> On Tue, May 27, 2003 at 06:31:22PM -0400, Nathanael Nerode wrote: > > * Q-1 (or fewer) of the voters vote C as the only acceptable option: [see below] > > * Slightly less than one-half of the remaining voters vote [ A=1, B=4, C= 2, D=2]
> > * Slightly more than one-half of the remaining voters vote: > > A = 4; > > B = 1; > > C = 2; > > D = 2; <default> > > * (There are no other vote patterns) > > > > (For those interested in the details, the "slightly"s above require that > > the margin of victory of B over A is smaller than the number of pro-C > > voters, so a margin of less than Q-1.) ... On Fri, May 30, 2003 at 11:01:58AM -0400, Nathanael Nerode wrote: > Thank you. I need to change my example so that some of the C voters vote: > C = 1 > D = 2 <default> > A = 2 > B = 2 > > (Just enough need to change to prevent the D-better-than-B voters from > outnumbering the B-better-than-D voters. Note that the D=B voters are > not counted either way for the majority requirement.) Ok, here you have the voters divided up into roughly four camps: [0] The vast majority don't think the issue is worth voting on. [1] The largest group of the remainder think B is best and oppose A [2] The next largest group think A is best and oppose B. [3] The final group consists mostly of people who think C is best and who don't care about A or B. In this situation, if the group favoring B meets quorum requirements, B wins. I think I can live with that. -- Raul
