On Tue, Aug 2, 2016 at 5:11 AM, Nick Lamb <[email protected]> wrote:
> Rob, today I examined https://crt.sh/mozilla-disclosures because I was 
> interested to see if the now expired signature from Symantec's "VeriSign 
> Class 3 SSP Intermediate CA - G2" of "Federal Bridge CA 2013" had the 
> expected effect.
>
> I understand that traversing a network with known and potentially unknown 
> loops in it is tricky to do correctly, so I am not sure whether the fact that 
> a large number of "US Government" CAs are still listed as Unconstrained 
> id-kp-serverAuth Trust reflects a problem with that traversal or a real, 
> previously undetected trust relationship that I wasn't able to spot by eye.

Nick,

I believe this to be a bug in crt.sh. I have a local copy of all the
cross-certificates and the US Federal PKI and subordinate CAs from
there do not appear in the current trust graph.

Thanks,
Peter
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