Just so there is a public record, I spoke with Sid and Steve yesterday, and I am in agreement that a separate Tor profile and separate Firefox process for Tor Mode is the best way to build a Tor Mode with good usability and minimal engineering effort. It will allow us to use pref-based tracking protection features, and worry less about layering issues deep in the stack causing leaks between Tor Mode and normal browsing.
If there is a simple UI like Switchy for launching these new profile instances in a seamless way, it seems like a win. I am also in favor of standardizing the way that Firefox communicates with Tor as a privacy-preserving network layer, so that Mozilla is not locked in to Tor as the only way of providing network privacy. I think this property is important for motivating the feature set without running into concerns that Tor would be the only possible consumer of the tracking protection features we want, especially if there are still concerns about Tor's scalability and performance (even though I believe these issues are solvable). Steve Workman: > Agree with Sid - adding in settings etc. it sounds like multiple profiles > is better here. > > Mike, have you seen Switchy? > https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/switchy/?src=ss It exposes > some more profile management that might be of interest to you. What if Tor > had a similar addon that created a new profile with the correct prefs > set/unset as desired? > > On Mon, Feb 2, 2015 at 8:14 AM, <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On Sunday, February 1, 2015 at 4:34:23 PM UTC-5, Mike Perry wrote: > > > Does anyone on the Mozilla side have any strong opinions about this? The > > > recent isolation thread made me wonder if there are other new isolation > > > mechanisms that we should be leveraging too, or if we should be more > > > actively involved in future isolation and identity management > > > discussions. > > > > Could we use a separate profile for Tor Mode? It would appear like a "new > > window" but could have complete process and profile directory isolation > > from a non-Tor session. > > > > -Sid > > _______________________________________________ > > dev-privacy mailing list > > [email protected] > > https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-privacy > > > _______________________________________________ > dev-privacy mailing list > [email protected] > https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-privacy -- Mike Perry
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
_______________________________________________ dev-privacy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-privacy
