On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 09:31:13AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: > On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:54:32AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: > > > > > > > However, with the 3:1 supermajority which affects A, you get: > > > > > > > 10 : 0 B:C > > > > > > > 3 1/3: 0 A:B > > > > > > > 3 1/3: 0 A:C > > > > > > > B wins.
This summary is completely wrong for any Condorcet scheme. A dominates B (by a reduced margin of 3.3 to 0 rather than 10 to 0) A dominates C (also by a reduced margin) B dominates C (by its original margin) A thus wins by dominating all others. Whatever you're using to declare B the winner above, it's not a Condorcet method. The rest of your message, and the conclusion that Condorced+Supermajority isn't possible is thus invalid. Cheers, aj -- Anthony Towns <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> <http://azure.humbug.org.au/~aj/> I don't speak for anyone save myself. GPG signed mail preferred. ``Thanks to all avid pokers out there'' -- linux.conf.au, 17-20 January 2001
