Hello,

kitty 0.26.5-5+deb12u1 for bookworm-security is ready for review. The debdiff 
against 0.26.5-5 and the draft DLA are attached.

It brings over a handful of kitty security fixes that applies to Bookworm:

- CVE-2026-33633 and CVE-2026-33642, fixed in Trixie by DSA-6307-1, 
0.41.1-2+deb13u1.
- CVE-2026-42850, CVE-2026-42851 and CVE-2026-54055, fixed in Trixie by 
DSA-6423-1, 0.41.1-2+deb13u2.
- CVE-2025-43929, already fixed upstream in Trixie's 0.41.1-1.
- CVE-2026-72913, fixed in Sid's 0.48.2-1. Trixie doesn't have this fix yet.

DSA-6423-1 also fixed CVE-2026-54057, but Bookworm isn't affected. Details are 
below.

References:

- CVE-2025-43929
  https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2025-43929
  
https://github.com/kovidgoyal/kitty/commit/537cabca710f64b838d3b8b1dc986db596fb29d4
  
https://github.com/kovidgoyal/kitty/commit/ce5cfdd9caf44c538af800a07162e1f49bd53c35
- CVE-2026-33633
  https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-33633
  https://github.com/kovidgoyal/kitty/security/advisories/GHSA-j68c-v8x4-269g
- CVE-2026-33642
  https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-33642
  https://github.com/kovidgoyal/kitty/security/advisories/GHSA-qfgm-2c64-6x3x
- CVE-2026-42850
  https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-42850
  https://github.com/kovidgoyal/kitty/security/advisories/GHSA-p64q-59hq-5q65
- CVE-2026-42851
  https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-42851
  https://github.com/kovidgoyal/kitty/security/advisories/GHSA-w98g-hpvr-r332
- CVE-2026-54055
  https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-54055
  https://github.com/kovidgoyal/kitty/security/advisories/GHSA-q446-x7q6-vcxh
- CVE-2026-72913
  https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-72913
  https://github.com/kovidgoyal/kitty/security/advisories/GHSA-ccp2-q4v6-rw94

CVE-2026-54057 is not-affected in Bookworm because the bug is in 
color_control(), and that function first appeared in kitty 0.36.0:
https://github.com/kovidgoyal/kitty/commit/deff40df8a867a95248003b703ffede6fb8d6aa3

I've marked the CVE not-affected for Bookworm in the security tracker, citing 
that commit.

Backport notes:

- CVE-2025-43929: Upstream added a confirmation prompt for shebang scripts 
(537cabca) and for executables (ce5cfdd9). Later, ca1555d1 moved that code into 
the Go kitten. In 0.26.5, the launchers are still Python, so both prompts go 
into the Python entry points: kitty +shebang, kitty +open and the new kitty 
+confirm-and-run. The prompt uses the ask kitten.
- CVE-2026-33633 and CVE-2026-33642: These are the same graphics fixes as in 
0.41.1-2+deb13u1, one for buffer growth and one for compose offsets, moved to 
where that code lives in 0.26.5.
- CVE-2026-42850: In 0.26.5, get_ssh_data() is in kittens/ssh/main.py. The 
error text it prints now keeps only letters, digits, spaces and underscores. 
Any other run of characters becomes an underscore.
- CVE-2026-42851: A remote edit now starts the editor with no inherited 
environment and no color options, as in the Trixie patch.
- CVE-2026-54055: Received files are now opened with O_NOFOLLOW, so a symlink 
can't redirect the write.
- CVE-2026-72913: The echo command now passes a payload to the child only when 
every byte is a digit. To match, the ssh kitten's startup canary is now 32 
digits, and the tty is switched to raw mode before it's sent, so no newline is 
needed. That's the same approach as 0.48.2, and the ssh kitten starts without 
delay. get_ssh_data() still starts with a newline, as in 0.48.2. That newline 
submits any digits the echo command left on the current line.

