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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2109?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:comment-tabpanel&focusedCommentId=12560525#action_12560525
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Daniel John Debrunner commented on DERBY-2109:
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Rick - good points with the clarification of user name & authentication id,
though for this:
> The practical consequence of this is that Edward and EdWard will authenticate
> with different credentials
I think this is a bug in the BUILTIN authentication scheme, not a design of the
authentication system. The documentation for UserAuthenticator.authenticateUser
kind of states this, but could be clearer. It applies case sensitivity to
authorization identifiers when it really means user names.
> Derby's solution to this problem is to tell the customer that they need to
> add two new users to their authentication system: "Edward" and "EdWard" so
> that Derby can disambiguate these users. This is frustrating to customers who
> want to integrate Derby applications into company-wide processes which rely
> on a single, organization-wide authentication scheme.
I think that's one solution, but not the most optimal. The best solution would
be to implement your own UserAuthenicator which translates from the user name
format to the format expected by the company wide authentication scheme.
Ideally Derby's LDAP authentication would have a builtin option (if not the
default) to do this, e.g. always authenticate against the LDAP server using
the authorization identifier.
> In this world, a DatabasePrincipal would correspond to a system-wide UserName.
and then it would make sense to rename the class to be SystemPrincipal.
> System privileges
> -----------------
>
> Key: DERBY-2109
> URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/DERBY-2109
> Project: Derby
> Issue Type: New Feature
> Components: Security
> Affects Versions: 10.3.1.4
> Reporter: Rick Hillegas
> Assignee: Martin Zaun
> Attachments: DERBY-2109-02.diff, DERBY-2109-02.stat,
> derby-2109-03-javadoc-see-tags.diff, DERBY-2109-04.diff, DERBY-2109-04.stat,
> DERBY-2109-05and06.diff, DERBY-2109-05and06.stat, DERBY-2109-07.diff,
> DERBY-2109-07.stat, DERBY-2109-08.diff, DERBY-2109-08.stat,
> DERBY-2109-08_addendum.diff, DERBY-2109-08_addendum.stat,
> SystemPrivilegesBehaviour.html, systemPrivs.html, systemPrivs.html,
> systemPrivs.html, systemPrivs.html
>
>
> Add mechanisms for controlling system-level privileges in Derby. See the
> related email discussion at
> http://article.gmane.org/gmane.comp.apache.db.derby.devel/33151.
> The 10.2 GRANT/REVOKE work was a big step forward in making Derby more
> secure in a client/server configuration. I'd like to plug more client/server
> security holes in 10.3. In particular, I'd like to focus on authorization
> issues which the ANSI spec doesn't address.
> Here are the important issues which came out of the email discussion.
> Missing privileges that are above the level of a single database:
> - Create Database
> - Shutdown all databases
> - Shutdown System
> Missing privileges specific to a particular database:
> - Shutdown that Database
> - Encrypt that database
> - Upgrade database
> - Create (in that Database) Java Plugins (currently Functions/Procedures,
> but someday Aggregates and VTIs)
> Note that 10.2 gave us GRANT/REVOKE control over the following
> database-specific issues, via granting execute privilege to system
> procedures:
> Jar Handling
> Backup Routines
> Admin Routines
> Import/Export
> Property Handling
> Check Table
> In addition, since 10.0, the privilege of connecting to a database has been
> controlled by two properties (derby.database.fullAccessUsers and
> derby.database.defaultConnectionMode) as described in the security section of
> the Developer's Guide (see
> http://db.apache.org/derby/docs/10.2/devguide/cdevcsecure865818.html).
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