On Tue, Aug 2, 2016 at 5:11 AM, Nick Lamb <[email protected]> wrote: > Rob, today I examined https://crt.sh/mozilla-disclosures because I was > interested to see if the now expired signature from Symantec's "VeriSign > Class 3 SSP Intermediate CA - G2" of "Federal Bridge CA 2013" had the > expected effect. > > I understand that traversing a network with known and potentially unknown > loops in it is tricky to do correctly, so I am not sure whether the fact that > a large number of "US Government" CAs are still listed as Unconstrained > id-kp-serverAuth Trust reflects a problem with that traversal or a real, > previously undetected trust relationship that I wasn't able to spot by eye.
Nick, I believe this to be a bug in crt.sh. I have a local copy of all the cross-certificates and the US Federal PKI and subordinate CAs from there do not appear in the current trust graph. Thanks, Peter _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

