On 03/23/15 22:47, Richard Barnes wrote:
> Dear dev.security.policy,
>
> It has been discovered that an intermediate CA under the CNNIC root has
> mis-issued certificates for some Google domains. Full details can be found
> in blog posts by Google [0] and Mozilla [1]. We would like to discuss what
> further action might be necessary in order to maintain the integrity of the
> Mozilla root program, and the safety of its users.
>
> There have been incidents of this character before. When ANSSI issued an
> intermediate that was used for MitM, name constraints were added to limit
> its scope to French government domains. When TurkTrust mis-issued
> intermediate certificates, they changed their procedures and then they were
> required to be re-audited in order to confirm their adherence to those
> procedures.
>
> We propose to add name constraints to the CNNIC root in NSS to minimize the
> impact of any future mis-issuance incidents. The “update procedures and
> re-audit” approach taken with TurkTrust is not suitable for this scenario.
> Because the mis-issuance was done by a customer of CNNIC, it’s not clear
> that updates to CNNIC’s procedures would address the risks that led to this
> mis-issuance. We will follow up this post soon with a specific list of
Can Mozilla consider more serious measures like also distrusting all CNNIC
certificates after a given date?
In light of CNNIC's apparent lack of monitoring or auditing of this subCA, CNNIC
should have anticipated that certs issued by this subCA would be substantially
noncompliant with the BRs and Mozilla's policy -- especially since they require
much more than domain validation. In addition, the subCA itself seems an
unambiguous violation of Mozilla's inclusion policy ("MUST disclose this
information before any such subordinate CA is allowed to issue certificates").
Mozilla should make clear that such recklessness will ultimately result in CAs
being removed from Mozilla's root program.
> proposed constraints.
>
> Please send comments to this mailing list. We would like to have a final
> plan by around 1 April.
>
> Thanks,
> --Richard
>
> [0]
> http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.com/2015/03/maintaining-digital-certificate-security.html
> [1]
> https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2015/03/23/revoking-trust-in-one-cnnic-intermediate-certificate/
>
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