On 24/06/2014 14:15, Cathal Garvey wrote: >> So, as I told, a little bit of paranoya is good, and this "feature" >> makes me believe a little less in Keybase, unfortunatelly. The main >> idea is pretty good and I'm trying to implement this culture in >> Brazil for a long time, but I use to say that ordinary people don't >> like computers: they like Skype, Facebook, Instragam... So, people >> don't care about privacy. If the same people see that movie about >> Asange, or read his book, or see the last news about privacy and >> Google and start to learn about cryptography, they will store private >> keys with lame passwords, and we'll have this fraudulent >> cert risc. > I'm not against cloud-keys as long as they're encrypted, and I've > thought of services that make use of cloud-stored keys in the past. But > the critical ingredient to getting this right is CPU/RAM-hard key > generating functions to make "bad" passwords "barely acceptable", and > "userland" code that rejects stupid passwords entirely. > Of course, hackers will be able to circumvent > shitty-password-restrictions, but we hope that the band of people > competent enough to circumvent password quality checks yet stupid enough > to use a bad password is small. > > The problem with Keybase is that the infrastructure they're based upon, > PGP/GPG, is probably not using modern key generation algorithms by > default for symmetric encryption of keys. What do you mean by that precisely? I don't think PGP/GPG/OpenPGP is meant to encrypt private keys on servers. In what way OpenPG or GnuPG would be linked with keybase.io private key encryption scheme or algorithms choice? I don't know everything about OpenPGP standard but I'm pretty sure it doesn't deal with such things. > So, how many keys are > encrypted using key algos that are easily cracked? If they were using > hard keygen algos, then even bad-but-not-terrible passwords would be > not-entirely-trivial to crack. But keybase can't even enforce that, > because the PGP infrastructure is too legacy-laden. Again, what has PGP/GPG/OpenPGP to do with keybase.io good or bad choices (you don't seem to know anything about that either by the way :-) regarding encryption of secrets on their servers? I don't get it. > > On 24/06/14 12:57, MrBiTs wrote: >> On 06/24/2014 08:28 AM, Cathal Garvey wrote: >>> Wait, do you *have* to keep your private keys in keybase? I >>> thought it was mostly pubkey operations? >>> I'm much more skeptical if they keep private keys, that's dark >>> stuff. Imagine how many private keys are protected with terrible >>> passwords, and what damage you could do to the WOT if you could >>> just quietly crack enough keys in the WOT and use them to sign a >>> fraudulent cert? >> >> You don't HAVE to, but they give this possibility. You can (if you >> want) store your private key in Keybase. They ask you to cypher your >> private key locally and send it to Keybase's servers. If you don't >> store your private key in its databases, you are unable to use some >> online services they offer, like to sign documents. You only will be >> able to do that using his NodeJS tool. But, your point is my point. >> I believe serious security professionals or people that understand >> the importance of cryptography first don't will send the private keys >> for Keybase and, second, if they do, they will use a strong password. >> We never must forget http://xkcd.com/936/ >> >> But, we know average people uses very weak passwords and only one >> password for everything. So, as I told, a little bit of paranoya is >> good, and this "feature" makes me believe a little less in Keybase, >> unfortunatelly. The main idea is pretty good and I'm trying to >> implement this culture in Brazil for a long time, but I use to say >> that ordinary people don't like computers: they like Skype, >> Facebook, Instragam... So, people don't care about privacy. If the >> same people see that movie about Asange, or read his book, or see the >> last news about privacy and Google and start to learn about >> cryptography, they will store private keys with lame passwords, and >> we'll have this fraudulent cert risc. >> >> In my opinion, nothing will replace a good key signature party, >> anyway. >> >> Pontifex www.cryptoparty.fr
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