Fed Root (not trusted) signs DigiCert Fed CA (not trusted)

A third CA (trusted) signs Fed Root (now trusted)

DigiCert Fed CA all of a sudden trusted but not through DigiCert. This CA now 
shows up on the list although it wasn’t DigiCert who signed it.

 

From: Eric Mill [mailto:[email protected]] 
Sent: Thursday, June 23, 2016 2:41 PM
To: Ben Wilson <[email protected]>
Cc: Peter Bowen <[email protected]>; Kurt Roeckx <[email protected]>; Richard 
Barnes <[email protected]>; Jeremy Rowley <[email protected]>; Steve 
<[email protected]>; [email protected]; 
Kathleen Wilson <[email protected]>; Rob Stradling <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: Intermediate certificate disclosure deadline in 2 weeks

 

Peter, I think I get what you're saying about this being a different category 
of cross-sign, but could you spell out explicitly how this differs from e.g. 
the Identrust cross-sign issue that Richard linked to?

 

-- Eric

 

On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 4:39 PM, Ben Wilson <[email protected] 
<mailto:[email protected]> > wrote:

That's correct.

-----Original Message-----
From: Peter Bowen [mailto:[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> ]
Sent: Thursday, June 23, 2016 2:39 PM
To: Ben Wilson <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >
Cc: Eric Mill <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >; Kurt Roeckx 
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >; Richard Barnes <[email protected] 
<mailto:[email protected]> >; Jeremy Rowley <[email protected] 
<mailto:[email protected]> >; Steve <[email protected] 
<mailto:[email protected]> >; [email protected] 
<mailto:[email protected]> ; Kathleen Wilson 
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >; Rob Stradling 
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >
Subject: Re: Intermediate certificate disclosure deadline in 2 weeks

On Thu, Jun 23, 2016 at 11:45 AM, Ben Wilson <[email protected] 
<mailto:[email protected]> > wrote:
> Another issue that  needs to be resolved involves the Federal Bridge
> CA 2013 (“Federal Bridge”).  When a publicly trusted sub CA
> cross-certifies the Federal Bridge, then all of the CAs cross-certified by 
> the Federal Bridge
> are trusted.   The chart (https://crt.sh/mozilla-disclosures) then captures
> all “non-publicly-trusted” sub CAs.  For instance, the following CAs
> are now caught up in the database,  but there is no way to input them
> (or CAs subordinate to them) into Salesforce because only the CA that
> cross-certified the Federal Bridge has access to that  certificate
> chain in Salesforce. In otherwords, I don’t have access to input the
> DigiCert Federated ID CA-1 or its sub CAs.

Ben,

Correct me if I'm wrong, but the DigiCert CA you mention is part of a different 
PKI from the DigiCert public roots in Mozilla, right?  The only reason that it 
is showing in the list is because a non-DigiCert CA cross-signed the Federal 
PKI and the Federal PKI cross-signed the DigiCert CA in question, correct?

Thanks,
Peter





 

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