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can hijack be changed to a "by user" base
instead of by ip (now that declude can extract auth info)
with different limits depending on
users
wouldn't that help ?
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Thursday, November 17, 2005 2:09
AM
Subject: Re: [Declude.JunkMail] OT:
another SOBERing though
Yep... except I don't believe IMail comes default
with a way to enforce any password requirements, though _javascript_ validation
could be added pretty easily to webmail.
If 1000 accounts are used to send 1000 messages
each, the spammer still gets a million out, though, for that matter, if
they sent 10 through 100,000 hacked accounts would we ever notice?
Maybe we wouldn't even care from an outgoing perspective, just in dealing
with the spam on the receiving end.
But you're right, defined limits with monitoring
and notifications.
Darin.
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Wednesday, November 16, 2005 8:52 PM
Subject: Re: [Declude.JunkMail] OT: another SOBERing
though
Darin,
I would pretty much skip over #1 except for some
obvious things like not allowing the username to be the password, and having a
minimum length of 4 or more characters. I think that hackers of this
type can get the passwords pretty much no matter how hard they are to unencode
in brute force fashion (which is what strong passwords are designed
for). Companies like IMail need to also stop using default passwords
because they represent a significant vulnerability.
As far as #2 goes,
this is definitely what needs to be done. Just like port 587 support is
now becoming common among mail servers, abuse detection (volume monitoring)
will also likely become common within the next two to three years. For
the time being though, even services like Yahoo and Hotmail which are commonly
abused, lack sufficient mechanisms to detect hacked and abused accounts.
Once you limit the number of messages that a single account can sent to less
than 1,000 a day, they are next to useless for a spammer due to the volume
that they require. Even if you aren't worried about your AUTH being
hacked there is plenty of reason for concern among ISP's since it is not that
uncommon for a customer to just assume that they can bulk mail from your
server.
Matt
Darin Cox wrote:
So the upshot of this is we need to
1. Figure out a way to enforce strong passwords
for mail users
and
2. Monitor traffic for individual user accounts
on an intra-day basis, perhaps even have a means of detecting sharp
increases in traffic from a particular account and alerting an admin to
investigate. We do review a daily report the following morning of
traffic by domain, but don't have anything in place to monitor by
account, or to alert on an intra-day basis.
Something to look into...
Darin.
-----
Original Message -----
Sent: Wednesday, November 16, 2005 6:18 PM
Subject: Re: [Declude.JunkMail] OT: another SOBERing
though
Hmm, who would have thunk?
Subject: Re: [Declude.JunkMail] SPF Success
Date 12/24/2004
9:24 AM
http://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg22584.html
IMO,
the best way to stop forging is to stop zombie spammers. The way to
do this is FIRST implement port 587 as AUTH-only, and then widely block
port 25. This means that mail clients would exclusively use AUTH on
private networks and connect to their mail server on port 587 where only
AUTHed connections would be allowed. Then only servers would share
non-AUTH E-mail on port 25. The only reason why blocking port 25 is
not very common currently is because it is severely limiting to customers
and would cause support issues for the ISP. If you first did the
migration to port 587 AUTH-only connections, which would take several
years to accomplish in good order, ISP's could move forward with port 25
blocking and cause many fewer issues as far as support and their clients
were concerned.
Basically what I am saying is that forging isn't
the issue, it's spam zombies, and to go after it as a forging issue is to
miss the point. The big caveat here is that spammers will turn to
hacking AUTH in much larger numbers, and E-mail server software should
also widely implement a 'hijack' detection mechanism in order to help stem
the abuse. I have already noted much more hacking going on, first
with Earthlink's properties, and now with Prodigy as well. I have
little faith that these things will happen in the proper order or with the
expedience necessary unfortunately, especially because of what I consider
to be a distraction focused on forging coming from the likes of SPF,
Microsoft and Yahoo. I feel that the big players are missing the
point, and they are the ones that heavily influence E-mail client and
server software which is where the changes first need to be
implemented.
Subject: Re: [Declude.JunkMail] Question on SPF
Setup. Was under You **May** etc **May** etc
Date 6/30/2004 12:33
PM
http://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg19684.html
What
I do think would work much better in the near term would be for every mail
server to support and require SMTP AUTH through port 587 as proposed, and
then have every ISP out there block port 25 which would be used
exclusively for non-AUTH'ed E-mail between systems. That would cut
the zombie problem down dramatically without interrupting service, but
this will probably take 5 years or more to widely implement. I think
this would have a much larger effect than SPF in terms of blocking forging
E-mail, the majority of which comes from PC's attached to these
residential ISP's presently. AUTH hacking, or even server hacking
however will become much more predominant when the bar is raised in this
manner, but there should be many fewer machines to
track.
While this is certainly a bit of me patting
myself on my back, it is also a reminder to all that the worst is yet to
come and for the most part people are totally unprepared for this sort of
thing. So what's next? Maybe Geocities spam sent through hacked
Yahoo accounts??? Oh wait, that's already
happening.
Matt
Colbeck, Andrew wrote:
So, we've seen the recent SOBER variants used their own SMTP engine to
propagate as well as a predefined list of usernames and passwords at
ISPs to send themselves.
We've also seen that keeping viruses and spam out of our mailboxes is
easier when we can identify the sender as a zombie, and that it is
harder when the junk is coming from a valid ISP and/or user at an ISP.
http://www.viruslist.com/en/weblog?done=vlpolls_resp155596558
Well, Kaspersky is reporting that the latest SOBER is also stealing (at
least) Outlook usernames and passwords from infectees.
Therefore, we can reasonably expect more junk coming from AUTH'ed
senders.
Andrew.
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