G’day Wayne et al,

In response to your post overnight (included below), I want to assure you that 
DarkMatter’s work is solely focused on defensive cyber security, secure 
communications and digital transformation. We have never, nor will we ever, 
operate or manage non-defensive cyber activities against any nationality.

Furthermore, in the spirit of transparency, we have published all our public 
trust TLS certificates to appropriate CT log facilities (including even all our 
OV certificates) before this was even a requirement.  We have been entirely 
transparent in our operations and with our clients as we consider this a vital 
component of establishing and maintaining trust.

We have used FIPS certified HSMs as our source of randomness in creating our 
Authority certificates, so we have opened an investigation based on Corey 
Bonnell’s earlier post regarding serial numbers and will produce a 
corresponding bug report on the findings.

I trust this answers your concerns and we can continue the Root inclusion 
onboarding process.


Regards,
 

-- 

Scott Rea

On 2/23/19, 1:21 AM, "dev-security-policy on behalf of Wayne Thayer via 
dev-security-policy" <dev-security-policy-boun...@lists.mozilla.org on behalf 
of dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:

    The recent Reuters report on DarkMatter [1] has prompted numerous questions
    about their root inclusion request [2]. The questions that are being raised
    are equally applicable to their current status as a subordinate CA under
    QuoVadis (recently acquired by DigiCert [3]), so it seems appropriate to
    open up a discussion now. The purpose of this discussion is to determine if
    Mozilla should distrust DarkMatter by adding their intermediate CA
    certificates that were signed by QuoVadis to OneCRL, and in turn deny the
    pending root inclusion request.
    
    The rationale for distrust is that multiple sources [1][4][5] have provided
    credible evidence that spying activities, including use of sophisticated
    targeted surveillance tools, are a key component of DarkMatter’s business,
    and such an organization cannot and should not be trusted by Mozilla. In
    the past Mozilla has taken action against CAs found to have issued MitM
    certificates [6][7]. We are not aware of direct evidence of misused
    certificates in this case. However, the evidence does strongly suggest that
    misuse is likely to occur, if it has not already.
    
    Mozilla’s Root Store Policy [8] grants us the discretion to take actions
    based on the risk to people who use our products. Despite the lack of
    direct evidence of misissuance by DarkMatter, this may be a time when we
    should use our discretion to act in the interest of individuals who rely on
    our root store.
    
    I would greatly appreciate everyone's constructive input on this issue.
    
    - Wayne
    
    [1] https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-spying-raven/
    
    [2] https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1427262
    
    [3]
    
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/hicp7AW8sLA/KUSn20MrDgAJ
    
    [4]
    
https://www.evilsocket.net/2016/07/27/How-The-United-Arab-Emirates-Intelligence-Tried-to-Hire-me-to-Spy-on-its-People/
    
    [5]
    
https://theintercept.com/2016/10/24/darkmatter-united-arab-emirates-spies-for-hire/
    
    [6]
    
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/mozilla.dev.security.policy/czwlDNbwHXM/Fj-LUvhVQYEJ
    
    [7] https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1232689
    [8]
    
https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/security-group/certs/policy/
     

Scott Rea | Senior Vice President - Trust Services 
Tel: +971 2 417 1417 | Mob: +971 52 847 5093
scott....@darkmatter.ae

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