I noticed there's an apparently valid facebook.com certificate in there (61b1526f9d75775c3d533382f36527c9.pem). This is surprising to me, that seems like it would be in CT already - so maybe I don't know what I'm doing.
Let me know if I've misunderstood something. Tavis. On Mon, Jun 19, 2017 at 12:41 PM, Tavis Ormandy <tav...@google.com> wrote: > Thanks Alex, I took a look, it looks like the check pings crt.sh - is > doing that for a large number of certificates acceptable Rob? > > I made a smaller set, the certificates that have 'SSL server: Yes' or 'Any > Purpose : Yes', there were only a few thousand that verified, so I just > checked those and found 551 not in crt.sh. > > (The *vast* majority are code signing certificates, many are individual > apple developer certificates) > > Is this useful? if not, what key usage is interesting? > > https://lock.cmpxchg8b.com/ServerOrAny.zip > > Tavis. > > On Mon, Jun 19, 2017 at 7:03 AM, Alex Gaynor <agay...@mozilla.com> wrote: > >> If you're interested in playing around with submitting them yourself, or >> checking if they're already submitted, I've got some random tools for >> working with CT: https://github.com/alex/ct-tools >> >> Specifically ct-tools check <cert1.pem, cert2.pem, ...> will get what you >> want. It's all serial, so for 8M certs you probably want to Bring Your Own >> Parallelism (I should fix this...) >> >> Alex >> >> On Mon, Jun 19, 2017 at 6:51 AM, Rob Stradling via dev-security-policy < >> dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote: >> >>> On 16/06/17 20:11, Andrew Ayer via dev-security-policy wrote: >>> >>>> On Fri, 16 Jun 2017 10:29:45 -0700 Tavis Ormandy wrote: >>>> >>> <snip> >>> >>>> Is there an easy way to check which certificates from my set you're >>>>> missing? (I'm not a PKI guy, I was collecting unusual extension OIDs >>>>> for fuzzing). >>>>> >>>>> I collected these from public sources, so can just give you my whole >>>>> set if you already have tools for importing them and don't mind >>>>> processing them, I have around ~8M (mostly leaf) certificates, the >>>>> set with isCa will be much smaller. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Please do post the whole set. I suspect there are several people on >>>> this list (including myself and Rob) who have the tools and experience >>>> to process large sets of certificates and post them to public >>>> Certificate Transparency logs (whence they will be fed into crt.sh). >>>> >>>> It would be useful to include the leaf certificates as well, to catch >>>> CAs which are engaging in bad practices such as signing non-SSL certs >>>> with SHA-1 under an intermediate that is capable of issuing SSL >>>> certificates. >>>> >>>> Thanks a bunch for this! >>>> >>> >>> +1 >>> >>> Tavis, please do post the whole set. And thanks! >>> >>> -- >>> Rob Stradling >>> Senior Research & Development Scientist >>> COMODO - Creating Trust Online >>> _______________________________________________ >>> dev-security-policy mailing list >>> dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org >>> https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy >>> >> >> > _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
