On Tue, 1 Sep 2015, Brian Dickson wrote:

Suppose there is a domain where email addresses are case-sensitive.
(RFC822 et al permit this.)

Suppose there is a case-folded collision (two LHS addresses differ
only by case).

What happens if you want to encrypt ONLY to the correct recipient?

What is "the correct recipient" in that case? Your supposed use case
would consist of say [email protected] and [email protected] being different
people. These two people would already regularly receive each other's
email. When you tell someone your email over the phone, do you say
"brian dot peter dot dickson at gmail dot com" or do you say
"lowercase brian dot lowercase peter dot lowercase dickson at gmail dot
com"?

This simply does not happen in the real world.

So, I think the choice between a) and b) is a no-brainer: a).

I disagree. You are solving a non-existent case at the experience of
a real life case of auto-capitalization.

For example, today I logged in on "bluejeans.com" using their ios app,
and their app changed my username input of "[email protected]" to
"[email protected]". It wasn't even a dictionary word/name and it
got capitalized.

In the real world therefor, option a) is the worst choice.

Paul


Brian

On Tue, Sep 1, 2015 at 2:44 PM, Olafur Gudmundsson <[email protected]> wrote:

Dear Colleagues

We received some questions about the selection.
In the discussions on the different ways to represent the left hand sides as 
DNS names there are number of ways the three ways we have been discussing are:
a) HEX( SHA256( LHS) [:28]))  i.e. 28 left most bytes of SHA256 hash hexified
b) HEX( SHA256( str2lower(LHS))[:28]) i.e. the same as before but the email 
name is lower cased before digesting, this will help mainly email addresses 
written in Latin-1
c)  split_lables(HEX(LHS), 60))    i.e. encode the email as a HEX, there are 
two drawbacks and one advantage see below

a) and b) both are fixed length and fit in one label, c) on the other hand may 
require multiple labels
c) in theory allows server that sees query may apply rules that allow it to 
give out better answers
c) on the other hand also has privacy issues against a passive “attacker” i.e. 
one that only listens to traffic, it can w/o any work discover email addresses, 
a) and b) require work by attacker to discover the email address (reverse/guess 
the HASH()) . There was pushback due to the privacy issue.

The difference between a) and b) is the lower casing. While this may be a win 
in some cases that is unproven, as we do not know if more people will know or 
guess the LHS they want to send to.
In addition the DNS contains a simple facility to equate names i.e. CNAME.

Olafur & Warren




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