On Sunday, 23 July 2017 20:12:18 UTC+1, Charles Reiss  wrote:
> This CA also issued a recent certificate for the unqualified dNSName 
> 'webinterfacestrong': https://crt.sh/?id=177606495

Another name that it shouldn't be possible to issue for, but this time one 
which can actually exist in local networks and therefore is put at risk by the 
existence of such bogus certificates.

>From the view on https://crt.sh/ it appears that this CA does not 
>automatically log all the certificates it issues which Mozilla will end up 
>trusting. It may have issued certificates we haven't seen yet.

DigiCert / Ben is that statement correct?

If we cannot today see the "whole iceberg" of certificates issued by this 
subCA, and we know it can and does issue problematic certificates I think it's 
a good candidate for distrust in OneCRL.
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