I agree that ACME alone is not the issue, so many of the criticisms I would levy against it apply equally well to other, more proprietary interfaces that the other CA's use (and I do commend ISRG for taking the open and transparent route). For that matter, are existing CA's required to undergo frequent security scans/reviews of their interfaces, both browser-based and otherwise? Do we know that their websites pass even the most basic pen-tests? As the bad guy, I hope the answer is no.

Personally I see ease and ubiquity as more appealing than the cost. It's easy and cheap to get a stolen credit card number so cost isn't much of a deterrent to the bad actor. But you'd still have get one so a free cert is an easy cert and, thus, more appealing.

(You might want to dust off your popcorn machine in case we need it.)


From: Matt Palmer
Sent: Tuesday, June 28, 2016 10:13 PM‎

On Tue, Jun 28, 2016 at 09:52:59PM -0500, Peter Kurrasch wrote:
> At issue is the degree to which automation is featured in the operating
> model of the Let's Encrypt CA. Fast, easy, cheap, and with little
> chance for human intervention or oversight...that's a recipe for abuse.

Every CA that I've ever used automates DV issuance. My DV certs always seem
to turn up within a minute or so of validating them -- no way a human is
consistently doing meaningful checks in there. ACME isn't the issue either;
most other CAs have (hideous) APIs to make requests automatic.

The only difference here between LE and every other CA is that issuance from
LE is free. While it's not a meaningful speedbump for the modern criminal,
it does at least mean they've got to find a stolen CC. Personally, I'd love
to have the popcorn concession on a discussion about whether to require
payment for DV certs; I could retire on the proceeds.

- Matt

_______________________________________________
dev-security-policy mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
_______________________________________________
dev-security-policy mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

Reply via email to