On Tue, May 13, 2008 at 11:39:54PM -0300, Henrique de Moraes Holschuh wrote: > On Wed, 14 May 2008, Nick Boyce wrote: > > This is the best explanation I've seen so far : > > http://it.slashdot.org/comments.pl?sid=551636&cid=23392602 > > > > I have no idea if it's correct, but it sounds very plausible. > > It is incorrect. Close, but incorrect. > > > If there was any mistake it may have been to try too hard to get a > > warning-free run from valgrind. > > Especially when dealing with a badly signaled landmine zone like OpenSSL... > > > As the /. post says, "Hats off to the reviewer who picked up on the > > problem". > > Indeed. Running millions of machines on what basically is a small set > of keys (in other words, brute-forceable) is no joke. We will be > feeling the repercusions of this one for a few years. > > It is probably worth a lot of effort to fully map the entire set of keys > the broken openssl could generate, and find a very fast way to check if > a key belong to that set. And add that to openssl upstream (to > automatically fail any verification done using such keys). >
So, just so I understand the possible issue here. The key generated with
the bad openssl library come from a smaller set of possible keys and a
brute force attack would take a lot less time than key generated from a
non broken openssl library ?
is that right ?
or is it that the keys generated from the bad openssl library can be
worked out (ie given the public you could compute the private)
Thanks
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> Henrique Holschuh
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