I am satisfied with the response to my questions. If no additional comments
are received by Tuesday, 8-January 2019, I will consider this request to
have been "resolved with a positive conclusion" as required by Mozilla
policy section 8.1.

- Wayne

On Fri, Nov 30, 2018 at 2:46 AM Pedro Fuentes via dev-security-policy <
[email protected]> wrote:

> Hi Wayne,
> thanks for your prompt reaction. I insert my comments below.
>
> El jueves, 29 de noviembre de 2018, 19:01:16 (UTC+1), Wayne Thayer
> escribió:
> > Questions for OISTE/WISeKey:
> >
> > Your plans for new audits will largely cover the requirement that OISTE
> > demonstrate compliance with the entirety of our policy. I believe that
> you
> > are asking for "approval" from Mozilla in the form of a "positive
> > conclusion" to the public discussion prior to conducting those audits -
> is
> > that correct? If so, I think that is a reasonable request. If the audits
> > uncover problems, they can be addressed via our normal processes.
>
> Yes, this is correct. We need to ensure full compliance with the Mozilla
> Program and therefore we'd process to execute the transfer plan only after
> having this approval.
>
> >
> > Section 8.1 also states: "Mozilla MUST be notified of any resulting
> changes
> > in the CA's CP or CPS." Are you able to tell us what those changes will
> be?
> > I am understanding that OISTE would like to have Mozilla's "approval"
> prior
> > to the change taking place, and thus the new CP/CPS taking effect, but I
> > think it is reasonable for us to know the specifics of what changes are
> > planned prior to ending this discussion period.
> >
>
> Indeed there will be changes in the CP/CPS. I tried to explain this in the
> above request, but I'll provide here more details.
>
> The current CPS is published by WISeKey and integrates the CP for the
> different certificate profiles issued. This CPS is already endorsed by the
> OISTE Policy Approval Authority (PAA), as explained in the first sections
> of the current CPS, because OISTE had always a role in our PKI (e.g. you
> can see in the Root Certificates the OU "OISTE Foundation Endorsed").
>
> We already wanted time ago to separate the CPS into different CP and CPS
> documents, and we'll profit this transfer process to do a full refactor of
> the policies and practices documents.
>
> The final picture we envision is:
> * OISTE will publish a set of CP documents that regulate the different
> certificate types issued by the trust model. A priori I foresee a CP for
> personal certificates, another CP for SSL certificates and another CP for
> device certificates (IoT). OISTE will play a supervisory role to grant
> permission to a subordinate CA to adopt one or more CP and issue such types
> of certificates.
> * OISTE will publish a CPS that covers the Root CAs and provides an
> "umbrella" for the whole trust model.
> * WISeKey will publish at least one CPS that regulates the operation of
> the Issuing CAs, in accordance to the OISTE CPS and the CP implemented by
> these issuing CAs
>
> Therefore a certificate subscriber will be still affected by the WISeKey
> CPS, as it is now, and our main intent will be that, in terms of
> "Certification practices", for the subscriber there won't be any practical
> change. It's just that, when evaluating our new practices, the readers will
> need to consider not only a single CPS document, but also the CP documents
> separately.
>
> I think this change will be positive, because a CPS covering different
> types of certificate policies can end up by being complex to read, as it
> needs to contain all possibilities for identity validation, certificate
> profiles, etc. for certificate profiles that can be quite different, in a
> single CPS document. I think the new documentation framework will be
> clearer and more in line of the new best practices and requirements.
>
> BTW, it happens that I'm member of the OISTE PAA, so I'll be personally
> involved in all the changes.
>
> I hope this clarifies the question, but don't hesitate to ask for more
> information.
>
> Regards,
> Pedro
> _______________________________________________
> dev-security-policy mailing list
> [email protected]
> https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy
>
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