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Sanhedrin 059: Learning and Teaching the Seven Mitzvos of Benei Noach
Samuel Kosofsky asked:
We learned that regarding a ben noach Meesatan hee azharatan, their
execution is their warning. How are they supposed to know their mitzvos?
They were never given the Torah. They're not even allowed to learn Torah.
Some of them are logical and everyone should know them such as
retzicha/murder, geneiva/robbery and giluy arayos/adultery but some are not
as clear. Are we mechooyav to teach them?
B'kavod,
Samuel Kosofsky
----------------------------------------------
Rav Joseph Pearlman replies:
The RAMBAM (Hilchos Melachim 10:9) states that a Nochri who studies Torah
is liable to death. However, he is encouraged to study the seven Mitzvos
applicable to him (as is clear from Sanhedrin 59a).
(Indeed, even for other Mitzvos, the Rambam's view is that he is only
liable to death bi'Ydei Shamayim, but not by the Beis Din -- see KESEF
MISHNEH there to explain the Gemara in Sanhedrin 59a. Others, such as RASHI
and RAN, take it more literally and consider a Nochri's learning Torah as
theft, etc., punishable by Beis Din.)
In any event, they are supposed to learn about their own Mitzvos and are
punished "Mipnei she'Hayah Lo Lilmod v'Lo Lamad" (RAMBAM ibid. 10:1). "One
who knows that the woman is married to another man, but does not know that
adultery is forbidden but deludes himself into believing it is permitted --
and similarly killing without realizing that it is forbidden -- is
considered 'Karov l'Mezid' (culpable as reckless negligence) and is liable
to death. This is not 'Shegagah' (accidental), because he should have known
better." Ignorance of the law is no excuse.
The Rambam there holds that "Shigegas Ma'aseh" (ignorance of the facts) is
different. If one thought that the woman was in fact not married, he would
not be punished by death. Similarly, if he was guilty of accidental
homicide, Beis Din would not put him to death, although the Go'el ha'Dam
would be permitted to do so. RASHI in Makos (9a) and Sanhedrin (57a)
disagrees with this and holds that even a Shogeg is liable (see LECHEM
MISHNEH on the Rambam there, ARUCH LA'NER on these words of Rashi, and
ARUCH HA'SHULCHAN HE'ASID, Hilchos Melachim 80:1-2, the latter giving the
rationale that "Adam Mu'ad l'Olam." A human being is fully responsible for
his own behavior and cannot exculpate himself by pleading negligence or
thoughtlessness. (A case of Ones, completely accident, by force, would of
course be different.))
Asher ha'Melech on this Rambam elaborates on why one is held liable (Karov
l'Mezid) for not learning: "For it is upon every person to investigate, as
a self-understood principle and natural law, what his obligations are in
his world, even if he is not commanded as such. Therefore, one cannot claim
that 'Hashem does not come with complaints on His creations,' because He
placed in the hearts of all men the inclination and the sense of obligation
to investigate, as mentioned above. It is because of this natural
inclination to search for one's obligations that a Ben Noach is considered
an intentional transgressor...."
This indeed is the rationale for the punishment of Avimelech for taking
Sarah, and of Shechem ben Chamor for taking Dinah. See Rambam, Hilchos
Melachim 9:14: "And because of this, all of the people of Shechem were
liable to death, for Shechem sinned and they saw, they knew, and they did
not bring him to judgement."
From this Rambam and from his words in Hilchos Melachim 6:4 it seems that
there is no need for a prior hearing in Beis Din, but that a Nochri who
fails to fulfill his Noahide obligations can be disposed of summarily.
However, TOSFOS in Avodah Zarah (64b, DH Eizehu) disagrees and insists on a
proper hearing in Beis Din first. The MINCHAS CHINUCH (end of Mitzvah 35)
discusses the view of this Tosfos and of an apparently conflicting Tosfos.
In any event, it is quite clear that we cannot go around killing Nochrim
today on the grounds that we perceive them to have failed to keep the seven
Noahide laws.
They do, however, have a clear duty to learn and keep them, and they are
punishable by death if they do not, because they ought to have learned them
and ignorance is no excuse. The AVNEI NEZER (OC 345:4-5) makes it clear
that this principle of "Omer Mutar Karov l'Mezid" applies equally to
perfectly logical cases, such as those mentioned by the questioner, and to
those which are not so clear. (He quotes the examples of euthanasia which
humanists rationalize as being beneficial for the suffering patient or for
society, but which is a capital offense as far as the Torah is concerned.)
As to teaching them, logic would dictate that although in the case of the
rest of the Torah it is forbidden, as mentioned in Chagigah 13a ("Ein
Mosrin Torah la'Akum"), this would be illogical in the case of the seven
Mitzvos which they have to keep and are obliged to study. This indeed is
clear from our text in Tosfos (DH Ein) in Chagigah there (contra Hagahos
ha'Bach #40 there) and so rules RAV MOSHE FEINSTEIN zt'l (in Igros Moshe YD
III 89).
A great deal has been written on the subject of not teaching Torah to
Nochrim and why the Halachic authorities omit the above statement from
Chagigah 13a (see Maharatz Chayos there and the Teshuvah he quotes, Igros
Moshe loc. cit. and 90 at great length).
Even in the seven Mitzvos, according to Maharsha's interpretation of
Chagigah 13a which distinguishes between "Mosrin" which is forbidden and
"Melamdim" which is permitted, it would be wrong to teach the Nochri the
deepest secrets (Ta'am v'Sod), but only the basic outline. He assumes it is
obvious that we have to teach them the basics of their obligations, but not
the deeper hidden aspects. Rav Moshe Feinstein (YD III 90), however,
rejects this distinction as it clearly does not accord with Tosfos either
in Chagigah 13a or in Bava Kama 38a (DH Karu). He rules that the
distinction is not in the quality or depth of the teaching but in the
subject matter.
Incidentally, Rav Moshe also deals there with the whole question of a
Nochri who is preparing for conversion as to what Torah he should or should
not be taught.
(As to what I have written in English on this topic, I have published in
HaMeir 5750, vol. 9, #14 (issue 286), Parshas va'Era, an analysis of the
whole allied subject of "Tov she'b'Mitzriyim Harog" (and some texts have
"she'b'Goiyim"). If it is of interest, please let me know and a copy can be
posted or perhaps faxed. It is of course not directly relevant to the
questions asked here, but it is of tangential interest.)
Joseph Pearlman
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