I built the package in a Bookworm schroot. The package test suite ran 140 
tests, with 3 skipped. It covers graphics loading, file transfer, the ssh 
kitten, and shell integration. I also checked each fix before and after, 
starting from 0.26.5-5 in the archive:

- CVE-2025-43929: Before, kitty +open ran an executable with no prompt. Now it 
asks first, and pressing Enter doesn't run it.
- CVE-2026-33633: Before, a crafted image caused a heap buffer overflow under 
ASan (AddressSanitizer). Now it's rejected with EBADPNG.
- CVE-2026-33642: Before, a graphics compose with a wrapped x offset crashed 
kitty. Now it gets EINVAL (invalid argument), and kitty keeps running.
- CVE-2026-42850: Before, the ssh error text kept newlines and shell 
metacharacters from the request. Now they're replaced with underscores.
- CVE-2026-42851: Before, a remote edit kept VIMINIT and a color option. Now 
the editor starts with no inherited environment and an empty color list.
- CVE-2026-54055: Before, a symlink swapped in during the transfer was 
followed, and its target was overwritten. Now the open fails with ELOOP (too 
many symlink levels), and the target is left alone.
- CVE-2026-72913: Before, a non-digit echo payload reached the child. Now digit 
payloads go through and everything else is dropped.

After installing 0.26.5-5+deb12u1 in a Bookworm schroot, x-terminal-emulator 
points to /usr/bin/kitty, and x-terminal-emulator --version prints 0.26.5.

Here is my Salsa fork: 
https://salsa.debian.org/tsimonq2/kitty/-/tree/debian/bookworm-security

Here is the Debusine work request: 
https://debusine.debian.net/debian/developers/work-request/1631015/

Feedback is welcome. If nothing showstopping comes up, I'll upload this and 
issue the DLA on Sunday afternoon (November 22nd, 2026).

Best regards,
Simon Quigley
[email protected]
diff -Nru kitty-0.26.5/debian/changelog kitty-0.26.5/debian/changelog
--- kitty-0.26.5/debian/changelog       2023-05-12 20:46:07.000000000 -0500
+++ kitty-0.26.5/debian/changelog       2026-11-18 11:21:08.000000000 -0600
@@ -1,3 +1,21 @@
+kitty (0.26.5-5+deb12u1) bookworm-security; urgency=high
+
+  * Non-maintainer upload by the LTS Team.
+  * CVE-2025-43929: Ask before kitty +open runs a local script or
+    executable.
+  * CVE-2026-33633: Grow the graphics image buffer to fit a direct PNG
+    payload.
+  * CVE-2026-33642: Check graphics compose rectangle offsets in 64-bit
+    arithmetic.
+  * CVE-2026-42850: Sanitize ssh kitten error text before writing it to
+    the terminal.
+  * CVE-2026-42851: Clear environment variables and color options on a
+    remote edit.
+  * CVE-2026-54055: Open a received regular file with O_NOFOLLOW.
+  * CVE-2026-72913: Accept only digits from the terminal echo command.
+
+ -- Simon Quigley <[email protected]>  Wed, 18 Nov 2026 11:21:08 -0600
+
 kitty (0.26.5-5) unstable; urgency=high
 
