Well now based on what Frank Hecker has posted, this is really getting
interesting.  First he stalwardly defends FF.  Then he acknowledges
that much of what was reported and commented on is in fact not wrong.
And now he begs off as not being an expert.

Not ragging you, Frank.  Just pointing out the irony of an aggressive
defense that does not stand up under scrutiny.  So please lets get a
Mozilla Security expert in here.

Originally I got interested in this as a result of a post in the GRC
newsgroups.  And I was reluctant to believe that my favorite browser
came "preloaded to trust" certifs from sites that have been publishing
improperly attributed certs and ones that are pretty much unheard of.
Now I am glad I did.  This needs some additional review.  If FF lets
you "delete" an item and then puts it back...???  well certainly makes
sense and we can be sure every user will spend lots of time assuring
that the delete was deleted.

So can we get a discussion of how this relates to improving phishing.
So that the next time I go to my bank and end up at "check free", I can
beleive the cert that is the ssl from my own bank???  Sounds like the
pathway here is muddled enough so as to be way too exploitable.  So
regardles of the proceeedure that seems to be referenced as a defense
for including the listed root certs, the results are munged and users
stuck with "push".

more disappointed
oops199

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