On Wed, May 28, 2014 at 4:42 PM, Ryan Sleevi < [email protected]> wrote:
> Whether it's version 1 or 3 has no effect on path building. If the policy > does require this, it's largely for cosmetic reasons than any strong > technical reasons. > > That said, cutting a new v3 root may involve bringing the root signing key > out of storage, hoisting a signing ceremony, etc. It may not be worth the > cost. NSS could, if it wanted, create dummy certs (with invalid > signatures) that looked just like the real thing, and things 'should' just > work (mod, you know, the inevitable avalanche of bugs that crop up when I > make statements like this). > mozilla::pkix will not trust a v1 certificate as an intermediate CA, but it does accept v1 root certificates for backward compatibility with NSS and for the reasons Ryan mentioned. v1 TLS end-entity certificates do not comply with our policy because a v1 certificate cannot (according to the spec) contain a subjectAltName extension and we require all TLS end-entity certificates to contain subjectAltName. Similarly, v1 certificates cannot legally contain an OCSP responder URI which is also required (practically). Cheers, Brian _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