   * Ship kitty-open.desktop as an example, instead of under
diff -Nru kitty-0.26.5/debian/patches/CVE-2025-43929-537cabca.patch 
kitty-0.26.5/debian/patches/CVE-2025-43929-537cabca.patch
--- kitty-0.26.5/debian/patches/CVE-2025-43929-537cabca.patch   1969-12-31 
18:00:00.000000000 -0600
+++ kitty-0.26.5/debian/patches/CVE-2025-43929-537cabca.patch   2026-11-17 
15:08:23.000000000 -0600
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+Origin: backport, 
https://github.com/kovidgoyal/kitty/commit/537cabca710f64b838d3b8b1dc986db596fb29d4
+Reviewed-by: Simon Quigley <[email protected]>
+Last-Update: 2026-11-17
+
+Backported to 0.26.5. This adds confirm_execution() on the Python
+shebang entry point. The following patch asks before every open.
+
+From 537cabca710f64b838d3b8b1dc986db596fb29d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kovid Goyal <[email protected]>
+Date: Sun, 7 May 2023 08:11:39 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] kitty +open: Ask for permission before executing script
+ files that are not marked as executable
+
+--- a/kitty/entry_points.py
++++ b/kitty/entry_points.py
+@@ -100,6 +100,16 @@ def edit(args: List[str]) -> None:
+     os.execv(exe, args[1:])
+ 
+ 
++def confirm_execution(path: str) -> bool:
++    from kittens.ask.main import main as ask_main
++    question = f'A program wants to run {path}. Allow this?'
++    try:
++        ans = ask_main(['ask', '--type=yesno', '--default=n', '--message', 
question])
++    except (SystemExit, Exception):
++        return False
++    return isinstance(ans, dict) and ans.get('response') == 'y'
++
++
+ def shebang(args: List[str]) -> None:
+     script_path = args[1]
+     cmd = args[2:]
+@@ -118,6 +128,8 @@ def shebang(args: List[str]) -> None:
+                 cmd = line.split(' ')
+             else:
+                 cmd = line.split(' ', maxsplit=1)
++    if not os.access(script_path, os.X_OK) and not 
confirm_execution(script_path):
++        raise SystemExit(1)
+     os.execvp(cmd[0], cmd + [script_path])
+ 
+ 
diff -Nru kitty-0.26.5/debian/patches/CVE-2025-43929-ce5cfdd9.patch 
kitty-0.26.5/debian/patches/CVE-2025-43929-ce5cfdd9.patch
--- kitty-0.26.5/debian/patches/CVE-2025-43929-ce5cfdd9.patch   1969-12-31 
18:00:00.000000000 -0600
+++ kitty-0.26.5/debian/patches/CVE-2025-43929-ce5cfdd9.patch   2026-11-17 
16:47:51.000000000 -0600
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+Origin: backport, 
https://github.com/kovidgoyal/kitty/commit/ce5cfdd9caf44c538af800a07162e1f49bd53c35
+Reviewed-by: Simon Quigley <[email protected]>
+Last-Update: 2026-11-17
+
+Backported to 0.26.5. Scripts are confirmed on every open, and an
+executable is launched through kitty +confirm-and-run. The Go kittens
+from the upstream commit are not part of this version.
+
+From ce5cfdd9caf44c538af800a07162e1f49bd53c35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kovid Goyal <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 20 Mar 2025 14:00:09 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] kitty +open: Ask for confirmation when running executables
+
+--- a/kitty/entry_points.py
++++ b/kitty/entry_points.py
+@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ def shebang(args: List[str]) -> None:
+                 cmd = line.split(' ')
+             else:
+                 cmd = line.split(' ', maxsplit=1)
+-    if not os.access(script_path, os.X_OK) and not 
confirm_execution(script_path):
++    if not confirm_execution(script_path):
+         raise SystemExit(1)
+     os.execvp(cmd[0], cmd + [script_path])
+ 
+@@ -182,8 +182,23 @@ namespaced_entry_points['launch'] = laun
+ namespaced_entry_points['open'] = open_urls
+ namespaced_entry_points['kitten'] = run_kitten
+ namespaced_entry_points['edit-config'] = edit_config_file
++
++
++def confirm_and_run(args: List[str]) -> None:
++    try:
++        path = args[1]
++    except IndexError:
++        raise SystemExit('usage: kitty +confirm-and-run program')
++    if not os.path.exists(path):
++        raise SystemExit(f'The file {path} does not exist')
++    if not confirm_execution(path):
++        raise SystemExit(1)
++    os.execv(path, [path])
