On 070613 at 10:43, Florian Weimer wrote: > > AND the fact that it needs to be a valid .deb archive, they are > > probably more than strong enough.
This is actually not much of a problem: http://www.cits.rub.de/MD5Collisions/ One example how to create two files with same hash that act differently. Should work with most active content. Kaminsky did the same with self-extracting executables: http://www.doxpara.com/md5_someday.pdf > That, and the "evil twin" package would have to be prepared by the > securty team as well, which isn't a relevant scenario (because they > could put a backdoor in the original without attacking the hash). So apt-get signatures use a secure hash function? With the above results, it would be possible to officially distribute nice behaving software but present specific targets with modified packages that do evil. Workaround would be to check two hashes(md5,sha1) or an XOR of them. /pepe -- # (o_ # +49/1781384223 //\-x gpg --recv-key A04D7875 V_/_ Use the source, Tux! mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
