No offense taken. Constructive technical feedback remains welcome.
Quoting Eddie Kohler: | Hi Gerrit, | | Gerrit Renker wrote: | > Listen Eddie, | > | > I am not interested in your offline email. All further such email will | > be directed back to the list. | > | > Eddie Kohler wrote: | > | Glad to help! | > | E | | As you requested, this mail is being cc'd to the kernel mailing list. | | In future, every time I send you a three-word note, I will make sure to cc the | kernel mailing list. | | I deeply, deeply apologize for whatever it is I have done this time to make | you angry, although I have no idea what that could be. I hereby acknowledge | all of your many thousands of contributions to the DCCP kernel implementation. | | All hail Gerrit!!~*$716617*&!197`987(*&!(*&([EMAIL PROTECTED]&(*#&([EMAIL PROTECTED] | | Eddie | | | > | | > | | > | Gerrit Renker wrote: | > | > Hi Eddie, | > | > | > | > first of all thank you for help with this bug. | > | > | > | > You are correct, the cause is somewhere else, it was an oversight. | > | > | > | > Arnaldo, can you please ignore this patch (16g); I have withdrawn it from the online directory. | > | > | > | > Instead, | > | > | > | > * a proper bug fix with description follows; | > | > | > | > * the bug and its cause are documented on | > | > http://www.erg.abdn.ac.uk/users/gerrit/dccp/docs/seqno_bug/ | > | > (in short, the Sync did not acknowledge GSR, but rather P.seqno); | > | > | > | > * I have further implemented rate-limiting for Syncs as suggested in 7.5.4. Rate-limiting | > | > proved to be an efficient countermeasure for this bug: it broke the vicious circle of | > | > invalid-Reset => Sync => invalid Reset. This was because the second received Reset is | > | > already subject to rate-limiting; hence there is no Sync in reply; hence no further | > | > sequence-invalid Reset is triggered. | > | > I believe that rate-limiting can be of similiar help in other situations involving | > | > sequence-invalid packets. | > | > | > | > * The reason that the bug does not show with the more recent patches is that previously | > | > it was possible for a DCCP application to silently crash, be killed, terminated without | > | > its connected peer taking notice of it. Patches 17a and 17b implement an ABORT function | > | > which sends a DCCP-Reset Code 2 "Aborted" which will terminate the connection. Thus | > | > mayhem due to half-closed connections is avoided. | > | > | > | > Thanks again for pointing this out, | > | > Gerrit | > | > | > | > | > | > Quoting Eddie Kohler: | > | > | Hi Gerrit, | > | > | | > | > | I agree that the bug is scary! It would be good to fix. But this fix isn't a | > | > | good fix, especially because it makes it trivially easy to shoot down a | > | > | connection if you know the port numbers. Would you mind withdrawing the patch | > | > | until the bug reappears? | > | > | | > | > | Eddie | > | > | | > | > | | > | > | Gerrit Renker wrote: | > | > | > Eddie, | > | > | > | > | > | > I have spent half a day or so trying to reconstruct the condition which triggered this bug. | > | > | > With the new patches regarding closing state I couldn't trigger this bug anymore. Which is | > | > | > not to say that it has gone away. | > | > | > | > | > | > All I can say is that I have observed this bug as described and that it is pretty scary - | > | > | > the computer freezes for several minutes (until the server connection timer declares the | > | > | > connection as dead) and it generates a massive load of packets. | > | > | > | > | > | > I will try to follow this up when I have some more time; as indicated by the comment in | > | > | > the patch below, I am lacking the resources to implement rate-limiting for DCCP-Sync; too | > | > | > many other things to fix. | > | > | > | > | > | > Anyone else any ideas / suggestions? | > | > | > | > | > | > Gerrit | > | > | > | > | > | > | > | > | > Quoting Eddie Kohler: | > | > | > | Hi Gerrit, | > | > | > | | > | > | > | I'm surprised this kind of flood happens & think it may represent a bug in the | > | > | > | stack. What is the acknowledgement number on the Sync packet sent in step | > | > | > | (6)? It should be GSR, according to Step 6 of the pseudocode in Section 8.5. | > | > | > | If it was GSR, I would expect the following denouement: | > | > | > | | > | > | > | 5. client responds with Reset packet Code 3 with seqno=0 | > | > | > | 6. server thinks that seqno=0 is out of synch (step 6), sends Sync with | > | > | > | seqno=GSS, ackno=GSR, then increments GSS; | > | > | > | 7. client responds with Reset packet Code 3 with seqno=GSR+1 and ackno=GSS (it | > | > | > | can do this because it takes the seqno from the received packet's ackno, per | > | > | > | Section 8.3.1); | > | > | > | 8. the Reset is now in synch, so the server kills the connection. | > | > | > | | > | > | > | No flood should be possible with valid