++
++
+ namespaced_entry_points['shebang'] = shebang
+ namespaced_entry_points['edit'] = edit
++namespaced_entry_points['confirm-and-run'] = confirm_and_run
+ 
+ 
+ def setup_openssl_environment(ext_dir: str) -> None:
+--- a/kitty/open_actions.py
++++ b/kitty/open_actions.py
+@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ action launch --type=os-window --cwd $FI
+ # Open executable file
+ protocol file
+ mime inode/executable,application/vnd.microsoft.portable-executable
+-action launch --hold --type=os-window $FILE_PATH
++action launch --hold --type=os-window kitty +confirm-and-run $FILE_PATH
+ 
+ # Open text files without fragments in the editor
+ protocol file
diff -Nru kitty-0.26.5/debian/patches/CVE-2026-33633.patch 
kitty-0.26.5/debian/patches/CVE-2026-33633.patch
--- kitty-0.26.5/debian/patches/CVE-2026-33633.patch    1969-12-31 
18:00:00.000000000 -0600
+++ kitty-0.26.5/debian/patches/CVE-2026-33633.patch    2026-11-17 
19:52:14.000000000 -0600
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+Origin: backport, 
https://github.com/kovidgoyal/kitty/commit/48ab623f594d60dbbfb1e767d9686d380ce547fb
+Reviewed-by: Simon Quigley <[email protected]>
+Last-Update: 2026-11-17
+
+Backported to 0.26.5. The direct-transmission buffer growth in
+load_image_data() is the same check.
+
+From 48ab623f594d60dbbfb1e767d9686d380ce547fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kovid Goyal <[email protected]>
+Date: Sat, 21 Mar 2026 17:23:06 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] Graphics protocol: Fix crash when handling invalid PNG
+ image with direct transmission
+
+--- a/kitty/graphics.c
++++ b/kitty/graphics.c
+@@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ load_image_data(GraphicsManager *self, I
+         case 'd':  // direct
+             if (load_data->buf_capacity - load_data->buf_used < 
g->payload_sz) {
+                 if (load_data->buf_used + g->payload_sz > MAX_DATA_SZ || 
data_fmt != PNG) ABRT("EFBIG", "Too much data");
+-                load_data->buf_capacity = MIN(2 * load_data->buf_capacity, 
MAX_DATA_SZ);
++                load_data->buf_capacity = MAX(MIN(2 * 
load_data->buf_capacity, MAX_DATA_SZ), load_data->buf_used + g->payload_sz);
+                 load_data->buf = realloc(load_data->buf, 
load_data->buf_capacity);
+                 if (load_data->buf == NULL) {
+                     load_data->buf_capacity = 0; load_data->buf_used = 0;
diff -Nru kitty-0.26.5/debian/patches/CVE-2026-33642.patch 
kitty-0.26.5/debian/patches/CVE-2026-33642.patch
--- kitty-0.26.5/debian/patches/CVE-2026-33642.patch    1969-12-31 
18:00:00.000000000 -0600
+++ kitty-0.26.5/debian/patches/CVE-2026-33642.patch    2026-11-17 
20:41:36.000000000 -0600
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+Origin: backport, 
https://github.com/kovidgoyal/kitty/commit/e9661f0f3afb4e4dbffa509adfb3df3c9780ad34
+Reviewed-by: Simon Quigley <[email protected]>
+Last-Update: 2026-11-17
+
+Backported to 0.26.5. The compose offset check uses the same unsigned
+fields, widened to uint64_t for the bounds test.
+
+From e9661f0f3afb4e4dbffa509adfb3df3c9780ad34 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kovid Goyal <[email protected]>
+Date: Sun, 22 Mar 2026 21:49:12 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] Graphics protocol: Fix crash when handling invalid
+ offset values in graphics compose commands
+
+--- a/kitty/graphics.c
++++ b/kitty/graphics.c
+@@ -1321,9 +1321,10 @@ handle_compose_command(GraphicsManager *
+         set_command_failed_response("ENOENT", "No destination frame number %u 
exists in image id: %u\n", g->other_frame_number, img->client_id);
+         return;
+     }
+-    const unsigned int width = g->width ? g->width : img->width;
+-    const unsigned int height = g->height ? g->height : img->height;
+-    const unsigned int dest_x = g->x_offset, dest_y = g->y_offset, src_x = 
g->cell_x_offset, src_y = g->cell_y_offset;
++    // Use uint64_t to avoid overflow when testing for validity. All 
dimensions are 32bit numbers.
++    const uint64_t width = g->width ? g->width : img->width;
++    const uint64_t height = g->height ? g->height : img->height;
