Wayne Thayer於 2018年5月19日星期六 UTC+8上午8時13分15秒寫道： > This request is for inclusion of the Chunghwa Telecom eCA as documented in > the following bug: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1341604
> ==Bad== > * A large number of certificates have been misissued from the “Public > Certification Authority - G2” intermediate [4] (recent example: [2]). Many > of these certificates remain valid. Chunghwa Telecom has published a > response to these errors [3] in the inclusion bug. My main concern with the > response is the assertion that some of these are not SSL certificates bound > to follow the BRs because they do not contain the CAB Forum OV OID in the > certificate policies extension. This assertion contradicts section 1.1 of > Mozilla policy. > > This begins the 3-week comment period for this request [4]. > > I will greatly appreciate your thoughtful and constructive feedback on the > acceptance of this root into the Mozilla CA program. > > - Wayne > > [1] > https://crt.sh/?CAID=1770&opt=cablint,zlint,x509lint&minNotBefore=2015-01-01 > [2] https://crt.sh/?id=290793483&opt=zlint,cablint,x509lint > [3] https://bug1341604.bmoattachments.org/attachment.cgi?id=8974418 > [4] https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA/Application_Process Dear Wayne, We have already paused the issuance of this type of certificate in argue, i.e., dedicated server application software certificate. There are 10 such type of certificates that are still valid, as listed in https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/attachment.cgi?id=8983333. By the way, the certificate of 綠金石平台(https://crt.sh/?id=290793483&opt=zlint,cablint,x509lint) that Mozilla mentioned in Ref [2] of Comment 55 of https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1341604 was revoked on May 21th this year, and hence not listed in this attached file. All these 10 certificates are used by the systems owned by our company, i.e., Chunghwa Telecom Co., Ltd.. Although these 10 certificates have a SubjectAltnativeName that includes DNSName, they are never used as SSL certificates. Here are our solutions for handling these 10 certificates. 1. We plan to modify the format of this type of certificate. The new certificate format will contain an EKU that excludes anyPolicy, emailProtection and serverAuth; besides, there will be no SubjectAltName anymore. In other words, neither DNSName nor IPAddress will be included in this type of certificate. 2. We plan to notify the owners of the 10 certificates to make an application for revoking their original certificates and re-issuing a new one according to the new format. After discussing with the owners of the 10 dedicated server application software certificates, they are all willing to re-issue these certificates with the new format and revoke the old ones. However, before that we still have some work to do, such as system modification, electronic process, and so on. We plan to finish the re-issuing and revocation processes of all these 10 certificates before early July. Of course we will also report immediately if we finish that in advance. Thank you. Sincerely Yours, Li-Chun _______________________________________________ dev-security-policy mailing list [email protected] https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
