wrote: > Alright, what I meant was this: The judge ordered that the information be > provided in electronically-readable form. He meant, "not on paper", because > if it were on paper, that would be very difficult to actually USE. My idea > was to put the information onto pdf files, where if you view the pdf file, it > would look like lines of "captcha"-type data: Weird, warped characters, in > various odd colors, overlapping lines, etc. CAPTCHA - Wikipedia, the free > encyclopedia Specifically designed to NOT be computer-identifiable. The > essence of the presentation of the data would be that it wouldn't be readable > by 'computer' at all; it would have to be decoded by human > intervention...even though it was in "electronically-readable form"!! > > > CAPTCHA - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia > A CAPTCHA (an acronym for "Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell > Computers and Humans Apart") is a type of challenge-respons... > View on en.wikipedia.org Preview by Yahoo > Jim Bell > > > > > ________________________________ > From: John Young <[email protected]> > To: jim bell <[email protected]>; cpunks <[email protected]> > Sent: Tuesday, May 13, 2014 5:51 PM > Subject: Re: "SIGINT tradecraft…is very hands-on (li terally!)" > > > > There is a good chance the documents are covertly marked as > you suggest, the ostentatious classification markings a ruse for > untutored yokels to fancy are genuine. > > Covert markings have been in use for a long time, as well as > ostentatious markings. On paper as well as digital and other > forms of electronic. > > And certainly packets carry unique markings in a variety of > overt and covert types. > > Some of the techniques fall under the inadvertent emanations > rubric associated with Tempest -- which has blossomed well > beyond the FOIA releases from the late 1990s. TSCM is a > marvel of duplicity and ruse. > > At 08:16 PM 5/13/2014, you wrote: > > From: Black > Fox <[email protected]> >> On Tue, May 13, 2014 at 2:58 PM, coderman > <[email protected]> > wrote: >>> On Tue, May 13, 2014 at 1:00 AM, John Young > <[email protected]> > wrote: >>>>> We've seen the Greenwald book No Place to Hide, where are > the >>>>> promised gush of Snowden documents available? His > publisher >>>>> doesn't show a source. Surely not another marketing > tease. >>>> great question; let us know if you find them! >>> http://glenngreenwald.net/pdf/NoPlaceToHide-Documents-Compressed.pdf >> >> If I were the telephone company from which the records were requested, > I'd note that the records were requested in "electronic" > format. Then, I'd ask a programmer to write a program to write a > program to generate pdf files with embedded "captcha"-type > text: Images that are quite apparent to the human eye, but are very > difficult for any computer to make any sense of. All the > phone records would be there (in no particular order), and they'd all be > very readable to humans, but... >> > Jim Bell >> >> -- T: @onetruecathal, @IndieBBDNA P: +353876363185 W: http://indiebiotech.com
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