++    const uint64_t dest_x = g->x_offset, dest_y = g->y_offset, src_x = 
g->cell_x_offset, src_y = g->cell_y_offset;
+     if (dest_x + width > img->width || dest_y + height > img->height) {
+         set_command_failed_response("EINVAL", "The destination rectangle is 
out of bounds");
+         return;
diff -Nru kitty-0.26.5/debian/patches/CVE-2026-42850.patch 
kitty-0.26.5/debian/patches/CVE-2026-42850.patch
--- kitty-0.26.5/debian/patches/CVE-2026-42850.patch    1969-12-31 
18:00:00.000000000 -0600
+++ kitty-0.26.5/debian/patches/CVE-2026-42850.patch    2026-11-18 
08:12:47.000000000 -0600
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+Origin: backport, 
https://github.com/kovidgoyal/kitty/commit/e4144832645aa437e9cfb4914ca0a358ae74724d
+Reviewed-by: Simon Quigley <[email protected]>
+Last-Update: 2026-11-18
+
+Backported to 0.26.5. get_ssh_data() lives in kittens/ssh/main.py.
+The error text written to the terminal is sanitized the same way.
+
+From e4144832645aa437e9cfb4914ca0a358ae74724d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kovid Goyal <[email protected]>
+Date: Fri, 24 Apr 2026 17:25:00 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] Sanitize ssh kitten shm open error message when sending
+ over tty
+
+--- a/kittens/ssh/main.py
++++ b/kittens/ssh/main.py
+@@ -218,7 +218,9 @@ def get_ssh_data(msg: str, request_id: s
+                 raise ValueError(f'Incorrect request id: {rq_id!r} expecting 
the KITTY_PID-KITTY_WINDOW_ID for the current kitty window')
+         except Exception as e:
+             traceback.print_exc()
+-            yield f'{e}\n'.encode('utf-8')
++            import re
++            safe = re.sub(r'[^a-zA-Z0-9 ]+', '_', str(e))
++            yield f'{safe}\n'.encode('utf-8')
+         else:
+             yield b'OK\n'
+             ssh_opts = SSHOptions(env_data['opts'])
diff -Nru kitty-0.26.5/debian/patches/CVE-2026-42851.patch 
kitty-0.26.5/debian/patches/CVE-2026-42851.patch
--- kitty-0.26.5/debian/patches/CVE-2026-42851.patch    1969-12-31 
18:00:00.000000000 -0600
+++ kitty-0.26.5/debian/patches/CVE-2026-42851.patch    2026-11-18 
09:06:33.000000000 -0600
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+Origin: backport, 
https://github.com/kovidgoyal/kitty/commit/8bf1bd479b0e75c9010800d135c8d90690d94645
+Reviewed-by: Simon Quigley <[email protected]>
+Last-Update: 2026-11-18
+
+Backported to 0.26.5. Upstream 8bf1bd47 clears the editor
+environment. copy_env and the color list are cleared as well, as in
+the Trixie patch for this issue.
+
+From 8bf1bd479b0e75c9010800d135c8d90690d94645 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kovid Goyal <[email protected]>
+Date: Sat, 4 Apr 2026 08:42:06 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] edit-in-kitty: Ignore environment variables as some
+ editors execute code present in env vars
+
+--- a/kitty/launch.py
++++ b/kitty/launch.py
+@@ -791,6 +791,9 @@ def remote_edit(msg: str, window: Window
+             q.abort_signaled = c.abort_signaled
+         return
+     cmdline = get_editor(path_to_edit=c.file_localpath, 
line_number=c.line_number)
++    c.opts.env = []
++    c.opts.copy_env = False
++    c.opts.color = []
+     w = launch(get_boss(), c.opts, cmdline, active=window)
+     if w is not None:
+         c.source_window_id = window.id
diff -Nru kitty-0.26.5/debian/patches/CVE-2026-54055.patch 
kitty-0.26.5/debian/patches/CVE-2026-54055.patch
--- kitty-0.26.5/debian/patches/CVE-2026-54055.patch    1969-12-31 
18:00:00.000000000 -0600
+++ kitty-0.26.5/debian/patches/CVE-2026-54055.patch    2026-11-18 
09:48:19.000000000 -0600
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+Origin: backport, 
https://github.com/kovidgoyal/kitty/commit/4aa4a5c0567a92553a8c20a88a4352da637fca5d
+Reviewed-by: Simon Quigley <[email protected]>
+Last-Update: 2026-11-18
+
+Backported to 0.26.5. The regular-file open in the receive path gains
+O_NOFOLLOW.
+
+From 4aa4a5c0567a92553a8c20a88a4352da637fca5d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kovid Goyal <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2026 06:18:31 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] File transfer protocol: use O_NOFOLLOW when opening
