On 04/12/2015 02:20, Matt Palmer wrote:
On Thu, Dec 03, 2015 at 07:32:43PM +0100, Jakob Bohm wrote:
On 03/12/2015 11:25, Gervase Markham wrote:
On 30/11/15 22:37, Jakob Bohm wrote:
1.2. Certificates that are moved from a server software implementation
that does do OCSP stapling to another that doesn't. In particular,
such cases should not lead to "certificate pinning errors" or any
similar failure modes.
You'll need to get a new cert if you have one which has must-staple in
it and you want to use it on a webserver which does not support stapling.
I wonder what the benefit is then (other than some CAs being able to force
their customers to reduce load on their OCSP servers).
Specifically: Regular stapling already provides the load and
performance benefits when used. Non-stapling would result in an OCSP
or CRL check without the change and/or without the extension, while it
would result in instant failure with the change *and* the extension.
You're assuming a world in which OCSP or CRL checks are done as a matter of
course. They're not, because they're largely worthless (OCSP is not
perfectly reliable, thus preventing hard-fail semantics, and CRLs are huge,
unwieldy, and thus rarely updated by clients). Thus, a certificate without
must-staple is able to be used by someone who has acquired the corresponding
private key *long* after it has been revoked. On the other hand, a
must-staple certificate isn't going to last past the OCSP response lifetime.
- Matt
How huge and unwieldy are CRLs really, especially if letting the
computer (NSS/Firefox) do the updating?
Enjoy
Jakob
--
Jakob Bohm, CIO, Partner, WiseMo A/S. https://www.wisemo.com
Transformervej 29, 2860 Søborg, Denmark. Direct +45 31 13 16 10
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WiseMo - Remote Service Management for PCs, Phones and Embedded
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