Hello:

Thanks for pointing these out.  Regarding the two problematic certificates
noted below chained to QuoVadis:

Changes were made to our systems last year dealing these very issues, and it
appears that these remaining certificates were not revoked.  They will now
be revoked.  
Leading hyphens and reallywildcards are now rejected by our systems.

Regards, Stephen
QuoVadis


-----Original Message-----
From: dev-security-policy
[mailto:dev-security-policy-bounces+s.davidson=quovadisglobal....@lists.mozi
lla.org] On Behalf Of Charles Reiss via dev-security-policy
Sent: Wednesday, July 19, 2017 10:30 PM
To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org
Subject: Re: Certificate with invalid dnsName

On 07/19/2017 06:03 PM, Tom wrote:
> Following that discovery, I've search for odd (invalid?) DNS names.
> Here is the list of certificated I've found, it may overlap some 
> discovery already reported.
> If I'm correct, theses certificate are not revoked, not expired, and 
> probably trusted by Mozilla (crt.sh issuer are marked trusted by 
> Mozilla, but not all).

Annotating these certs:

> Starting with *:

I believe this cert is presently untrusted by Mozilla due to revocation of
all paths to the Federal PKI:
> https://crt.sh/?id=7211484    *eis.aetc.af.mil

chains to StartCom (and all of these from StartCom are minor compared to 
StartCom's other problems):
> https://crt.sh/?id=10714112    *g10.net-lab.net

chains to Baltimore CyberTrust Root (DigiCert):
> https://crt.sh/?id=48682944    *nuvolaitaliana.it

chains to StartCom:
> https://crt.sh/?id=15736178    *assets.blog.cn.net.ru
> https://crt.sh/?id=17295812    *dev02.calendar42.com
> https://crt.sh/?id=15881220    *dev.1septem.ru
> https://crt.sh/?id=15655700    *assets.blog.cn.net.ru
> https://crt.sh/?id=17792808    *quickbuild.raptorengineering.io


> 
> Starting with -:

chains to QuoVadis:
> https://crt.sh/?id=54285413    
> -d1-datacentre-12g-console-2.its.deakin.edu.au

chains to StartCom:
> https://crt.sh/?id=78248795    -1ccenter.777chao.com


> 
> Multiple *.:

chains to QuoVadis:
> https://crt.sh/?id=13299376    *.*.victoria.ac.nz

I believe this cert is presently trusted by Mozilla only via a 
technically constrained subCA:
> https://crt.sh/?id=44997156    *.*.rnd.unicredit.it

chains to Swisscom:
> https://crt.sh/?id=5982951    *.*.int.swisscom.ch


> 
> Internals TLD:

chains to Baltimore CyberTrust Root (DigiCert):
> https://crt.sh/?id=33626750    a1.verizon.test

I believe this cert is presently untrusted by Mozilla due to revocation 
of the relevant subCA:
> https://crt.sh/?id=33123653    DAC38997VPN2001A.trmk.corp

chains to Certplus (DocuSign):
> https://crt.sh/?id=42475510    naccez.us.areva.corp

I believe these presently lack an unrevoked, unexpired trust path in 
Mozilla:
> https://crt.sh/?id=10621703    collaboration.intra.airbusds.corp
> https://crt.sh/?id=48726306    zdeasaotn01.dsmain.ds.corp
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