+ regular files
+
+--- a/kitty/file_transmission.py
++++ b/kitty/file_transmission.py
+@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ class DestFile:
+                     self.actual_file = PatchFile(self.name)
+                 else:
+                     self.unlink_existing_if_needed()
+-                    flags = os.O_RDWR | os.O_CREAT | os.O_TRUNC | getattr(os, 
'O_CLOEXEC', 0) | getattr(os, 'O_BINARY', 0)
++                    flags = os.O_RDWR | os.O_CREAT | os.O_TRUNC | getattr(os, 
'O_CLOEXEC', 0) | getattr(os, 'O_BINARY', 0) | getattr(os, 'O_NOFOLLOW', 0)
+                     self.actual_file = open(os.open(self.name, flags, 
self.permissions), mode='r+b', closefd=True)
+             af = cast(Union[IO[bytes], PatchFile], self.actual_file)
+             if decompressed or is_last:
diff -Nru kitty-0.26.5/debian/patches/CVE-2026-72913.patch 
kitty-0.26.5/debian/patches/CVE-2026-72913.patch
--- kitty-0.26.5/debian/patches/CVE-2026-72913.patch    1969-12-31 
18:00:00.000000000 -0600
+++ kitty-0.26.5/debian/patches/CVE-2026-72913.patch    2026-11-18 
10:52:17.000000000 -0600
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+Origin: backport, 
https://github.com/kovidgoyal/kitty/commit/9dca948e9bec3c926ab3370f2cd10f9b9b10821f
+Reviewed-by: Simon Quigley <[email protected]>
+Last-Update: 2026-11-18
+
+Backported to 0.26.5. handle_remote_echo() receives a string. The
+decoded payload is written to the child only when every byte is a
+digit. The ssh kitten canary is digits only, and the tty is set raw,
+so that canary is echoed back without a line terminator.
+
+From 9dca948e9bec3c926ab3370f2cd10f9b9b10821f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kovid Goyal <[email protected]>
+Date: Sun, 26 Jul 2026 15:53:15 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] Restrict echo to only allow characters 0-9
+
+--- a/kitty/window.py
++++ b/kitty/window.py
+@@ -1070,6 +1070,8 @@ class Window:
+     def handle_remote_echo(self, msg: str) -> None:
+         from base64 import standard_b64decode
+         data = standard_b64decode(msg)
++        if re.fullmatch(rb'[0-9]+', data) is None:
++            return
+         self.write_to_child(data)
+ 
+     def handle_remote_ssh(self, msg: str) -> None:
+--- a/kittens/ssh/main.py
++++ b/kittens/ssh/main.py
+@@ -604,9 +604,11 @@ def drain_potential_tty_garbage(p: 'subpr
+             # discard queued input data on tty in case data transmission was
+             # interrupted due to SSH failure, avoids spewing garbage to screen
+-            from uuid import uuid4
+-            canary = uuid4().hex.encode('ascii')
++            import tty as tty_module
++            canary = ''.join(secrets.choice('0123456789') for _ in 
range(32)).encode('ascii')
+             turn_off_echo(tty.fileno())
++            with suppress(termios.error):
++                tty_module.setraw(tty.fileno(), termios.TCSANOW)
+-            tty.write(dcs_to_kitty(canary + b'\n\r', type='echo'))
++            tty.write(dcs_to_kitty(canary, type='echo'))
+             tty.flush()
+             data = b''
+             give_up_at = time.monotonic() + 2
diff -Nru kitty-0.26.5/debian/patches/series kitty-0.26.5/debian/patches/series
--- kitty-0.26.5/debian/patches/series  2023-05-12 20:46:07.000000000 -0500
+++ kitty-0.26.5/debian/patches/series  2026-11-18 10:52:17.000000000 -0600
@@ -2,3 +2,11 @@
 define-singlekey-bitfields-according-to-.patch
 try-to-fix-tests-failing-on-python-3.11.patch
 backport-test-fix-when-term-is-set-to-no.patch
+CVE-2025-43929-537cabca.patch
+CVE-2025-43929-ce5cfdd9.patch
+CVE-2026-33633.patch
+CVE-2026-33642.patch
+CVE-2026-42850.patch
+CVE-2026-42851.patch
+CVE-2026-54055.patch
+CVE-2026-72913.patch
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Debian LTS Advisory DLA-XXXX-1                [email protected]
https://www.debian.org/lts/security/                        Simon Quigley
November 22, 2026                             https://wiki.debian.org/LTS
-------------------------------------------------------------------------