stacks; some people actually verified | > | > | > | this theoretically. | > | > | > | | > | > | > | Of course stacks can be INvalid, in which case one should rate-limit Syncs, as | > | > | > | allowed by the protocol. | > | > | > | | > | > | > | Your solution, which is to accept Resets with seqno 0, makes it trivially | > | > | > | simple for an attacker to kill any connection. It should not be committed! | > | > | > | Can we figure out why the stack has the chatter problem first? | > | > | > | | > | > | > | Eddie | > | > | > | | > | > | > | | > | > | > | Gerrit Renker wrote: | > | > | > | > [DCCP]: Protect against Reset/Sync floods due to buggy applications | > | > | > | > | > | > | > | > This patch protects against Reset/Sync floods which happens as a result | > | > | > | > of either buggy or crashing client applications. The Reset/Sync flood | > | > | > | > is triggered as follows: | > | > | > | > | > | > | > | > 1. Client establishes connection to listening server; | > | > | > | > 2. before server can write data to client, client crashes; | > | > | > | > 3. crashing client removes connection state at client host; | > | > | > | > 4. server still thinks client is alive and sends data; | > | > | > | > 5. client responds to server packet with Reset packet Code 3, | > | > | > | > "No Connection", with seqno=0 - as per RFC 4340, 8.3.1; | > | > | > | > 6. server thinks that seqno=0 is out of synch (step 6), sends Sync; | > | > | > | > 7. goto (6). | > | > | > | > | > | > | > | > The result is a drastic flood of packets: In one occasion I counted | > | > | > | > 345549 Reset/Sync packets, before the server finally killed itself. | > | > | > | > | > | > | > | > Fix: | > | > | > | > ---- | > | > | > | > Since this condition is peculiar and can be distinguished from other | > | > | > | > sequence-invalid packets, a special case has been added. The Reset | > | > | > | > is accepted if | > | > | > | > * it has Reset Code 3, "No Connection" AND | > | > | > | > * it has sequence number 0 as described in RFC 4340, 8.3.1. | > | > | > | > | > | > | > | > If both conditions are satisfied, the Reset is enqueued in the receive queue | > | > | > | > as usual, and will very soon terminate the crashed connection. | > | > | > | > | > | > | > | > Signed-off-by: Gerrit Renker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> | > | > | > | > --- | > | > | > | > net/dccp/input.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ | > | > | > | > 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+) | > | > | > | > | > | > | > | > --- a/net/dccp/input.c | > | > | > | > +++ b/net/dccp/input.c | > | > | > | > @@ -155,6 +155,22 @@ static int dccp_check_seqno(struct sock | > | > | > | > (DCCP_SKB_CB(skb)->dccpd_ack_seq != | > | > | > | > DCCP_PKT_WITHOUT_ACK_SEQ)) | > | > | > | > dp->dccps_gar = DCCP_SKB_CB(skb)->dccpd_ack_seq; | > | > | > | > + | > | > | > | > + } else if (dh->dccph_type == DCCP_PKT_RESET && | > | > | > | > + dccp_hdr_reset(skb)->dccph_reset_code == | > | > | > | > + DCCP_RESET_CODE_NO_CONNECTION && | > | > | > | > + DCCP_SKB_CB(skb)->dccpd_seq == 0) { | > | > | > | > + /* | > | > | > | > + * This happens when connection is established and client app | > | > | > | > + * crashes before server can send data. The crashing client | > | > | > | > + * removes connection state, so the server gets a Code 3 Reset | > | > | > | > + * packet with seqno 0 (RFC 4340, 8.3.1). Responding here with | > | > | > | > + * a Sync leads to a Reset-Storm which will flood the network | > | > | > | > + * until the server gives up on this connection or is killed. | > | > | > | > + * We let this case pass so that the Reset gets enqueued and | > | > | > | > + * will terminate the erratic connection. | > | > | > | > + */ | > | > | > | > + DCCP_WARN("DCCP: Peer sent RESET with seqno 0\n"); | > | > | > | > } else { | > | > | > | > DCCP_WARN("DCCP: Step 6 failed for %s packet, " | > | > | > | > "(LSWL(%llu) <= P.seqno(%llu) <= S.SWH(%llu)) and " | > | > | > | > @@ -168,6 +184,7 @@ static int dccp_check_seqno(struct sock | > | > | > | > (unsigned long long) lawl, | > | > | > | > (unsigned long long) DCCP_SKB_CB(skb)->dccpd_ack_seq, | > | > | > | > (unsigned long long) dp->dccps_awh); | > | > | > | > + /* FIXME: Rate-limit DCCP-Sync packets as per RFC 4340, 7.5.4 */ | > | > | > | > dccp_send_sync(sk, DCCP_SKB_CB(skb)->dccpd_seq, DCCP_PKT_SYNC); | > | > | > | > return -1; | > | > | > | > } | > | > | > | > - | > | > | > | > To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe dccp" in | > | > | > | > the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] | > | > | > | > More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html | > | > | > | | > | > | > | | > | > | | > | > | | > | | > | | | - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe dccp" in the body of a message to [EMAIL PROTECTED] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
