hi pasquale thanks for the feedback
https://groups.google.com/g/d12rg/c/71AixTjBiog

On Tuesday, November 17, 2026, Pasquale Kaboth <[email protected]>
wrote:

> .
>
> *1. Backward-linked Release provenance*
>
> .
>
> This creates a backward-verifiable release history without requiring
> modifications to the existing Debian Release formats.
>
we just added a proposed set of tags, for solving
the external genesis / provenance problem, there's
a debian enhancement protocol DEP for this
scenario: i don't have a problem with following it
through


*2. Protection against conflicting but validly signed histories*
>
> This is a particularly important point.
>
> Our counter-tests demonstrated that two isolated recipients can accept
> different release histories even when both are cryptographically correctly
> signed.
>
> A hash chain alone does not prevent this type of split-view attack.
>
mmmm it's not an "attack" per se.
iirc, rolling releases such
as debian/experimental then become debian/unstable
automatically after 2 weeks, then debian/testing
you get the idea.

(much more crucial is ISP transparent cacheing
proxies screwing around in ways that no amount
of apt/dpkg config fixes will solve - more on that
below)


when you have Reproducible builds you *want*
a stake-in-the-ground Release, otherwise how are
you going to report a *reproducible* build bug
against a moving *non-reproducible* target??

if the user who reported the bug has the packages
they used still installed then the peer-network
allows the Maintainer to grab a snapshot of
the reproducible-build packages *from the
reporter's* system even when the public mirrors
have long since moved on.


also look up devuan (and the angband.pl no-systemd repositories: with that
now offline
i have to recompile several key packages after
modifying debian/rules and debian/control to
100% remove libsystemd - xserver-xorg-core being
the primary but also cups and others. complete
pain but pottering's behaviour was so alarming to
me, i cannot *personally* trust anything he's been
involved in: others are free to make their own
assessments)

devuan is particularly interesting as they have
a transparent proxy that replaces *some* packages
and lets others "fall through" to debian stable,
it's quite sophisticated and saves them a hell
of a lot of mirror hosting costs for such a small
team.

also it's common practice to add your own repo
to /etc/apt/sources.list[.d] or a local apt-mirror
to act as a cache, etc etc

and then there's canonical who forked the whole
damn debian project, with too small a team to
cope with that, resulting in incompatible forks
of packages with radically different *binary* level
dependencies and you could add and mix debian
and ubuntu /etc/apt/sources.list entries and get
into a dreadful mess... all they had to do was
provide a *small* repo with enhancements... sigh
i'll shut up now on this one 😁

I would therefore introduce independent witnesses that exchange signed
> checkpoints from an append-only transparency log and verify their
> consistency.
>
> Clients would retain their last accepted checkpoint and require a valid
> consistency proof before accepting subsequent updates. Conflicting
> checkpoints could then be detected through gossip.
>
you may not be aware that debian packages are
required to be lexicographically increasing in
revision (makes pinning very powerful), and an
even more sophisticated set of
"compatibility-with-other-packages" rules.

this is *downstream* of the top-level "Release"
file.

any upgrades, *even* when you accidentally
do "apt-get dist-upgrade" on debian/unstable,
which i've accidentally done in the past,
should always always work. [for a given definition
of "always"...]



one thing that has royally effed up use of
debian/testing for me in the past is ISP transparent
proxies! there's almost nothing you can do about
that with the possible exception of routing use
of apt over a goddamn TOR session.

no amount of dpkg or apt configuration solves
ISPs doing transparent proxies, particularly ones
from Chinese ISPs written in perl (.pl) when one
of your /etc/apt/sources.list entries is angband.pl
and the ISP's scripts expose their private network
infrastructure IP addresses due to their fuckup
on gratuitous regexp matches firing http redirects
directly onto their *internal* proxy servers. that
was fun to watch the broadband ISP callout
engineer try to diagnose. twice.

A configurable witness quorum could provide an additional acceptance
> condition for new checkpoints.
>
> *3. Decentralised trust management*
>
> The actual data distribution could remain entirely peer-to-peer, using Git
> bundles, BitTorrent, a Kademlia DHT, or other P2P transports.
>
the current candidates are a local mirror
service which is then libp2p enabled. however
C.A.T also found a particularly intriguing and
very small apt transport plugin that directly
uses ipfs. only about... 300 lines of code.

Trust decisions would remain independent of the transport mechanism.
>
yes. that's in the WOT requirements.

and the really hard-to-grasp part for people
unfamiliar with debian: the transport has *zero*
trust associated with it.

zero. period.

Each user could decide which repository keys, release authorities, and
> witnesses they trust.
>
correct.

> Key rotations should be documented as explicitly authorised and signed
> transitions. Threshold signatures would also be useful for particularly
> critical changes.
>
there's debian-keyring and debian-archive-keyring
they serve different purposes, look them up.


> However, a new participant would still require an independently
> authenticated initial trust anchor. The DHT alone cannot provide that.
>
correct. also listed in the requirements.

bootstrap-hex0 makes it small enough that you
could verify the first boot/compile by hand.

will continue tomorrow, lots to cover.

l.

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