I was just going to respond with something similar.
Appendix F:
"A CA may issue an EV Certificate with .onion in the right-most label of the
Domain Name provided
that issuance complies with the requirements set forth in this Appendix:
1. CAB Forum Tor Service Descriptor Hash extension (2.23.140.1.31) The CAB
Forum has created an
extension of the TBSCertificate for use in conveying hashes of keys related to
.onion addresses. The
Tor Service Descriptor Hash extension has the following format:
cabf-TorServiceDescriptor OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2.23.140.1.31 }
TorServiceDescriptorSyntax ::=
SEQUENCE ( 1..MAX ) of TorServiceDescriptorHash
TorServiceDescriptorHash:: = SEQUENCE {
onionURI UTF8String
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier
subjectPublicKeyHash BIT STRING
}
Where the AlgorithmIdentifier is a hashing algorithm (defined in RFC 6234)
performed over the DERencoding
of an ASN.1 SubjectPublicKey of the .onion service and SubjectPublicKeyHash is
the hash
output."The requirements don't specify what to do with this information. I know our product team interpreted this as part of the validation methods and exchange of key information, not something that was included in a certificate. We can include this information, but the guidelines are unclear what we do with this. -----Original Message----- From: dev-security-policy [mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+jeremy.rowley=digicert....@lists.mozilla.org] On Behalf Of Peter Bowen via dev-security-policy Sent: Monday, February 27, 2017 3:12 PM To: Ryan Sleevi <r...@sleevi.com> Cc: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org Subject: Re: (Possible) DigiCert EV Violation On Mon, Feb 27, 2017 at 1:41 PM, Ryan Sleevi via dev-security-policy <dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: > The EV Guidelines require certificates issued for .onion include the > cabf-TorServiceDescriptor extension, defined in the EV Guidelines, as part of > these certificates. This is required by Section 11.7.1 (1) of the EV > Guidelines, reading: "For a Certificate issued to a Domain Name with .onion > in the right-most label of the Domain Name, the CA SHALL confirm that, as of > the date the Certificate was issued, the Applicant’s control over the .onion > Domain Name in accordance with Appendix F. " I don't see anything requiring this extension to be included in certificates. (hat tip to Andrew Ayer for noticing the lack of requirement) > The intent was to prevent collisions in .onion names due to the use of a > truncated SHA-1 hash collision with distinct keys, as that would allow two > parties to respond on the hidden service address using the same key. > > Last week, a SHA-1 collision was announced. > > In examining the .onion precertificates DigiCert has logged, available at > https://crt.sh/?q=facebookcorewwwi.onion , I could not find a single one > bearing this extension, which suggests these are all misissued certificates > and violations of the EV Guidelines. > > During a past discussion of precertificates, at > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/siHOXppxE9k/0PLPVcktBAAJ > , Mozilla did not discuss whether or not it considered precertificates > misissuance, although one module peer (hi! it's me!) suggested they were. > > This interpretation seems consistent with the discussions during the WoSign > issues, as some of those certificates examined were logged precertificates. > > Have I missed something in examining these certificates? Am I correct that > they appear to be violations? > _______________________________________________ > dev-security-policy mailing list > dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org > https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
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