On Tue, Dec 11, 2018 at 11:34 AM Hector Martin via dev-security-policy <
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:

> I figured this presentation might be of interest to this list:
>
>
> https://i.blackhat.com/eu-18/Thu-Dec-6/eu-18-Heftrig-Off-Path-Attacks-Against-PKI.pdf
>
> It seems they found 5 (unspecified) public CAs out of 17 tested were
> vulnerable to this attack, which can be performed by an off-path attacker.
>
> The TL;DR is you can force fragmentation by spoofing ICMP fragmentation
> needed packets, and then cause the DNS answer to be split into two
> fragments, one with all the actual anti-spoofing relevant information
> (TXID, UDP source port, etc), and one with the actual DNS answer data of
> interest. Then all you have to do is guess the IPID and keep the UDP
> checksum valid, both of which are practical, and you can spoof the
> second fragment with whatever you want.
>
> Yet another reason to push for DNSSEC everywhere (and pervasive use of
> CAA records to reduce attack surface). This is scary enough I think CAs
> should be required to implement practical mitigations.
>

Is this new from the past discussion?
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/KvQc102ZTPw/iLQLKfbbAwAJ

There's also other discussions, such as
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/ydxiw3S3gSw/Q0CpD8zlBQAJ
,
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/84lxLwhaHPQ/KSsjk-JVAwAJ
,
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/2teeVLJ44RM/Yqk5GHSpCQAJ

I think we're at the stage where it's less about a call to abstract action,
and actually requires specific steps being taken, by CAs, to explore and
document solutions. Saying "push for DNSSEC" doesn't actually lead to
objective threat analysis' and their mitigations.

In this regard, Let's Encrypt seems to be the industry leader here - with
respect to
https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/validating-challenges-from-multiple-network-vantage-points/40955
and the aforementioned
https://community.letsencrypt.org/t/mitigating-dns-fragmentation-attack/74838

If other CAs are taking steps in this direction, and have public
documentation considering their analysis and design, that'd be extremely
useful to the community.
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