That's correct.

-----Original Message-----
From: Peter Bowen [mailto:[email protected]] 
Sent: Thursday, June 23, 2016 2:39 PM
To: Ben Wilson <[email protected]>
Cc: Eric Mill <[email protected]>; Kurt Roeckx <[email protected]>; Richard Barnes 
<[email protected]>; Jeremy Rowley <[email protected]>; Steve 
<[email protected]>; [email protected]; 
Kathleen Wilson <[email protected]>; Rob Stradling <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: Intermediate certificate disclosure deadline in 2 weeks

On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 11:45 AM, Ben Wilson <[email protected]> wrote:
> Another issue that  needs to be resolved involves the Federal Bridge 
> CA 2013 (“Federal Bridge”).  When a publicly trusted sub CA 
> cross-certifies the Federal Bridge, then all of the CAs cross-certified by 
> the Federal Bridge
> are trusted.   The chart (https://crt.sh/mozilla-disclosures) then captures
> all “non-publicly-trusted” sub CAs.  For instance, the following CAs 
> are now caught up in the database,  but there is no way to input them 
> (or CAs subordinate to them) into Salesforce because only the CA that 
> cross-certified the Federal Bridge has access to that  certificate 
> chain in Salesforce. In otherwords, I don’t have access to input the 
> DigiCert Federated ID CA-1 or its sub CAs.

Ben,

Correct me if I'm wrong, but the DigiCert CA you mention is part of a different 
PKI from the DigiCert public roots in Mozilla, right?  The only reason that it 
is showing in the list is because a non-DigiCert CA cross-signed the Federal 
PKI and the Federal PKI cross-signed the DigiCert CA in question, correct?

Thanks,
Peter

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