Package        : kitty
Version        : 0.26.5-5+deb12u1
CVE ID         : CVE-2025-43929 CVE-2026-33633 CVE-2026-33642
                 CVE-2026-42850 CVE-2026-42851 CVE-2026-54055
                 CVE-2026-72913
Debian Bug     : 1103691 1137210 1139898

Kitty is a GPU-based terminal emulator. An attacker who can place text
in a Kitty window can crash the terminal, cause the shell inside that
window to run commands, or have Kitty run a program or overwrite a file
as the user at the keyboard.

CVE-2025-43929

    The default open actions run a local script or executable that a
    document links to, as soon as Kitty opens that link. The program
    runs as the user.

CVE-2026-33633

    The graphics protocol grows the buffer for a directly transmitted
    PNG by doubling the current allocation. A chunk larger than that
    doubled buffer is copied past the end of the allocation, and the
    terminal crashes.

CVE-2026-33642

    The graphics compose command checks rectangle offsets with 32-bit
    unsigned arithmetic. An offset that wraps past that width passes
    the check, and the frame is then read and written outside its
    buffer. The terminal crashes.

CVE-2026-42850

    An error from the ssh kitten is written back to the terminal as
    the text of the exception. Control characters in that text are
    delivered to the shell as input.

CVE-2026-42851

    A remote edit request can set the environment and the color
    options of the editor Kitty launches for that request. An editor
    that executes code from its environment runs that code as the
    user.

CVE-2026-54055

    The file transmission protocol opens a regular-file destination
    by name after it has checked that name. When the name is replaced
    by a symbolic link before the open, the write follows the link
    and changes the link target.

CVE-2026-72913

    The terminal echo command writes its decoded payload into the
    shell. The ssh data command writes a newline before it checks the
    request, which submits whatever the echo command placed at the
    prompt. The shell runs that line as the user.

For Debian 12 bookworm, these problems have been fixed in version
0.26.5-5+deb12u1.

We recommend that you upgrade your kitty packages.

For the detailed security status of kitty please refer to
its security tracker page at:
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/kitty

Further information about Debian LTS security advisories, how to apply
these updates to your system, and frequently asked questions can be
found at: https://wiki.debian.org/LTS

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