Hi Doug,

Kathleen is unavailable this week, so I'll try and answer. (This might
have been better as a new top-level post, though...)

On 11/04/17 21:14, Doug Beattie wrote:
> This is my understanding: 
>
> - Under policy 2.3 a CA that is technically
> constrained with EKU set to only secure email but without name
> constraints was considered out of scope of the Mozilla Policy.

Which parts of policy 2.3 lead you to that conclusion?
https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/blob/2.3/rootstore/policy.md

2.3 does not have an explicit scope statement, something we fixed in 2.4.

Policy 2.3, Application section, bullet 9, defines rules for technically
constrained certificates, including a section giving rules for certs
issued by technically constrained email sub-CAs. How do you then see
these as out of scope?

> - Policy 2.4.1 adds a requirement that for the CA to be out of scope of
> the Mozilla policy the CA needs to have name constraints if the CA is
> capable of issuing secure email certificates.

Which parts of policy 2.4.1 lead you to that conclusion?
https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/blob/2.4.1/rootstore/policy.md

Section 1.1.2 of 2.4.1 says that sub-CAs are included in the overall
scope statement. There are two ways to be exempted - not be capable of
issuing email certificates, or be name-constrained. So I assume you are
referring to 1.1.2, bullet 2. But this says that to be exempted, you
need to be not issuing any form of rfc822Name - in other words, it's a
way of turning off email entirely using a different technical mechanism.
This bullet is not met if you have name constraints which restrict you
to particular email domains.

So I would say that an email-only sub-CA which is name-constrained to
certain domains is currently still in scope. And, indeed, section 5.3.1
is the new analogue of the old Application section, bullet 9 mentioned
above, and contains the same language governing certs issued by
technically constrained email-only sub-CAs.

Of course, this is all related to:
https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/issues/36
:-)

Gerv
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