Well, in my particular case there´re no problem on doing tomorrow for example because our software allows to do it but as none has requested we haven´t changed. We can generate serial numbers of 16 bytes, of which 12 bytes (96 bits) are random and the other 4 bytes correspond to the issuance date
Iñigo Barreira Responsable del Área técnica [email protected] 945067705 ERNE! Baliteke mezu honen zatiren bat edo mezu osoa legez babestuta egotea. Mezua badu bere hartzailea. Okerreko helbidera heldu bada (helbidea gaizki idatzi, transmisioak huts egin) eman abisu igorleari, korreo honi erantzuna. KONTUZ! ATENCION! Este mensaje contiene informacion privilegiada o confidencial a la que solo tiene derecho a acceder el destinatario. Si usted lo recibe por error le agradeceriamos que no hiciera uso de la informacion y que se pusiese en contacto con el remitente. -----Mensaje original----- De: Ben Wilson [mailto:[email protected]] Enviado el: miércoles, 04 de mayo de 2016 16:59 Para: Barreira Iglesias, Iñigo; Peter Bowen; Matt Palmer CC: [email protected] Asunto: RE: Undisclosed CA certificates How much lead time do CAs need? Or will that depend on what the language of the ballot says? Right now, we're leaning toward requiring CSPRNG, defined as "a random number generator intended for use in cryptographic systems". -----Original Message----- From: dev-security-policy [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of "Barreira Iglesias, Iñigo" Sent: Wednesday, May 4, 2016 2:57 AM To: Peter Bowen <[email protected]>; Matt Palmer <[email protected]> Cc: [email protected] Subject: RE: Undisclosed CA certificates Yes, that´s true, there´s no RNG at all, they are sequential numbers. Once the CABF has decided what to do regarding this issue we´ll change accordingly. Iñigo Barreira Responsable del Área técnica [email protected] 945067705 ERNE! Baliteke mezu honen zatiren bat edo mezu osoa legez babestuta egotea. Mezua badu bere hartzailea. Okerreko helbidera heldu bada (helbidea gaizki idatzi, transmisioak huts egin) eman abisu igorleari, korreo honi erantzuna. KONTUZ! ATENCION! Este mensaje contiene informacion privilegiada o confidencial a la que solo tiene derecho a acceder el destinatario. Si usted lo recibe por error le agradeceriamos que no hiciera uso de la informacion y que se pusiese en contacto con el remitente. -----Mensaje original----- De: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+i-barreira=izenpe....@lists.mozilla.org] En nombre de Peter Bowen Enviado el: sábado, 30 de abril de 2016 4:50 Para: Matt Palmer CC: [email protected] Asunto: Re: Undisclosed CA certificates On Fri, Apr 29, 2016 at 7:17 PM, Matt Palmer <[email protected]> wrote: > On Fri, Apr 29, 2016 at 05:12:28PM -0700, Peter Bowen wrote: >> On Fri, Apr 29, 2016 at 5:03 PM, Matt Palmer <[email protected]> wrote: >> > Even more fun: what if the serial number is MD5(YYYYMMDDHHmmss)? >> > In that case, comparing two serial numbers makes them all *look* >> > awesomely random, until someone figures out "the secret", at which >> > point pretty much all the bits are predictable, even though there's >> > no "obvious" pattern from examining the serials themselves. >> >> What if the serial number is HMAC-MD5(SecretStaticKey, >> YYYYMMDDHHmmss)? Or AES encryption of the timestamp? >> >> This is why there are human auditors. They can ask the CA how they >> are generating the serial numbers. That is the only way that this >> can every be verified. > > Yes, that's my point. It is entirely pointless to examine the > sausages once they're sitting on the shelf. Think about it more like home inspectors. The can tell you if something is wrong but cannot guarantee it is right. https://crt.sh/?Identity=%25&iCAID=535 is an example of either the worst RNG ever or not using a RNG. I'd say that is wrong. _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
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