On Fri, 22 Mar 2019 12:50:43 -0600
Wayne Thayer via dev-security-policy
<dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org> wrote:

> I've been asked if the section 5.1.1 restrictions on SHA-1 issuance
> apply to timestamping CAs. Specifically, does Mozilla policy apply to
> the issuance of a SHA-1 CA certificate asserting only the
> timestamping EKU and chaining to a root in our program? Because this
> certificate is not in scope for our policy as defined in section 1.1,
> I do not believe that this would be a violation of the policy. And
> because the CA would be in control of the entire contents of the
> certificate, I also do not believe that this action would create an
> unacceptable risk.

It was the intent of section 5.1.1 to apply to such certificates, and
the wording in 5.1.1, which talks about "CAs" signing "SHA-1 hashes"
means that 5.1.1 applies even when the apparent signed data isn't a
certificate in scope of Mozilla policy.  This is necessary because the
problem with hash collisions is that while the data the CA thinks it's
signing might not be a certificate in scope of Mozilla policy, the hash
might collide with a certificate that *is* in scope.

Although this isn't a risk when the CA controls all the data to be signed,
5.1.1 doesn't distinguish this case.

However, 5.1.1 provides an exception if a CA needs to issue a SHA-1
intermediate certificate:

> CAs MAY sign SHA-1 hashes over intermediate certificates which chain
> up to roots in Mozilla's program only if the certificate to be signed
> is a duplicate of an existing SHA-1 intermediate certificate with the
> only changes being all of:
>
> * a new key (of the same size);
> * a new serial number (of the same length);
> * the addition of an EKU and/or a pathlen constraint to meet the
> requirements outlined above.

This is the only compliant way a CA can sign a SHA-1 intermediate that
chains up to a root that's included by Mozilla.

Regards,
Andrew
_______________________________________________
dev-security-policy mailing list
dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org
https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-security-policy

Reply via email to