On Tue, May 27, 2003 at 06:31:22PM -0400, Nathanael Nerode wrote: > Here's a generalized example: > > * Q-1 (or fewer) of the voters vote C as the only acceptable option: > C = 1 > D = 2 <default> > A = 3 > B = 3 > * Slightly less than one-half of the remaining voters vote like you. > * Slightly more than one-half of the remaining voters vote: > A = 4; > B = 1; > C = 2; > D = 2; <default> > * (There are no other vote patterns) > > (For those interested in the details, the "slightly"s above require that > the margin of victory of B over A is smaller than the number of pro-C > voters, so a margin of less than Q-1.) > > Without quorum, C wins. (There is a majority preferring it to each > other option; a different majority in each case, admittedly.) > With quorum, C is thrown out and B wins.
> If this is generally considered desirable, under your interpretation of > ranking something equal to the default (and it may well be), then there > is no problem at all with your proposal. Hmm... Did you forget about the majority requirement? Unless the camp voting for B represents a majority of the voters, the vote defaults. [I think some of this discussion has confused the quorum requirements and the majority requirement.] Thanks, -- Raul
