On Thu, Aug 10, 2017 at 5:31 PM, Jakob Bohm via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:
>
> This raises the question if CAs should be responsible for misissued
> domain names, or if they should be allowed to issue certificates to
> actually existing DNS names.
>

No. It doesn't. That's been addressed several times in the CA/Browser Forum
with other forms of 'invalid' (non-preferred name syntax) domain names,
such as those with underscores.

It's not permitted under RFC 5280, thus, CAs are responsible. Full stop.


> I don't know if the bad punycode encodings are in the 2nd level names (a
> registrar/registry responsibility, both were from 2012 or before) or in
> the 3rd level names (locally created at an unknown date).
>
> An online utility based on the older RFC349x round trips all of these.
> So if the issue is only compatibility with a newer RFC not referenced from
> the current BRs, these would probably be OK under the current BRs and
> certLint needs to accept them.
>

No, it's a newer RFC not referenced in RFC 5280, so it's not permitted
under the current BRs.

There's no retroactive immunity.
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