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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2109?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=12559046#action_12559046
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John H. Embretsen commented on DERBY-2109:
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Dan commented:
> With the class DatabasePrincipal, a user name of "*" corresponds to all
> users. Is this use of * come from any existing practice? In SQL authorization
> the identifier PUBLIC is used to represent all users. Would it make more
> sense to use the SQL practice here?
At first glance I found it intuitive that the wildcard for "all principal
names" is "*", since a number of Permissions in a Java Security Policy file
already accept * as a wildcard (e.g. for host names, property names, file
paths, etc.). I don't know much about existing practice with regards to
principal wildcards, but I found this [1]:
"The principal_class_name may be set to the wildcard value, *, which allows it
to match any Principal class. In addition, the principal_name may also be set
to the wildcard value, *, allowing it to match any Principal name. When setting
the principal_class_name or principal_name to *, do not surround the * with
quotes. Also, if you specify a wildcard principal class, you must also specify
a wildcard principal name."
[1]:
http://download.java.net/jdk7/docs/technotes/guides/security/PolicyFiles.html#FileSyntax
So, I tried using a customized policy file with the latest patch, and from what
I could see, using
grant principal org.apache.derby.authentication.DatabasePrincipal * {
is, from a user's perspective, equivalent to
grant principal org.apache.derby.authentication.DatabasePrincipal "*" {
So, even if the wildcard in our implementation is changed to "PUBLIC" or
something else, it seems that users can still use the generic wildcard * (no
quotes) to specify "all users" (correct me if I'm wrong).
Other than that, I agree with Dan's comment about the need to specify how the
various forms of user names are handled (preferably in the user documentation
as well, not only in the funcSpec). The current handling/presentation/usage of
user names in Derby is IMHO already quite confusing, if not a mess, so it would
be good not to add too many extra variables into the mix.
Finally, I would like to mention that I have done some (basic) manual
experiments using Derby with the latest patches for this issue applied, and
have found no issues so far.
> System privileges
> -----------------
>
> Key: DERBY-2109
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2109
> Project: Derby
> Issue Type: New Feature
> Components: Security
> Affects Versions: 10.3.1.4
> Reporter: Rick Hillegas
> Assignee: Martin Zaun
> Attachments: DERBY-2109-02.diff, DERBY-2109-02.stat,
> derby-2109-03-javadoc-see-tags.diff, DERBY-2109-04.diff, DERBY-2109-04.stat,
> DERBY-2109-05and06.diff, DERBY-2109-05and06.stat, DERBY-2109-07.diff,
> DERBY-2109-07.stat, DERBY-2109-08.diff, DERBY-2109-08.stat,
> DERBY-2109-08_addendum.diff, DERBY-2109-08_addendum.stat,
> SystemPrivilegesBehaviour.html, systemPrivs.html, systemPrivs.html,
> systemPrivs.html, systemPrivs.html
>
>
> Add mechanisms for controlling system-level privileges in Derby. See the
> related email discussion at
> http://article.gmane.org/gmane.comp.apache.db.derby.devel/33151.
> The 10.2 GRANT/REVOKE work was a big step forward in making Derby more
> secure in a client/server configuration. I'd like to plug more client/server
> security holes in 10.3. In particular, I'd like to focus on authorization
> issues which the ANSI spec doesn't address.
> Here are the important issues which came out of the email discussion.
> Missing privileges that are above the level of a single database:
> - Create Database
> - Shutdown all databases
> - Shutdown System
> Missing privileges specific to a particular database:
> - Shutdown that Database
> - Encrypt that database
> - Upgrade database
> - Create (in that Database) Java Plugins (currently Functions/Procedures,
> but someday Aggregates and VTIs)
> Note that 10.2 gave us GRANT/REVOKE control over the following
> database-specific issues, via granting execute privilege to system
> procedures:
> Jar Handling
> Backup Routines
> Admin Routines
> Import/Export
> Property Handling
> Check Table
> In addition, since 10.0, the privilege of connecting to a database has been
> controlled by two properties (derby.database.fullAccessUsers and
> derby.database.defaultConnectionMode) as described in the security section of
> the Developer's Guide (see
> http://db.apache.org/derby/docs/10.2/devguide/cdevcsecure865818.html).
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