On Fri, Mar 23, 2018 at 6:22 PM, Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy <
[email protected]> wrote:

> I've drafted these changes:
> https://github.com/mozilla/pkipolicy/commit/e5269ff0d6ced93a6c6af65947712b
> 8e4b2e18b8
>
> On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 9:57 AM, Tim Hollebeek <[email protected]
> >
> wrote:
>
> >
> > > * Add a new bullet on IP Address validation that forbids the use of BR
> > > 3.2.2.5(4) (“any other method”) and requires disclosure of IP Address
> > > validation processes in the CA’s CP/CPS.
> >
> > This is a bit premature.  Most CA's IP validation procedures still fall
> > under
> > any other method, and the draft ballot that we've been trying to pass
> > for a year or so is not done yet (I was writing it when the Validation
> > Summit started taking over my life...)  There's a good chance we will
> > get a ballot passed on this issue this summer, but there's also a good
> > chance that work on improving the non-IP validation methods will be
> > prioritized above it.
> >
> > It might make sense, though, to require that if you use 3.2.2.4.8, you
> > cannot use 3.2.2.5(4).  That would eliminate the ability to use .5(4) to
> > validate domain names.
> >
> > My commit includes this compromise.
>
> The IP validation disclosure language is fine and would actually help
> > get a ballot passed.  I've been trying to get everyone to disclose their
> > IP validation practices and whether they issue IP certificates, but it
> > turns out that "the CABF Validation Chair is politely asking for your
> > cooperation" has some positive impact, but is mostly ignored.
> >
> > This is the new 2.2 (4) in my commit.
>
> I think disclosure and eliminating the loophole that allows IP validation
> > method risk to bleed into domain names is a good place to start.
> >
> > -Tim
>
>
I think this looks good, and paves a path for further simplification as the
IP validation methods are reformed.
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