On 10/05/05, Raul Miller <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > >At minimum, there must be some modified form of some of > > >the creative content of the Program in a derivative > > >work, or it's no a derivative work under copyright law. > > > > > Where did you get this idea? > > This idea pervades the copyright system. For example, 17 USC 102: > > The historic expansion of copyright has also applied to forms of expression > which, although in existence for generations or centuries, have > only gradually > come to be recognized as creative and worthy of protection. > > For example, the berne convention says, in Article 2: > > (5) Collections of literary or artistic works such as encyclopaedias and > anthologies which, by reason of the selection and arrangement of their > contents, constitute intellectual creations shall be protected as such, > without prejudice to the copyright in each of the works forming part of > such collections. > > It's very clear that what copyright is protecting is not the symbols which > comprise a document but the creative content that they represent.
This could be different in common law copyright, but the idea in authorship (droit d'auteur) is not that creativity grants protection, but originality. The question to be answered is "does the work bear the mark of the author?" The question whether or not a work has creative content in the first place is not being asked. This stems from a deeper prerequisite of copyright, i.e. that the work must be tangible. Authorshiprights indeed protects the symbols, not the creative content. It is only in its tangible form that it can receive protection, mere ideas, however creative they may be. Copyright protection only protects the expression. In continental law it is very clear that you're mistaken on this point. You are right though in a meta-legal context, the copyright given on the symbols is to ensure legal protection for creativity, but creativity in the sense of intellectual labour, not artistic creativity. Kind regards Batist
