On 2017-03-30 23:30, Alex Gaynor via dev-security-policy wrote:
>>> 1. HTTP
>>> 2. "I explicitly asked for security and didn't get it" (HTTPS with no
>>> validation)
>>> 3. HTTPS
> 
> You're not wrong that (2) is better than (1). It's also indistinguishable
> from a downgrade attack from (3).

But so is (1) if the URI didn't come from somewhere that already
requested HTTPS. Enter HSTS, etc. Ultimately, yes, ideally we'd have had
something like HSTS levels for each trust level, plus matching URI
schemes or some other way of requesting a minimum trust level in the URI.

> If we got to do the web all over again, I think we'd make the UX for (1)
> have an interstitial, or just not exist. Unfortunately, we're paying down
> two decades of technical debt :-)

Indeed. This is something that was a day 1 design flaw in HTTPS (with
the UX as implemented). The moment you start throwing up big scary
warnings for self-signed certs and not for HTTP, you've lost, because
the people with certs aren't going to want to become susceptible to
downgrade attacks. Though browser makers have progressively made this
worse by making the warning scarier and scarier.

Ah well, we are where we are. I'm grateful I can finally nuke a couple
random personal CAs and just Let's Encrypt everything, with HSTS. With
any luck browsers will start significantly penalizing the HTTP UX and
we'll finally get on the path to ubiquitous encryption.

-- 
Hector Martin (mar...@marcan.st)
Public Key: https://mrcn.st/pub
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