On Sat, 2009-06-13 at 16:05 +0300, Aigars Mahinovs wrote: > 2009/6/11 Aníbal Monsalve Salazar <[email protected]>: > > I was thinking about accepting only keys that don't suffer from the > > recently discovered weaknesses. > > > > What people think about that? > > If we do that, the new keys will not get signatures by people that > have not generated a new key
True. Two side-effects: 1. People are encouraged to generate a new key, which is good. 2. No effort is spent on signing old keys, which is also good. > and thus the only link between the new > and the old keys in the web of trust will be the self-signatures. Not true. Participants can use their own old and new keys to sign other participants new keys. > It > would be better IMHO if all participants (who made a new key) would > use both keys for this signing party Yes, sign with both keys is OK. > and sign all keys with both their > new and their old key thus establishing a much more interwoven web of > trust for the new keys. It is more useful to focus on getting more signatures added to the new keys, not to the old keys. > > Or in other words: you make my new shiny key get less signatures - you meany! > Not true, since the shiny new keys get lots of signatures from old and new keys. See also the part "not the other way around" on this page: http://www.debian-administration.org/users/dkg/weblog/48 Regards, Bart Martens _______________________________________________ Debconf-discuss mailing list [email protected] http://lists.debconf.org/mailman/listinfo/debconf-discuss
