On Tuesday, 4 July 2017 02:37:36 UTC+1, Jeremy Rowley  wrote:
> [JR] Well yeah - but this one is self-signed and self-issued, so how does it
> chain?

This seems to be a source of confusion for a lot of people, several people have 
posted queries about it to Stack Overflow or its sister Q&A systems over the 
years too. It chains because the Issuer is also the Subject of a (different) 
trusted, certificate. To decide whether a certificate chains we don't need to 
look at its Subject at all, even if the Subject is itself.

The self-signed, self-issued certificate is a loop in the PKI graph. But just 
because it's a loop very much does NOT mean that it isn't connected to the rest 
of the graph, nor does it mean that client software trying to make a chain 
should give up and decide it's a root. In fact some systems (I believe 
including in the Web PKI) already rely on being able to get pst the loop if 
it's presented as an intermediate.

I'm glad that transitivity was a red herring and in fact your understanding of 
what is to be disclosed lines up with everybody else's except for this blind 
spot about self-signed certificates.

The Belgian government seems to have understood that this certificate was to be 
treated like any other trusted certificate, it was for example listed in their 
audit documents, the only oversight was that it wasn't disclosed to Mozilla via 
the common database. As I said, I believe this is a process shortcoming, and I 
grasp that you don't feel this is directly DigiCert's responsibility, but of 
course the Belgian government is not a root programme member, so DigiCert ends 
up answering for what they do here on m.d.s.policy.
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