On 24/03/15 02:11 PM, Charles Reiss wrote:
> On 03/23/15 22:47, Richard Barnes wrote:
>> Dear dev.security.policy,
>>
>> It has been discovered that an intermediate CA under the CNNIC root has
>> mis-issued certificates for some Google domains. Full details can be found
>> in blog posts by Google [0] and Mozilla [1]. We would like to discuss what
>> further action might be necessary in order to maintain the integrity of the
>> Mozilla root program, and the safety of its users.
>>
>> There have been incidents of this character before. When ANSSI issued an
>> intermediate that was used for MitM, name constraints were added to limit
>> its scope to French government domains. When TurkTrust mis-issued
>> intermediate certificates, they changed their procedures and then they were
>> required to be re-audited in order to confirm their adherence to those
>> procedures.
>>
>> We propose to add name constraints to the CNNIC root in NSS to minimize the
>> impact of any future mis-issuance incidents. The “update procedures and
>> re-audit” approach taken with TurkTrust is not suitable for this scenario.
>> Because the mis-issuance was done by a customer of CNNIC, it’s not clear
>> that updates to CNNIC’s procedures would address the risks that led to this
>> mis-issuance. We will follow up this post soon with a specific list of
>
> Can Mozilla consider more serious measures like also distrusting all CNNIC
> certificates after a given date?
>
> In light of CNNIC's apparent lack of monitoring or auditing of this subCA,
> CNNIC
> should have anticipated that certs issued by this subCA would be substantially
> noncompliant with the BRs and Mozilla's policy -- especially since they
> require
> much more than domain validation. In addition, the subCA itself seems an
> unambiguous violation of Mozilla's inclusion policy ("MUST disclose this
> information before any such subordinate CA is allowed to issue certificates").
> Mozilla should make clear that such recklessness will ultimately result in CAs
> being removed from Mozilla's root program.This is a great idea. CAs are not taking the policies seriously because it has been shown that there are no consequences to breaking them. The potential breakage has been the excuse in the past, but that is only a reason to continue trusting *existing* certificates. They should no longer be trusted for any new certificates and should have to re-apply once they've made *provable* changes to prevent this from happening again. Implementing Certificate Transparency would be a step towards regaining trust down the road. They need to prove that this isn't happening anymore if they expect to be trusted again.
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